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MISCELLANEOUS PIECES OF M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU.

MISCELLANEOUS

PIECES

OF

M. DE SECONDAT,

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU.

TRANSLATED

From the NEW EDITION of his Works in Quarto printed at PARIS.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Publick is here preſented with a Collection of M. *De Monteſquieu*'s ſmall Pieces, tranſlated into *Engliſh* from the laſt ſplendid and correct Edition publiſhed at *Paris*. They who have Tranſlations of his great Works, on the Spirit of Laws, on the Cauſes of the Grandeur and Declenſion of the *Romans*, with his *Perſian* Letters, by purchaſing this Volume, will have a complete Sett of all that great Man's Works in *Engliſh*.

'Tis an Object worthy of Attention, to follow ſo profound a Genius from his deepeſt Speculations to his more airy Flights and leſs finiſhed Compoſitions. In ſome of theſe little Pieces Pleaſure is the Subject, but he treats of it in ſuch a Manner as can have no Ten-

Tendency to debauch the Mind, or to corrupt the Heart. 'Twould, however, be ſuperfluous to give a Character of the Pieces here publiſhed, or of his other Works, ſince the Reader will find it, at the Beginning of this Volume, ſo judiciouſly and elegantly done by Monſieur *D'Alembert*; an Article which, 'tis hoped, will make this Collection the more valuable, as an Account of the Life and Writings of ſuch a Genius as Baron *De Monteſquieu*, wrote by ſo able a Man, and one who knew Him ſo well, as M. *D'Alembert*, cannot fail of being acceptable to thoſe who have any Curioſity, or would wiſh to be acquainted with the Hiſtory of one of the wiſeſt and beſt Men that ever appeared upon Earth.

CON-

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A N

AN

EULOGIUM

ON

Preſident Monteſquieu,

BY

MONSIEUR D'ALEMBERT.

(Inſerted in the Encyclopedia.)

THE intereſt which good citizens are pleaſed to take in the Encyclopedia, and the great number of men of letters, who conſecrate their labours to it, ſeem to permit us to regard this Work as one of the moſt proper monuments, to preſerve the grateful ſentiments of our country, and that reſpect which is due to the memory of thoſe celebrated men who have done it honour. Perſuaded, however, that M. De Monteſquieu had a title to expect other panegyriſts, and that the publick grief deſerved to be deſcribed by more eloquent pens, we would have concealed within our own breaſts our juſt concern, and reſpect for his memory; but the acknowledgment of what

we owe him we hold too dear to permit us to leave the care of it to others. While a benefactor to mankind by his writings, he alſo condeſcended to be ſo to this work, and our gratitude pretends to no more but only to trace out a few lines at the foot of his ſtatue.

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, Baron of La Brede and of Monteſquieu, late preſident *à Mortier* of the parliament of Bourdeaux, member of the French academy, of the royal academy of ſciences and Belles Lettres of Pruſſia, and of the royal ſociety of London, was born at the caſtle of La Brede, near Bourdeaux, the eighteenth of January 1689, of a noble family of Guyenne. His great great grandfather, John de Secondat, ſteward of the houſhold to Henry the ſecond King of Navarre, and afterwards to Jane daughter of that King, who married Antony of Bourbon, purchaſed the eſtate of Monteſquieu for the ſum of 10,000 livres, which this princeſs gave him by an authentic deed, as a reward for his probity and ſervices.

HENRY the third King of Navarre, afterwards Henry the fourth King of France, erected the Lands of Monteſquieu into a barony, in favour of Jacob de Secondat, ſon of John, firſt one of the gentlemen in ordinary of the bedchamber to this prince, and afterwards colonel of the regi-

regiment of Chatillon. John Gaſton de Secondat, his ſecond ſon, having married a daughter of the firſt preſident of the parliament of Bourdeaux, purchaſed the office of preſident *a Mortier* in this ſociety. He had ſeveral children, one of whom entered into the ſervice, diſtinguiſhed himſelf in it, and quitted it very early in life. This was the father of Charles de Secondat, author of the Spirit of Laws. Theſe particulars may perhaps appear miſplaced, at the beginning of the *Eloge* of a philoſopher, whoſe name ſtands ſo little in need of anceſtors; but let us not envy their memory that eclât which this name reflects upon it.

The early marks of his genius, a preſage ſometimes ſo deceitful, was not ſo in Charles de Secondat; he diſcovered very ſoon what he one day would be, and his father employed all his attention to cultivate this riſing genius, the object of his hope and of his tenderneſs. At the age of twenty, young Monteſquieu already prepared materials for the Spirit of Laws, by a well digeſted extract from thoſe immenſe volumes, which compoſe the body of the civil law: thus heretofore Newton laid in his early youth the foundation of works, which have rendered him immortal. The ſtudy of juris-prudence, however, tho' leſs dry to M. de Monteſquieu, than

to the moſt part of thoſe who apply to it, becauſe he ſtudied it as a philoſopher, was not ſufficient for the extent and activity of his genius. He inquired deeply at the ſame time, into ſubjects ſtill more important and more delicate, * and diſcuſſed them in ſilence, with that wiſdom, with that decency, and with that equity, which he has ſince diſcovered in his works.

A BROTHER of his father, preſident *a Mortier* of the parliament of Bourdeaux, an able judge and virtuous citizen, the oracle of his own ſociety and of his province, having loſt an only ſon, and wanting to preſerve in his own corps, that elevated ſpirit, which he had endeavoured to infuſe into it, left his fortune and his office to M. de Monteſquieu. He had been one of the counſellors of the parliament of Bourdeaux ſince the 24th of February 1714, and was received preſident *a Mortier* the 13th of July 1716.

SOME years after, in 1722, during the king's minority, his ſociety employed him to preſent remonſtrances upon occaſion of a new impoſt.

* It was a work in the form of letters, the purpoſe of which was to prove that the idolatry of moſt of the Pagans did not appear to deſerve eternal damnation.

Place

Placed between the throne and the people, he filled, like a reſpectful ſubject, and couragious magiſtrate, the imployment, ſo noble, and ſo little envied, of making the cries of the unfortunate reach the Sovereign: the publick miſery, repreſented with as much addreſs, as force of argument, obtained that juſtice which it demanded. This ſucceſs, 'tis true, much more unfortunately for the ſtate than for him, was of as ſhort continuance, as if it had been unjuſt. Scarce had the voice of the people ceaſed to be heard, but the impoſt, which had been ſuppreſſed, was replaced by another: but the good citizen had done his duty.

He was received the 3d of April 1716 into the academy of Bourdeaux, which was then only beginning. A taſte for muſick, and for works of pure entertainment, had at firſt aſſembled together the members who compoſed it. M. de Monteſquieu believed, with reaſon, that the riſing ardour and talents of his friends might be imployed with ſtill greater advantage in phyſical ſubjects. He was perſuaded that nature, ſo worthy of being beheld every where, found alſo in all places eyes worthy of viewing her; that, on the contrary, works of taſte, not admitting of mediocrity, and the metro-

polis, being the center of men of abilities and opportunities of improvement in this way, it was too difficult to gather together at a diſtance from it, a ſufficient number of diſtinguiſhed writers. He looked upon the ſocieties for Belles Lettres, ſo ſtrangely multiplied in our provinces, as a kind, or rather as a ſhadow of literary luxury, which is of prejudice to real opulence, without even preſenting us with the appearance of it. Luckily the Duke de la Force, by a prize which he had juſt founded at Bourdeaux, ſeconded theſe rational and juſt deſigns. It was judged that an experiment properly made would be preferable to a weak diſcourſe or a bad poem; and Bourdeaux got an academy of ſciences.

M. DE MONTESQUIEU, not at all eager to ſhew himſelf to the public, ſeemed, according to the expreſſion of a great genius, to wait for *an age ripe for writing*. It was not till 1721, that is to ſay, at 32 years of age, that he publiſhed the Perſian Letters. The *Siamois*, and the *ſerious and comic amuſements*, might have furniſhed him with the idea of it; but he excelled his model. The deſcription of oriental manners, real or ſuppoſed, of the pride and phlegm of Aſiatic love, is but the ſmalleſt

object

object of theſe letters; it only ſerves, ſo to ſpeak, as a pretence for a delicate ſatire upon our manners, and for treating of ſeveral important ſubjects, which the author went to the bottom of, while he only appeared to glance at them. In this kind of moving picture, Uſbec chiefly expoſes, with as much genteel eaſineſs as energy, whatever amongſt us moſt ſtruck his penetrating eyes; our way of treating the moſt ſilly things ſeriouſly, and of turning the moſt important into a joke; our converſations which are ſo bluſtering and ſo frivolous; our impatience even in the midſt of pleaſure itſelf; our prejudices and our actions perpetually in contradiction with our underſtandings; ſo much love of glory joined with ſo much reſpect for the idol of court favour; our courtiers ſo mean and ſo vain; our exterior politeneſs to, and our real contempt of ſtrangers, or our affected regard for them; the fantaſtickneſs of our taſtes, than which there is nothing lower, but the eagerneſs of all Europe to adopt them; our barbarous diſdain for the two moſt reſpectable occupations of a citizen, commerce and magiſtracy; our literary diſputes ſo keen and ſo uſeleſs; our rage for writing before we think, and for judging before we underſtand. To this picture, which is lively but without malice, he oppoſes,

in the apologue of the Troglodites the deſcription of a virtuous people, become wiſe by misfortunes. A piece worthy of the portico. In another place, he repreſents philoſophy, which had been a long time ſmother'd, appearing all of a ſudden, regaining, by a rapid progreſs, the time which he had loſt; penetrating even amongſt the Ruſſians at the voice of a genius which invites her; while, among other people of Europe, ſuperſtition, like a thick atmoſphere, prevents that light which ſurrounds them on all hands from reaching them. In fine, by the principles which he has eſtabliſhed concerning the nature of ancient and modern government, he preſents us with the bud of thoſe bright ideas, which have been ſince developped by the author in his great work.

These different ſubjects, deprived at preſent of the graces of novelty which they had when the Perſian Letters firſt appeared, will for ever preſerve the merit of that original character which the author has had the art to give them: A merit by ſo much the more real, that in this caſe, it proceeds alone from the genius of the writer, and not from that foreign vail with which he covered himſelf: for Uſbec acquired, during

during his abode in France, not only ſo perfect a knowledge of our morals, but even ſo ſtrong a tincture of our manners, that his ſtyle makes us often forget his country. This ſmall defect in point of probability was perhaps not without deſign and addreſs: when he was expoſing our follies and vices, he wanted without doubt alſo to do juſtice to our advantages. He was fully conſcious of the inſipidity of a direct panegyric; he has more delicately praiſed us, by ſo often aſſuming our own air to ſatyriſe us more agreeably.

NOTWITHSTANDING the ſucceſs of this work, M. de Monteſquieu did not openly declare himſelf the author of it. Perhaps he thought that by this means he would more eaſily eſcape that literary ſatire, which ſpares anonymous writings the more willingly, becauſe 'tis always the perſon and not the work which is the aim of its darts. Perhaps he was afraid of being attacked on account of the pretended contraſt of the Perſian Letters with the gravity of his office; a ſort of reproach, ſaid he, which critics never fail to make, becauſe it requires no effort of genius. But his ſecret was diſcovered, and the Public already pointed him out to the French academy. The event demon-

demonſtrated how prudent M. de Monteſquieu's ſilence had been. Uſbec expreſſes himſelf ſometimes freely enough, not concerning the fundamentals of chriſtianity, but about matters which too many people affect to confound with chriſtianity itſelf; about the ſpirit of perſecution with which ſo many chriſtians have been animated; about the temporal uſurpations of eccleſiaſtic power; about the exceſſive multiplication of monaſteries, which deprive the ſtate of ſubjects, without giving worſhippers to God; about ſome opinions which have in vain been attempted to be eſtabliſhed as principles; about our religious diſputes, always violent and always fatal. If he appears any where to touch upon more delicate queſtions, and which more nearly intereſt the chriſtian religion, his reflections weighed with juſtice, are in fact very favourable to revelation; becauſe he only ſhows how little human reaſon left to itſelf, knows concerning theſe ſubjects. In a word, among the genuine letters of M. de Monteſquieu the foreign printer had inſerted ſome by another hand: and they ought at leaſt, before the author was condemned, to have diſtinguiſhed which properly belonged to him. Without regard to theſe conſiderations, on the one hand, hatred under the name of zeal, and on the other,

other, zeal without diſcernment or underſtanding, roſe and united themſelves againſt the *Perſian letters*. Informers, a ſpecies of men dangerous and baſe, which even in a wiſe government are unfortunately ſometimes liſtened to, alarmed, by an unfaithful extract, the piety of the miniſtry. M. de Monteſquieu, by the advice of his friends, ſupported by the public voice, having offered himſelf for that place in the French academy vacant by the death of M. de Sacy, the miniſter wrote a letter to the academy that his majeſty would never agree to the election of the author of the Perſian Letters: that he had not read the book; but that perſons in whom he placed confidence had informed him of their poiſonous and dangerous tendency. M. de Monteſquieu perceived what a ſtroke ſuch an accuſation might be to his perſon, his family, and the tranquillity of his life. He neither put ſo high a price upon literary honours, either keenly to ſeek them, or to affect to diſdain them when they came in his way, nor in a word to regard the ſimple want of them as a misfortune: But a perpetual excluſion, and eſpecially the motives of that excluſion, appeared to him to be an injury. He ſaw the miniſter, declared to him that for particular reaſons he did not own the

Perſian

Perſian Letters; but that he would be ſtill farther from diſowning a work for which he believed he had no reaſon to bluſh; and that he ought to be judged after a reading, and not upon an information: at laſt the miniſter did what he ought to have begun with; he read the book, loved the author, and learned to place his confidence better. The French academy was not deprived of one of its greateſt ornaments; and France had the happineſs to preſerve a ſubject which ſuperſtition or calumny was ready to deprive her of: For M. de Monteſquieu had declared to the government, that after that kind of affront which they were about to put upon him, he would go among foreigners, who with open arms offered to receive him, in queſt of that ſafety, that repoſe, and perhaps thoſe rewards, which he might have hoped for in his own country. The nation would have deplored this loſs, and the diſgrace of it would notwithſtanding have fallen upon it.

The late marſhal D' Eſtrees, at that time director of the French academy, conducted himſelf upon this occaſion like a virtuous courtier, and a perſon of a truly elevated mind: he was neither afraid of abuſing his credit, nor of endangering it; he ſupported his friend and

juſti-

juſtified Socrates. This act of courage, ſo dear to learning, ſo worthy of being imitated at preſent, and ſo honourable to the memory of marſhal D' Eſtrees, ought not to have been forgot in his panegyric.

M. DE MONTESQUIEU was received the 24th of January 1728. His diſcourſe is one of the beſt which has been pronounced upon a like occaſion: its merit is by ſo much the greater, that thoſe who were to be received, till then confined by thoſe forms and by thoſe *Eloges* which were in uſe, and to which a kind of preſcription ſubjected them, had not as yet dared to ſtep over this circle to treat of other ſubjects, or had not at leaſt thought of comprehending them in it. Even in this ſtate of conſtraint he had the happineſs to ſucceed. Among ſeveral ſtrokes with which his * diſcourſe ſhines we may eaſily diſtinguiſh the deep thinking writer by the ſingle portrait of Cardinal Richlieu, *who taught France the ſecret of its ſtrength, and Spain that of its weakneſs; who freed Germany from her chains, and gave her new ones.* We muſt admire Monſieur de Monteſquieu for having been able to overcome

* 'Tis printed at the end of this *Eloge*.

the

the difficulty of his ſubject, and we ought to pardon thoſe who have not had the ſame ſucceſs.

THE new academician was by ſo much the more worthy of this title, that he had not long before renounced every other buſineſs to give himſelf entirely up to his genius and taſte. However important the place which he occupied was, with whatever judgement and integrity he might have fulfilled its duties, he perceived that there were objects more worthy of employing his talents; that a citizen is accountable to his country and to mankind for all the good which he can do; and that he could be more uſeful to the one and the other, by inſtructing them with his writings, than he could be by determining a few particular diſputes in obſcurity. All theſe reflections determined him to ſell his office. He was no longer a magiſtrate, and was now only a man of letters.

BUT to render himſelf uſeful by his works to different nations, it was neceſſary that he ſhould know them: 'twas with this view that he undertook to travel: his aim was to examine every where the natural and moral world, to

ſtudy

ſtudy the laws and conſtitution of every country; to viſit the learned, the writers, the celebrated artiſts; every where to ſeek for thoſe rare and ſingular geniuſes, whoſe converſation ſometimes ſupplies the place of many years obſervation and reſidence. M. de Monteſquieu might have ſaid, like Democritus; "I have for-"got nothing to inſtruct myſelf: I have quit-"ted my country and travelled over the uni-"verſe, the better to know truth: I have ſeen "all the illuſtrious perſonages of my time." But there was this difference between the French Democritus and him of Abdera, that the firſt travelled to inſtruct men, and the ſecond to laugh at them.

He firſt went to Vienna, where he often ſaw the celebrated prince Eugene. This hero, ſo fatal to France (to which he might have been ſo uſeful) after having given a check to the fortune of Lewis XIV. and humbled the Ottoman pride, lived during the peace without pomp, loving and cultivating letters in a court, where they are little honoured, and ſetting an example to his maſters how they ſhould protect them. M. de Monteſquieu thought that he could diſcover in his converſation ſome remains of affection for his ancient country. Prince Eugene

Eugene eſpecially diſcovered it, as much as an enemy could, when he talked of the fatal conſequences of that inteſtine diviſion which has ſo long troubled the church of France: the ſtateſman foreſaw its duration and effects, and foretold it like a philoſopher.

M. DE MONTESQUIEU left Vienna to viſit Hungary, an opulent and fertile country, inhabited by a haughty and generous nation, the ſcourge of its tyrants, and the ſupport of its ſovereigns. As few perſons know this country well, he has written with care this part of his travels.

FROM Germany he went to Italy: he ſaw at Venice the famous Mr. Law, who had nothing remaining of his grandeur but projects fortunately deſtined to die away in his own head, and a diamond which he pawned to play at games of hazard. One day the converſation turned on the famous ſyſtem which Law had invented; an epoch of ſo many calamities and ſo many great fortunes, and eſpecially of a remarkable corruption in our morals. As the parliament of Paris, the immediate depoſitory of the laws during a minority, had made ſome reſiſtance to the Scotch miniſter on this occaſion, M. de Monteſquieu aſked him why he had never

never try'd to overcome this reſiſtance by a method almoſt always infallible in England, by the grand mover of human actions, in a word, by money. *Theſe are not*, anſwered Law, *Geniuſes ſo ardent and ſo generous as my countrymen; but they are much more incorruptible.* We ſhall add, without any prejudice of national vanity, that a ſociety which is free for ſome ſhort limited time, ought to reſiſt corruption more, than one which is always ſo: the firſt when it ſells its liberty loſes it; the ſecond, ſo to ſpeak, only lends it, and exerciſes it even when it is doing ſo. Thus the circumſtances and nature of government give riſe to the vices and virtues of nations.

ANOTHER perſon no leſs famous, whom M. de Monteſquieu ſaw ſtill oftner at Venice, was Count de Bonneval. This man, ſo known by his adventures which were not yet at an end, and flattered with converſing with ſo good a judge, and one ſo worthy of hearing them, often related to him the remarkable circumſtances of his life, recited the military actions in which he had been engaged, and drew the characters of thoſe generals and miniſters whom he had known. M. de Monteſquieu often recalled to

mind theſe converſations, and related different ſtrokes of them to his friends.

He went from Venice to Rome. In this ancient capital of the world, which is ſtill ſo in ſome reſpects, he applied himſelf chiefly to examine that which diſtinguiſhes it moſt at preſent; the works of Raphael, of Titian, and of Michael Angelo. He had not made a particular ſtudy of the fine arts; but that expreſſion, which ſhines in the maſter-pieces of this kind, infallibly ſtrikes every man of genius. Accuſtomed to ſtudy nature, he knew her again when well imitated, as a like pourtrait ſtrikes all thoſe who are familiarly acquainted with the original. Thoſe productions of art muſt indeed be wretched whoſe whole beauty is only diſcernible by artiſts.

After having travelled over Italy, M. de Monteſquieu came to Switzerland. He carefully examined thoſe vaſt countries which are watered by the Rhine. There was nothing more for him to ſee in Germany, FOR FREDERIC DID NOT YET REIGN. He ſtopt afterwards ſome time in the United Provinces; an admirable monument what human induſtry, animated by a love

a love of liberty, can do. At laſt he went to England, where he ſtaid three years. Worthy of viſiting and entertaining the greateſt of men, he had nothing to regret but that he had not made this voyage ſooner. Newton and Locke were dead. But he had often the honour of paying his reſpects to their protectreſs, the celebrated queen of England, who cultivated philoſophy upon a throne, and who properly eſteemed and valued M. de Monteſquieu. He was no leſs well received by the nation, which, however, was not obliged to follow the example of its ſuperiors on this occaſion. He formed at London intimate friendſhips with men accuſtomed to think, and to prepare themſelves for great actions by profound ſtudies; with them he inſtructed himſelf in the nature of the government, and attained to a thorough knowledge of it. We ſpeak here after the public teſtimonies which have been given him by the Engliſh themſelves, ſo jealous of our advantages, and ſo little diſpoſed to acknowledge any ſuperiority in us.

As he had examined nothing either with the prejudice of an enthuſiaſt, or the auſterity of a cynic, he brought back from his travels, neither a ſaucy diſdain for foreigners, nor a

ſtill more miſplaced contempt for his own country. It was the reſult of his obſervations, that Germany was made to travel in, Italy to ſojourn in, England to think in, and France to live in.

AFTER his return to his own country, M. de Monteſquieu retired for two years to his eſtate of la Brede. He there enjoyed in peace that ſolitude which our having viewed the tumult and hurry of the world, ſerves to render more agreeable: he lived with himſelf, after having ſo long lived in a different way: and, what intereſts us moſt, he put the laſt hand to his work *on the Cauſe of the Grandeur and Declenſion of the Romans*, which appeared in 1734.

EMPIRES, like men, muſt encreaſe, decay, and be extinguiſhed. But this neceſſary revolution has often hidden cauſes, which the vail of time conceals from us, and which myſtery or their apparent minuteneſs has even ſometimes hid from the eyes of contemporaries.

NOTHING in this reſpect reſembles modern hiſtory more than ancient hiſtory. That of the Romans however deſerves, in this reſpect, to

to be made an exception of; it preſents us with a rational policy, a connected ſyſtem of aggrandizement, which does not permit us to attribute the fortune of this people to obſcure and inferior ſprings. The cauſes of the Roman grandeur may then be found in hiſtory; and 'tis the buſineſs of the philoſopher to diſcover them. Beſides, there are no ſyſtems in this ſtudy as in that of phyſic; theſe are almoſt always overthrown, becauſe one new and unforeſeen experiment can overturn them in an inſtant; on the contrary, when we carefully collect the facts which the ancient hiſtory of a country tranſmits to us, if we don't always gather together all the materials which we can deſire, we can at leaſt hope one day to have more of them. A careful ſtudy of hiſtory, a ſtudy ſo important and ſo difficult, conſiſts in combining in the moſt perfect manner theſe defective materials: ſuch would be the merit of an architect, who, from ſome curious learned remains, ſhould trace in the moſt probable manner, the plan of an ancient edifice; ſupplying, by genius, and happy conjectures, what was wanting in theſe unformed and mutilated ruins.

It is in this point of view that we ought to conſider the work of M. de Monteſquieu. He

finds the cauſes of the grandeur of the Romans in that love of liberty, of labour, and of their country, which was inſtilled into them during their infancy; in thoſe inteſtine diviſions, which gave an activity to their genius, and which ceaſed immediately upon the appearance of an enemy; in that conſtancy after misfortunes, which never deſpaired of the republic; in that principle they adhered to of never making peace but after victories; in the honour of a triumph, which was a ſubject of emulation among the generals; in that protection which they granted to thoſe people who rebelled againſt their kings; in the excellent policy of permitting the conquered to preſerve their religion and cuſtoms; and that of never having two enemies upon their hands at once, and of bearing every thing of the one, 'till they had deſtroyed the other. He finds the cauſes of their declenſion in the aggrandizement of the ſtate itſelf; in thoſe diſtant wars, which, obliging the citizens to be too long abſent, made them inſenſibly loſe their republican ſpirit; in the privilege of being citizens of Rome granted to ſo many nations, which made the Roman people at laſt become a ſort of many headed monſter; in the corruption introduced by the luxury of Aſia; in the proſcriptions

tions of Sylla, which debaſed the genius of the nation, and prepared it for ſlavery; in that neceſſity which the Romans found themſelves in of having a maſter, while their liberty was become burthenſome to them; in that neceſſity they were obliged to of changing their maxims when they changed their government; in that ſeries of monſters who reigned, almoſt without interruption, from Tiberius to Nerva, and from Commodus to Conſtantine; in a word, in the tranſlation and diviſion of the empire, which periſhed firſt in the Weſt by the power of barbarians, and which, after having languiſhed ſeveral ages in the Eaſt, under weak or cruel emperors, inſenſibly died away, like thoſe rivers which diſappear in the ſands.

A VERY ſmall volume was enough for M. de Monteſquieu, to explain and unfold ſo intereſting and vaſt a picture. As the author did not inſiſt upon the detail, and only ſeized on the moſt fruitful branches of his ſubject, he has been able to include in a very ſmall ſpace, a vaſt number of objects diſtinctly perceived, and rapidly preſented, without fatiguing the reader. While he points out a great deal to

us, he leaves us ſtill more to reflect upon; and he might have intitled his book *A Roman Hiſtory for the uſe of Stateſmen and Philoſophers.*

WHATEVER reputation M. de Monteſquieu had acquired by this laſt work, and by thoſe which had preceded it, he had only cleared the way for a far grander undertaking, for that which ought to immortalize his name, and render it reſpectable to future ages. He had long ago formed the deſign: and had meditated for twenty years upon the execution of it; or, to ſpeak more properly, his whole life had been a perpetual meditation upon it. He had firſt made himſelf in ſome reſpect a ſtranger in his own country, better to underſtand it at laſt: he had afterwards travelled over all Europe, and profoundly ſtudied the different people who inhabit it. The famous iſland, which glories ſo much in her laws, and which makes ſo bad a uſe of them, had been to him in this long tour, what the iſle of Crete had formerly been to Lycurgus, a ſchool where he had known well how to inſtruct himſelf without approving every thing: in a word, he had, if we may ſo ſpeak, examined and judged thoſe celebrated nations and men who only

only exiſt at preſent in the annals of the world. It was thus that he attained by degrees to the nobleſt title which a wiſe man can deſerve, that of legiſlator of nations.

If he was animated by the importance of his ſubject, he was at the ſame time terrified by its extenſiveneſs; he abandoned it, and returned to it again at ſeveral intervals. He felt more than once, as he himſelf owns, his paternal hands fail him. At laſt, encouraged by his friends, he collected all his ſtrength, and publiſhed the *Spirit of Laws*.

In this important work, M. de Monteſquieu, without inſiſting, after the example of thoſe who preceded him, upon metaphyſical diſcuſſions relative to the nature of man, ſuppoſed in an abſtract ſtate; without confining himſelf, like others, to conſider certain people in certain particular relations or circumſtances, takes a view of the inhabitants of the world in the actual ſtate in which they are, and in all the relations which they can ſtand in to one another. The moſt part of other writers in this way are almoſt always either ſimple moraliſts, or ſimple lawyers, or even ſometimes ſimple theologiſts. As for him, a citizen of all

countries,

countries, and of all nations, he is leſs employed about what our duty requires of us, than about the means by which we can be obliged to fulfil it; about the metaphyſical perfection of laws, than about that which human nature renders man capable of; about laws which have been made, than about thoſe which ought to have been made; about the laws of a particular people, than about thoſe of all nations. Thus, when comparing himſelf to thoſe who have run before him in this noble and grand career, he might ſay, with Corregio when he had ſeen the works of his rivals, *And I alſo, I am a Painter.*

FILLED and penetrated with his ſubject, the author of the Spirit of Laws comprehends in it ſo great a number of materials, and treats them with ſuch brevity and depth, that an aſſiduous and ſtudious reading of it can make us alone perceive the merit of this book. This will eſpecially ſerve, we venture to ſay, to make that pretended want of method with which ſome readers have accuſed M. de Monteſquieu diſappear; an advantage which they ought not ſlightly to have accuſed him of having neglected in a philoſophical ſubject, and in a work of twenty years. Real want

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of order ought to be diſtinguiſhed from that which is only apparent. Diſorder is when the analogy and connection of ideas is not obſerved; when concluſions are ſet up as principles, or precede them; when the reader after innumerable windings finds himſelf at the point whence he ſet out. Apparent diſorder is when the author, putting in their true place the ideas which he makes uſe of, leaves it to the readers to ſupply the intermediate ones: and 'tis thus that M. de Monteſquieu believed that he might and ought to make uſe of them in a book deſigned for men who thought, whoſe genius ought to ſupply voluntary and reaſonable omiſſions.

The order which is perceivable in the grand diviſions of the Spirit of Laws, takes place no leſs in the ſmaller details; we believe that the more profoundly the work is ſtudied, the more one will be convinced of it. Faithful to his general diviſions, the author refers to each thoſe objects which belong to it excluſively; and, with reſpect to thoſe which, by different branches, belong to ſeveral ſubjects at once, he has placed under each diviſion, that branch which properly belongs to it. By this we eaſily perceive, and without confuſion, the influence

fluence which the different parts of the ſubject have upon each other; as, in a tree or ſyſtem of human knowledge well underſtood, we may perceive the mutual relation of ſciences and arts. This compariſon is by ſo much the more juſt, that it is the ſame thing with reſpect to a plan which we may form to ourſelves for examining laws philoſophically, as of that order which may be obſerved in a tree comprehending all the ſciences: there will always remain ſomething arbitrary in it; and all that can be required of an author is, that he follow ſtrictly, without deviating from it, that ſyſtem which he has once formed to himſelf.

We may ſay of that obſcurity, which is allowable in ſuch a work, the ſame thing as of want of order. What may be obſcure for vulgar readers is not ſo for thoſe whom the author had in his view. Beſides, obſcurity which is voluntary, is not properly obſcurity. M. de Monteſquieu being ſometimes obliged to preſent to us truths of great importance, the abſolute and direct avowal of which might have ſhocked without doing any good, has had the prudence to cover them; and, by this innocent artifice, he has concealed them from

thoſe to whom they might have been hurtful, without making them loſt to men of ſagacity.

Among thoſe works which have ſometimes furniſhed him with aſſiſtance, and ſometimes with clearer views for his own, we may perceive that he has eſpecially profited from two hiſtorians who have thought the moſt, Tacitus and Plutarch: but, tho' a philoſopher who has read theſe two authors might have diſpenſed with a great many others, he did not believe that he ought to neglect or diſdain any thing in this way which could be of uſe to his ſubject. That reading which we muſt ſuppoſe neceſſary for the Spirit of Laws is immenſe; and the rational uſe which the author has made of ſuch a prodigious multitude of materials, will appear ſtill more ſurpriſing, when it is known that he was almoſt entirely deprived of ſight, and obliged to have recourſe to eyes not his own; this prodigious reading contributes not only to the utility, but to the agreeableneſs of the work. Without derogating from the majeſty of his ſubject, M. de Monteſquieu has known how to ſoften its auſterity, and procure the reader ſome moments of repoſe, whether by facts which are

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ſingular and little known, or by delicate alluſions, or by thoſe ſtrong and brilliant touches of the pencil which paint by one ſtroke nations and men.

In a word, for we won't here play the part of Homer's commentators, there are, without doubt, faults in the Spirit of Laws, as there are in every work of genius whoſe author firſt dared to clear out for himſelf a new rout. M. de Monteſquieu has been amongſt us for the ſtudy of laws, what Deſcartes was for that of philoſophy: he often inſtructs us, and is ſometimes miſtaken; and, even when he miſtakes, he inſtructs thoſe who know how to read him. The laſt edition of his works demonſtrates, by the corrections and additions which he has made, that, if he has now and then made a ſlip, he has been able to find it out and to riſe again. By this he will acquire at leaſt a title to a new examination, in thoſe places where he was not of the ſame opinion with his cenſurers; perhaps indeed what he imagined ſtood moſt in need of correction has entirely eſcaped them; ſo blind commonly is the inclination to do hurt.

But that which is within the reach of all

the world in the Spirit of Laws, that which ought to render the author dear to all nations, that which would ſerve to cover far greater faults than are in it, is that ſpirit of patriotiſm which dictated it. The love of the public good, a deſire of ſeeing men happy, diſcovers itſelf in it every where; and, had it no other merit but this, which is ſo rare and ſo valuable, it would be worthy, on this account alone, to be read by nations and kings. We already perceive, by happy experience, that the fruits of this work are not confined to uſeleſs ſentiments in the minds of its readers. Though M. de Monteſquieu ſurvived the publication of the Spirit of Laws but a ſhort while, he had the ſatisfaction in ſome meaſure to foreſee thoſe effects which it begins to produce amongſt us; the natural love of Frenchmen for their country, turned towards its true object; that taſte for commerce, for agriculture, and for uſeful arts which inſenſibly ſpreads itſelf in our nation; that general knowledge of the principles of government, which renders people more attached to that which they ought to love. Thoſe who have ſo indecently attacked this work, perhaps owe more to it than they imagine. Ingratitude, beſides, is the ſmalleſt reproach which

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we have to make to them. 'Tis not without regret, and without bluſhing for the age we live in, that we proceed to expoſe them; but this hiſtory is of too much conſequence to the glory of M. de Monteſquieu, and advantage to philoſophy, to be paſſed over in ſilence. May that reproach which at laſt covers his enemies be of uſe to them!

SCARCE had the Spirit of Laws appeared, but it was eagerly ſought after on account of the reputation of its author: but tho' M. de Monteſquieu had wrote for the good of the people, he ought not to have had the vulgar for his judge. The depth of his ſubject was a neceſſary conſequence of its importance. However, the ſtrokes which were ſcattered up and down the work, and which would have been diſplaced if they had not ariſen naturally from the ſubject, made too many people believe that it was wrote for them. People ſought for an agreeable book, and they only found an uſeful one; the whole ſcheme and particular details of which they could not comprehend without ſome attention. The Spirit of Laws was treated with a deal of light wit; even the title of it was made a ſubject

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of pleaſantry; in a word, one of the fineſt literary monuments which our nation ever produced, was at firſt regarded by it with much indifference. It was requiſite that the true judges ſhould have time to read it: they very ſoon corrected the errors of the multitude, always ready to change its opinion. That part of the public which teaches, dictated to that which liſtens to hear how it ought to think and ſpeak; and the ſuffrages of men of abilities joined to the echoes which repeated them, formed only one voice over all Europe.

'Twas then that the open and ſecret enemies of letters and philoſophy (for there are of both kinds) united their darts againſt this work. Hence that multitude of pamphlets which were aimed againſt him from all parts, and which we ſhall not draw out from that oblivion in which they have ſunk. If thoſe authors had not taken proper meaſures to be unknown to poſterity, it might be believed that the Spirit of Laws was wrote amidſt a nation of Barbarians.

M. de Montesquieu eaſily deſpiſed the dark criticiſms of thoſe weak authors, who, whether out of a jealouſy which they had no

title to have, or to ſatisfy the public ill-nature, which loves ſatyre and contempt, outrageouſly attack what they can't attain to; and more odious on account of the ill which they want to do, than formidable for that which they actually do, don't ſucceed even in this kind of writing, the facility of which, as well as its object, render equally mean. He placed works of this kind on the ſame level with thoſe weekly newspapers of Europe, the encomiums of which have no authority, and their darts no effect; which indolent readers run over without giving credit to, and in which ſovereigns are inſulted without knowing it, or without deigning to revenge it. But he was not equally indifferent about thoſe principles of irreligion which they accuſed him of having propagated in the Spirit of Laws. By deſpiſing ſuch reproaches, he would have believed that he deſerved them; and the importance of the object, made him ſhut his eyes at the real meanneſs of his adverſaries. Thoſe men, who really want zeal as much as they are eager to make it appear that they have it, afraid of that light which letters diffuſe, not to the prejudice of religion, but to their own diſadvantage, took different ways of attacking him; ſome by a ſtratagem which was as puerile as puſillanimous,

mous, had wrote to himſelf; others, after having attacked him under the maſk of anonymous writers, had afterwards fallen by the ears among themſelves. M. de Monteſquieu, tho' he was very jealous of confounding them with each other, did not think it proper to loſe time, which was precious, in combating them one after another; he contented himſelf with making an example of him who had moſt ſignalized himſelf by his extravagance. 'Twas the author of an anonymous and periodical paper, who imagined that he had a title to ſucceed Paſcal, becauſe he has ſucceeded to his opinions; a panegyriſt of works which no body reads, and an apologiſt of miracles which the ſecular power put an end to whenever it wanted to do it; who calls the little intereſt which people of letters take in his quarrels impious and ſcandalous; and hath by an addreſs worthy of him, alienated from himſelf that part of the nation whoſe affections he ought chiefly to have endeavoured to keep. The ſtrokes of this formidable champion were worthy of thoſe views which inſpired him; he accuſed M. de Monteſquieu of Spinoſiſm and deiſm (two imputations which are incompatible;) of having followed the ſyſtem of Pope (of which there is not a word in his works;) of having quoted

Plutarch, who is not a Chriſtian author; of not having ſpoken of original ſin and of grace. In a word, he pretended that the Spirit of Laws was a production of the conſtitution *Unigenitus*; an idea which we may perhaps be ſuſpected of fathering on the critic out of deriſion. Thoſe who have known M. de Monteſquieu, and who underſtand his work, and that of Clement XI. may judge by this accuſation of the reſt.

The unſucceſsfulneſs of this writer ought greatly to diſcourage him: he wanted to attack a wiſe man in that place which is moſt ſenſible to every good citizen, but he only procured him an addition of glory as a man of letters: *the Defence of the Spirit of Laws* appeared. This work, on account of that moderation, that truth, that delicacy of ridicule which abound in it, ought to be regarded as a model in this way. M. de Monteſquieu, charged by his adverſary with atrocious imputations, might eaſily have rendered him odious; he did better, he made him ridiculous. If we are beholden to an aggreſſor for that good which he has done us without wanting to do it, we owe him eternal thanks for having procured us this maſter-piece. But what adds ſtill more to the merit of this precious little piece is

this, that the author without thinking of it has there drawn a picture of himself: those who knew him think they hear him; and posterity will be convinced, when reading his *Defence*, that his conversation was not inferior to his writings; an encomium which few great men have deserved.

Another circumstance gave him plainly the advantage in this dispute. The critic, who, as a proof of his attachment to religion, attacks its ministers, loudly accused the clergy of France, and especially the faculty of theology, of indifference for the cause of God, because they did not authentically proscribe so pernicious a work. The faculty had a title to despise the reproach of a nameless writer: but religion was in the question; a commendable delicacy made it resolve to examine the Spirit of Laws. Tho' it has been employed about it several years, it has not yet pronounced any thing; and if some slight inadvertancies, which are almost inevitable in so vast a career, should have escaped M. de Montesquieu, the long and scrupulous attention which they would have required from the most enlightened body of the church, might prove at least how excusable they are. But this body, full of pru-

dence, will do nothing raſhly in ſo important an affair. It knows the grounds of reaſon and of faith: it knows that the work of a man of letters ought not to be examined like that of a theologiſt; that the bad conſequences, which odious interpretations may draw from a propoſition, don't render the propoſition blameable in itſelf; that beſides we live in an unlucky age, in which the intereſts of religion have need of being delicately managed; and that it may do hurt to weak people to throw an ill-timed ſuſpicion of incredulity upon geniuſes of the firſt rank; that, in a word, in ſpite of this unjuſt accuſation, M. de Monteſquieu was always eſteemed, viſited and well received by the greateſt and moſt reſpectable characters in the church. Would he have preſerved among men of worth that eſteem which he enjoyed, if they had regarded him as a dangerous writer?

While inſects plagued him in his own country, England erected a monument to his glory. In 1752, M. d'Affier, celebrated for the medals which he has ſtruck in honour of ſeveral illuſtrious men, came from London to Paris to ſtrike one of him. M. de la Tour,

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an artiſt of ſuch ſuperior talents, and ſo reſpectable for his diſintereſtedneſs and greatneſs of mind, had ardently deſired to give a new luſtre to his pencil, by tranſmitting to poſterity the portrait of the author of the Spirit of Laws; he only wanted the ſatisfaction of painting him; and he deſerved, like Apelles, that this honour ſhould be reſerved for him: but M. de Monteſquieu, as ſparing of M. de la Tour's time as he himſelf was free of it, conſtantly and politely refuſed his preſſing ſollicitations. M. d'Aſſier at firſt bore with ſuch difficulties. "Do you believe, ſaid he at laſt to M. de "Monteſquieu, that there is not as much "pride in refuſing my offer, as in accepting "of it?" Overcome by this pleaſantry, he permitted M. d'Aſſier to do whatever he would.

The author of the Spirit of Laws, in fine, was peaceably enjoying his glory, when he fell ſick at the beginning of February: his health, naturally delicate, began to decay for ſome time paſt, by the ſlow and almoſt infallible effect of deep ſtudy, by the uneaſineſs which they had endeavoured to give him on account of his work; in a word, by that kind of life which he was obliged to lead at Paris, which he felt to be fatal to him. But the eagerneſs

with which his company was ſought after was too keen, not to be ſometimes indiſcreet; they would, without perceiving it, enjoy him at the expence of himſelf. Scarce had the news of the danger in which he was in ſpread abroad, but it became the object of the converſation and anxiety of the public. His houſe was never empty of perſons of all ranks who came to enquire about his health, ſome out of real affection, others to have the appearance of it, or to follow the croud. His majeſty, penetrated with the loſs which his kingdom was about to ſuſtain, enquired about him ſeveral times; a teſtimony of goodneſs and juſtice which does equal honour to the monarch and the ſubject. M. de Monteſquieu's end was not unworthy of his life. Oppreſſed with cruel pains, far from a family that was dear to him, and which had not the comfort of cloſing his eyes, ſurrounded by ſome friends, and a great croud of ſpectators, he preſerved, to his laſt moments, a calmneſs and tranquillity of ſoul. In a word, after having performed with decency every duty, full of confidence in the eternal being whom he was about to be reunited with, he died with the tranquillity of a man of worth, who had never conſecrated his talents but to the improvement of virtue and humanity.

humanity. France and Europe loſt him the 10th of February 1755, aged ſixty-ſix.

ALL the public news-papers publiſhed this event as a misfortune. We may apply to M. de Monteſquieu what was formerly ſaid of an illuſtrious Roman; that no body, when told of his death, ſhowed any joy at it; that no body even forgot him when he was no more. Foreigners were eager to demonſtrate their regrets: my lord Cherſterfield, whom it is enough to name, cauſed to be publiſhed in one of the public London papers, an article to his honour, an article worthy of the one and of the other; 'tis the portrait of Anaxagoras drawn by Pericles *. The royal academy of

* See this encomium in Engliſh, as we read it in the paper called the Evening Poſt. "On the 10th of this month, died at Paris, univerſally and ſincerely regretted, Charles Secondat, baron of Monteſquieu, and preſident a Mortier of the parliament of Bourdeaux. His virtues did honour to human nature, his writings juſtice. A friend to mankind, he aſſerted their undoubted and unalienable rights, with freedom, even in his own country, whoſe prejudices in matters of religion and government (*we muſt remember 'tis an Engliſhman who ſpeaks*) he had long lamented and endeavoured (not without ſome ſucceſs) to remove. He well knew and juſtly admired the happy conſtitution of this country, where fixed and known laws equally reſtrain monarch, from tyranny, and liberty from licentiouſneſs. His works will illuſtrate his name, and ſurvive him, as long as right reaſon, moral obligation, and the true Spirit of Laws, ſhall be underſtood, reſpected, and maintained."

ſciences

ſciences and belles letters of Pruſſia, tho' it is not its cuſtom to pronounce the *eloge* of foreign members, thought themſelves bound to do him an honour, which it had not before done to any one but the illuſtrious John Bernouilli. M. de Maupertuis, notwithſtanding he was at that time indiſpoſed, performed himſelf this laſt duty to his friend, and would not permit an office ſo dear and ſo melancholy to fall to the ſhare of any other perſon. To ſo many honourable ſuffrages in favour of M. de Monteſquieu, we believe we may add, without indiſcretion, thoſe praiſes which were given him, in preſence of one of us, by that very monarch to whom this celebrated academy owes its luſtre, a prince made to feel thoſe loſſes which Philoſophy ſuſtains, and at the ſame time to comfort her.

The ſeventeenth of February, the French academy, according to cuſtom, performed a ſolemn ſervice for him, at which, notwithſtanding the rigour of the ſeaſon, almoſt all the learned men of this body, who were not abſent from Paris, thought it their duty to aſſiſt. They ought, at this melancholy ceremony, to have placed the Spirit of Laws upon his coffin, as heretofore they expoſed, oppoſite to that of Raphael,

Raphael, his laſt picture of the Transfiguration. This ſimple and affecting ornament would have been a fine funeral oration.

HITHERTO we have only conſidered M. de Monteſquieu as a writer and philoſopher: it would be to rob him of the half of his glory, to paſs over in ſilence his agreeable perſonal qualities.

HE had, in company, a ſweetneſs and gayety of temper always the ſame. His converſation was ſpirited, agreeable, and inſtructive, by the great number of men and of nations whom he had known. It was, like his ſtyle, conciſe, full of wit and ſallies, without gall, and without ſatire. Nobody told a ſtory in a more lively manner, more readily, or with more grace and leſs affectation: he knew that the concluſion of an agreeable ſtory is always the point in view; he therefore made diſpatch to come at it, and produced the effect, without having long promiſed it.

HIS frequent abſence of mind only rendered him more amiable: he always awaked from it by ſome unexpected ſtroke which reanimated the languiſhing converſation: beſides, theſe

theſe were never either frolickſome, ſhocking, or troubleſome. The fire of his genius, the great number of ideas with which it was furniſhed, gave riſe to them; but this never happened in the middle of an intereſting or ſerious converſation: the deſire of pleaſing thoſe in whoſe company he was, made him attentive to them without affectation and without conſtraint.

The agreeableneſs of his converſation, not only reſembled his character and his genius, but even that kind of method which he obſerved in his ſtudy. Tho' capable of deep and long continued meditation, he never exhauſted his ſtrength; he always left off application, before he felt the leaſt ſymptom of fatigue †.

† The author of the anonymous and periodical paper which we mentioned above, pretends to find a manifeſt contradiction, between what we ſay here, and that which we had ſaid before, that M. de Monteſquieu's health was impaired by the ſlow and almoſt infallible effect of deep ſtudy. But why when he was comparing the two places, has he ſuppreſſed theſe words, *Slow and almoſt infallible*, which he had under his eyes? 'Tis evidently becauſe he perceived, that an effect which is ſlow, is not a bit leſs real for being not felt immediately; and that, conſequently, theſe words deſtroy that appearance of contradiction which he pretends to point out. Such is the fidelity of this author in trifles, and for a ſtronger reaſon in more ſerious matters.

He

He was ſenſible to glory; but he did not wiſh to attain to it, but by deſerving it. He never endeavoured to augment his own by thoſe underhand practices, by thoſe dark and ſhameful methods, which diſhonour the character of the man without adding to that of the author.

Worthy of every diſtinction, and of every reward, he aſked nothing, and he was not ſurpriſed that he was forgot: but he has adventured, even in delicate circumſtances, to protect at court men of letters who were perſecuted, celebrated, and unfortunate, and has obtained favours for them.

Tho' he lived with the great, whether out of neceſſity, or propriety, or taſte, their company was not neceſſary to his happineſs. He retired whenever he could to his eſtate in the country; he there again, with joy, met his philoſophy, his books, and his repoſe. Surrounded, at his leiſure hours, with country people, after having ſtudied man, in the commerce of the world, and in the hiſtory of nations, he ſtudied him alſo in thoſe ſimple people whom nature alone has inſtructed, and

he

he could from them learn ſomething: he converſed chearfully with them; he endeavoured, like Socrates, to find out their genius; he appeared as happy when converſing with them, as in the moſt brilliant aſſemblies, eſpecially when he made up their differences, and comforted them under their diſtreſs by his beneficence.

NOTHING does greater honour to his memory than the method in which he lived, which ſome people have pretended to blame as extravagant in a proud and avaricious age, extremely unfit to find out, and ſtill leſs to feel the real benevolent motives of it.

M. DE MONTESQUIEU would neither make encroachments upon the fortune of his family, by thoſe ſupplies which he gave the unfortunate, nor by thoſe conſiderable expences, which his long tour of travelling, the weakneſs of his ſight, and the printing of his works had expoſed him to. He tranſmitted to his children, without diminution or augmentation, the eſtate which he received from his anceſtors; he added nothing to it but the glory of his name, and the example of his life. He had married in 1715, dame Jane de

de Lartigue, daughter of Peter de Lartigue, lieutenant colonel of the regiment of Molevrier: he had two daughters and one ſon by her, who by his character, his morals, and his works, has ſhewn himſelf worthy of ſuch a father.

THOSE who love truth and their country, will not be diſpleaſed to find ſome of his maxims here: he thought,

THAT every part of the ſtate ought to be equally ſubject to the Laws, but that the privileges of every part of the ſtate ought to be reſpected when their effects have nothing contrary to that natural right which obliges every citizen equally to concur to the public good: that ancient poſſeſſion was in this kind the firſt of titles and the moſt inviolable of rights, which it was always unjuſt, and ſometimes dangerous, to want to ſhake.

THAT magiſtrates, in all circumſtances, and notwithſtanding whatever advantage it might be to their own body, ought never to be any thing but magiſtrates without partiality and without paſſion, like the laws which abſolve and puniſh without love and hatred.

IN

In a word, he ſaid, upon occaſion of thoſe eccleſiaſtical diſputes which have ſo much employed the Greek emperors and Chriſtians, that theological diſputes, when they are not confined to the ſchools, infallibly diſhonour a nation in the eyes of its neighbours: in fact, the contempt in which wiſe men hold thoſe quarrels, does not vindicate the character of their country; becauſe ſages making every where the leaſt noiſe and being the ſmalleſt number, 'tis never from them that the nation is judged of.

The importance of thoſe works which we have had occaſion to mention in this panegyric has made us paſs over in ſilence leſs conſiderable ones, which ſerved as a relaxation to our author, and which in any other perſon would have merited an encomium. The moſt remarkable of them is the temple of Gnidus, which was very ſoon publiſhed after the Perſian Letters. M. de Monteſquieu, after having been Horace, Theophraſtus and Lucian in thoſe, was an Ovid and Anacreon in this new eſſay. 'Tis no more the deſpotic love of the Eaſt which he propoſes to paint; 'tis the delicacy and ſimplicity of paſtoral love, ſuch as it

is

is in an unexperienced heart which the commerce of the world has not yet corrupted. The author, fearing perhaps that a picture ſo oppoſite to our manners ſhould appear too languid and uniform, has endeavoured to animate it by the moſt agreeable images. He tranſports the reader into inchanted ſcenes, the view of which, to ſay the truth, little intereſts the lover in his happieſt moments, but the deſcription of which ſtill flatters the imagination, when the paſſions are gratified. Inſpired by his ſubject, he hath adorned his proſe with that animated, figurative, and poetic ſtile, which the romance of Telemachus gave the firſt example of amongſt us. We don't know why ſome cenſurers of the temple of Gnidus have ſaid upon this occaſion, that it ought to have been wrote in verſe. The poetic ſtile, if we underſtand, as we ought by this word, a ſtile full of warmth and images, does not ſtand in need of the uniform march and cadency of verſification to be agreeable: but if we only make this ſtile to conſiſt in a diction loaded with needleſs epithets, in the cold and trivial deſcriptions of the wings and quiver of love, and of ſuch objects, verſification will add nothing to the merit of theſe beaten ornaments; in vain will we look for the life and ſpirit of it. However this be,

the temple of Gnidus being a ſort of poem in proſe, it belongs to our celebrated writers to determine the rank which it ought to hold: it is worthy of ſuch judges.

We believe at leaſt the deſcriptions in this work may with ſucceſs ſtand one of the principal teſts of poetic deſcriptions, that of being repreſented on canvaſs. But what we ought chiefly to obſerve in the temple of Gnidus, is that Anacreon himſelf is always the obſerver and the philoſopher there. In the fourth canto the author appears to deſcribe the manners of the Cyberites, and it may eaſily be perceived that theſe are our own manners. The preface eſpecially bears the mark of the author of the Perſian Letters. When he repreſents the Temple of Gnidus as a tranſlation from a Greek manuſcript, a piece of wit which has been ſo much disfigured ſince by bad imitators, he takes occaſion to paint by one ſtroke of his pen the folly of critics, and the pedantry of tranſlators. He concludes with theſe words, which deſerve to be repeated: 'If ſerious people re-'quire ſome other work of me of a leſs frivo-'lous nature, I can eaſily ſatisfy them; I have 'been labouring thirty years at a work of 'twelve pages, which will contain all that we 'know

'know of metaphyſics, politics, and morality, 'and all that the greateſt authors have forgot 'in the volumes which they have publiſhed 'on theſe ſciences.'

We look upon that particular intereſt which M. de Monteſquieu took in the Encyclopædia, as one of the moſt honourable rewards of our labour: this work, till the preſent time, has only been ſupported by the courage and emulation of its authors. All men of letters ought, as he thought, eagerly to concur in the execution of this moſt uſeful undertaking. He gave an example of it, with M. de Voltaire, and ſeveral other celebrated writers. Perhaps the oppoſition which this work has met with, and which reminded him of what had happened to himſelf, intereſted him the more in our favour. Perhaps he was ſenſible, without perceiving it, of that juſtice which we dared to do him in the firſt volume of the Encyclopædia, when no body as yet ventured to ſay a word in his defence. He prepared for us an article *upon taſte*, which has been found imperfect among his papers. We ſhall give it to the public in that condition, and treat it with the ſame reſpect that antiquity formerly ſhowed to

the laſt words of Seneca. Death prevented him from giving us any farther marks of his beneficence; and joining our own griefs with thoſe of all Europe, we might write on his tomb,

Finis vitæ ejus nobis luctuoſus, patriæ triſtis, extraneis etiam ignotiſque non ſine cura fuit.
TACIT. in Agric.

THE ANALYSIS OF The SPIRIT of LAWS.

By M. D'ALEMBERT.

THE greateſt part of men of letters who have mentioned the Spirit of Laws, having rather endeavoured to criticize it than to give a juſt idea of it; we ſhall endeavour to ſupply what they ought to have done, and to explain its plan, its nature, and its object. Thoſe who may think this Analyſis too long, will perhaps be of opinion, after having read it, that there was no other method but this alone of making the author's method properly underſtood. Beſides, it ought to be remembered, that the hiſtory of celebrated writers is no more than that of their thoughts and their works; and that this part of their hiſtory is the moſt eſſential, and moſt uſeful.

MEN in the ſtate of nature, abſtracting from all religion, in thoſe diſputes which they may have, knowing no other law but that of all animals, the right of the ſtrongeſt, the eſtabliſhment of ſociety ought to be regarded as a kind of treaty againſt this unjuſt title; a treaty deſtined to eſtabliſh a ſort of balance between the different diviſions of the human race.

BUT it happens in the moral, as in the phyſical equilibrium; it is ſeldom perfect and durable, and the treaties of mankind are, like treaties among our princes, a perpetual ſource of diſputes. Intereſt, neceſſity, and pleaſure, made men aſſociate together. The ſame motives puſh them continually to want to enjoy the advantages of ſociety without bearing the burdens of it; and it is in this ſenſe that we may ſay with our author, That men, from the time they enter into ſociety, are in a ſtate of war. For war ſuppoſes in thoſe who make it, if not an equality of ſtrength, at leaſt an opinion of this equality; whence ariſe the mutual deſire and hope of conqueſt. Now, in a ſtate of ſociety, if the balance among men is never perfect, neither is it, on the other hand, too unequal. On the contrary, they would either

either have nothing to diſpute about in the ſtate of nature; or if neceſſity obliged them to it, nothing would be ſeen but weakneſs flying before force, oppreſſors meeting with no reſiſtance, and thoſe who were oppreſſed, tamely ſubmitting.

Behold then men, united and armed at the ſame time, embracing each other on one ſide, if we may ſpeak ſo; and endeavouring on the other mutually to wound each other. Laws are the chains, more or leſs efficacious, which are deſtined to ſuſpend or to reſtrain their blows. But the prodigious extent of the globe which we inhabit, the different nature of the regions of the earth, and of the people who are ſpread over it, not permitting that all mankind ſhould live under one and the ſame government, the human race was obliged to divide itſelf into a certain number of ſtates, diſtinguiſhed by the difference of thoſe laws to which they are ſubjected. One ſingle government would have made the human kind to have been no more than one extenuated and languiſhing body, extended without vigour over the ſurface of the earth. The different governments are ſo many robuſt and active bodies, which, by mutually aſſiſting each other, form one whole,

and whoſe reciprocal action maintains and keeps up motion and life every where.

We may diſtinguiſh three ſorts of governments, the republican, the monarchical, the deſpotic. In the republican, the people in a body poſſeſs the ſovereign power. In the monarchical, one ſingle perſon governs by fundamental laws. In the deſpotic, no other law is known but the will of a maſter, or rather of a tyrant. This is not to ſay, that there are in the univerſe only theſe three kinds of government; 'tis not even to ſay, that there are ſtates which belong only and ſtrictly to ſome one of theſe forms; the greateſt part of them are mixed or ſhaded the one with the other. Here, monarchy inclines to deſpotiſm; there, the monarchical government is combined with the republican; elſewhere, 'tis not the whole people, 'tis only a part of them, which make the laws. But the preceding diviſion is not on that account the leſs juſt and exact. The three kinds of government, which it includes, are ſo diſtinguiſhed that they have properly nothing in common; and beſides, all the governments which we know participate the one of the other. It was then neceſſary to form particular claſſes of theſe three kinds, and afterwards

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to determine the laws which are proper for each; it will be eaſy afterwards to adapt thoſe laws to any particular government, according as it may belong more or leſs to thoſe different forms.

In different ſtates, the laws ought to be relative to their *nature*, that is to ſay, to that which conſtitutes them; and to their *principle*, that is to ſay, to that which ſupports them, and puts them in motion: an important diſtinction, the key of an infinite number of laws, and from which the author draws many conſequences.

The principal laws relative to the *nature* of democracy are; That the people be in ſome reſpects the monarch, and in others the ſubject; that it elect and judge its magiſtrates, and that the magiſtrates on certain occaſions decide. The *nature* of monarchy requires, That there be between the monarch and the people one body to whom the laws are entruſted, and which ought to be a mediator between the ſubject and the prince. The *nature* of deſpotiſm requires, That the tyrant exerciſe his authority, either by himſelf alone, or by one who repreſents him.

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As to the *principle* of the three governments; that of democracy is the love of the republic, that is, of equality. In monarchies where one ſingle perſon is the diſpenſer of diſtinctions and rewards, and where they are accuſtomed to confound the ſtate with this ſingle man, the principle is honour, that is, ambition, and the love of eſteem. Laſtly, under deſpotiſm, 'tis fear. The more vigorous theſe principles are, the more fixed the government is; the more theſe are altered and corrupted, the more it tends to its deſtruction. When the author ſpeaks of equality in democracy, he does not mean an extreme, abſolute, and conſequently chimerical equality. He means that happy equilibrium which renders all the citizens equally ſubject to the laws, and equally intereſted to obſerve them.

In every government the laws of education ought to be relative to its *principle*. We underſtand here by *education* that which they receive when they are entering upon the world; and not that of parents and of ſchool-maſters, which is often contrary to it, eſpecially in ſome ſtates. In monarchies, education ought to have for its object politeneſs and reciprocal civilities:

lities: in deſpotic ſtates, terror, and the debaſing the ſpirits of men. In republics they have occaſion for all the force of education: it ought to inſpire a ſentiment which is noble, but hard to be attained, that diſregard to our own intereſt from whence the love of our country ariſes.

The laws which the legiſlator makes ought to be conformable to the principle of each government: in a republic, to maintain equality and frugality; in monarchy, to ſupport the nobility without ruining the people; in a deſpotic government, to ſilence and equally to keep under ſubjection thoſe of every condition. M. de Monteſquieu ought not to be accuſed of having pointed out to ſovereigns the principles of arbitrary power, the very name of which is ſo odious to juſt princes, and ſtill more ſo to a wiſe and virtuous citizen. 'Tis to labour to deſtroy it, to point out what is neceſſary to maintain it: the perfection of this government is its ruin, and an exact ſyſtem of the laws of tyranny, ſuch as our author deſcribes it to us, is at the ſame time a ſatyr upon, and the moſt formidable ſcourge of tyrants. With reſpect to other governments, they have

have each their advantages: the republican is more proper to ſmall, the monarchical to great ſtates; the republican is more ſubjected to exceſſes, the monarchical to abuſes; the republican executes the laws after more mature deliberation, the monarchical with more promptitude.

The difference of the principles of the three governments muſt produce many differences in the number and object of laws, in the forms of judgments, and the nature of puniſhments. The conſtitution of monarchies, being invariable and fundamental, requires more civil laws and tribunals, that juſtice may be adminiſtred in the moſt uniform and leaſt arbitrary manner. In moderate governments, be they monarchical or republican, there cannot be too many formalities in criminal laws. Puniſhments ought not only to be in proportion to the crime, but alſo as gentle as poſſible, eſpecially in a democracy: the opinion attached to puniſhments will often have more effect than their ſeverity. In republics, judgment muſt be given according to law, becauſe no individual has the power to alter it. In monarchies, the clemency of the ſovereign can ſometimes

ſometimes ſoften the law: but crimes ought never to be judged there but by magiſtrates expreſsly intruſted with that office. In a word, 'tis principally in democracies that the laws ought to be ſevere againſt luxury, looſeneſs of morals, and debauching of women. Their very ſoftneſs and weakneſs render them fit enough to govern in monarchies; and hiſtory proves, that they have often wore a crown with glory.

M. DE MONTESQUIEU having thus run over each government in particular, afterwards examines them in the relation which they may have with each other, but only in the moſt general point of view, that is to ſay, under that which is only relative to their nature and their principle. Viewed in this light, ſtates can have no relations, but that of defending themſelves, or of attacking. Republics by their nature, ſuppoſing their ſtate to be ſmall, cannot defend themſelves without alliances; but it is with republics that they ought to ally themſelves. The defenſive force of monarchy conſiſts principally in having frontiers ſecured from inſults. States, like men, have a right to attack for their own preſervation: from the right of war that of conqueſt is derived; a right neceſſary,

ceſſary, lawful, calamitous, *which always lays an immenſe debt upon us, if we would diſcharge what on that account becomes due from us to human nature*, and the general law of which is to do as little harm as poſſible to the conquered. Republics can conquer leſs than monarchies: immenſe conqueſts ſuppoſe deſpotiſm already in a ſtate, or render its approach certain. One of the great principles of the ſpirit of conqueſt ought to be, to render the condition of the conquered as much better as poſſible: this is to fulfil, at once, the law of nature, and a maxim of ſtate. Nothing is more noble than that treaty of peace which Gelo made with the Carthaginians, by which he forbad them to ſacrifice for the future their own children. The Spaniards, when they conquered Peru, ought in the ſame way to have obliged the inhabitants no more to have ſacrificed men to their Gods; but they thought it more advantageous to ſacrifice theſe people themſelves. There remained nothing to them as a conqueſt but a vaſt deſert; they were obliged to depopulate their own country, and for ever weakened it by their own conqueſt. It may ſometimes be neceſſary to change the laws of the conquered people; it can never be ſo to deprive them of their manners, or even of their cuſtoms, which are often all

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they have for manners. But the ſureſt way of preſerving a conqueſt, is to put, if 'tis poſſible, the conquered on a level with the conquerors, to grant them the ſame rights and the ſame privileges: this the Romans often did, and thus eſpecially Cæſar acted with reſpect to the Gauls.

HITHERTO, when conſidering government, as well in itſelf as in its relation to others, we have neither taken notice of what ought to be common to them, nor of thoſe particular circumſtances which ariſe either from the nature of the country, or from the genius of the people. 'Tis this which we muſt now explain.

THAT political liberty which every citizen ought to enjoy, is the common law of all governments, at leaſt moderate governments, and conſequently juſt ones. This liberty is not an abſurd licence of doing every thing we wiſh to do, but the power of doing every thing that the laws permit. It may be conſidered either in its relation to the conſtitution, or in its relation to the citizen. There are in the conſtitution of every ſtate two ſorts of powers, the legiſlative and the executive; and this laſt has two

two objects, the internal police, and its relation to foreign intereſts. 'Tis from the legitimate diſtribution and proper ſubdiviſion of theſe different powers, that the greateſt perfection of political liberty with relation to the conſtitution depends. M. de Monteſquieu brings as a proof of this the conſtitution of the Roman republic, and that of England. He finds the principle of the laſt in that fundamental law of the government of the ancient Germans, that affairs of ſmall importance were determined by the chiefs, and that great affairs were brought before the tribuual of the nation, after they had been firſt debated by them. M. de Monteſquieu does not examine whether the Engliſh enjoy actually or not that high political liberty which their conſtitution gives them; 'tis enough for him that it is eſtabliſhed by their laws. He is ſtill farther from writing a ſatire upon other ſtates: he believes on the contrary, that an exceſs even of good is not always deſirable; that extreme liberty, like extreme ſlavery, has its inconveniences; and that in general human nature is moſt adapted to a middling ſtate of freedom.

POLITICAL liberty, conſidered with relation to a citizen, conſiſts in that ſecurity in which he

lives under ſhelter of the laws; or at leaſt in an opinion of this ſecurity which makes no one citizen entertain any fear of another. 'Tis principally by the nature and proportion of puniſhments, that this liberty is eſtabliſhed or deſtroyed. Crimes againſt religion ought to be puniſhed by a privation of thoſe advantages which religion procures; crimes againſt morality, by ſhame; crimes againſt the public tranquillity, by impriſonment or baniſhment; crimes againſt its ſecurity, by more grievous puniſhments. Writings ought to be leſs puniſhed than actions; ſimple thoughts ought never to be ſo. Accuſations which are not according to the forms of law, ſpies, anonymous letters, all thoſe reſources of tyranny which are equally diſgraceful to ſuch as are the inſtruments of them, and to thoſe who make uſe of them, ought to be proſcribed in every good monarchical government. No body ought to be permitted to accuſe but in face of the law, which always puniſhes either the accuſed perſon or the calumniator. In every other caſe, thoſe who govern ought to ſay, with the Emperor Conſtantius: *We cannot ſuſpect a man againſt whom no accuſer appeared, when at the ſame time he did not want an enemy.* 'Tis a very fine inſtitution by which a public officer charges himſelf, in name of the

ſtate, with the proſecution of crimes; as this anſwers all the good purpoſes of informers without being expoſed to thoſe ſordid intereſts, thoſe inconveniencies, and that infamy, which attend them.

The greatneſs of taxes ought to be in a direct proportion, with public liberty. Thus, in democracies they may be greater than elſewhere, without being burdenſome; becauſe every citizen looks upon them as a tribute which he pays to himſelf, and which ſecures the tranquillity and fortune of every member of it. Beſides, in a democratical ſtate, an unjuſt application of the public revenue is more difficult; becauſe it is eaſier to find it out, and to puniſh it, he who is intruſted with it being obliged to give an account of it, ſo to ſpeak, to the firſt citizen who requires it of him.

In every government, of whatever ſort, the leaſt burdenſome kind of tax is that which is laid upon merchandize; becauſe the citizen pays without perceiving it. An exceſſive number of troops in time of peace is only a pretence to load the people with taxes, a means of enervating the ſtate, and an inſtrument of ſlavery.

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THAT adminiſtration of the revenues which makes the whole produce of it enter into the public treaſury is beyond compariſon leaſt chargeable to the people, and conſequently more advantageous when it can take place than the farming out of theſe taxes, which always leaves in the hands of private perſons part of the revenue of the ſtate. But above all, every thing is ruined (theſe are the author's own words) when the profeſſion of a farmer of the revenues becomes honourable; and it becomes ſo, when luxury is at a great height. To permit ſome men to acquire vaſt fortunes out of what belongs to the public, to plunder them in their turn, as was formerly practiſed in certain ſtates, is to repair one injuſtice by another, and to commit two ills inſtead of one.

LET us now come, with M. de Monteſquieu, to thoſe particular circumſtances which are independant of the nature of government, and to which laws ought to be adapted. The circumſtances which ariſe from the nature of the country, are of two ſorts; the one has a relation to the climate, the other to the ſoil. No body doubts but that the climate has an influence upon the habitual diſpoſition of the bodies,

and conſequently upon the characters of men; on which account laws ought to be framed agreeable to the nature of the clime in indifferent things, and, on the contrary, to reſiſt its bad effects. Thus, in countries where the uſe of wine is hurtful, that law which forbids it is a very good one: in countries where the heat of the climate inclines people to lazineſs, that law which incourages labour is a very proper one. The government can then correct the effects of the climate; and this is enough to obviate that reproach which has been thrown upon the Spirit of Laws, as if it attributed every thing to cold and heat: for, beſides that heat and cold are not the only circumſtances by which climates are diſtinguiſhed, it would be as abſurd to deny certain effects of climate, as to attribute every thing to it.

THE practice of having ſlaves, eſtabliſhed in the warm countries of Aſia and America, and rejected in the temperate climates of Europe, affords our author an opportunity of treating of ſlavery in a ſtate. Men having no more right over the liberty, than over the lives of each other, it follows that ſlavery, generally ſpeaking, is againſt the law of nature. In effect, the right of ſlavery cannot ariſe from war, becauſe

cauſe it could not then be founded on any thing but the redemption of one's life, and no body has a right over the life of one who no longer attacks him; nor from that ſale which a man may make of himſelf to another, ſince every citizen, being accountable for his life to the ſtate, is ſtill more ſo for his liberty, and conſequently has no title to ſell it. Beſides, what could be a proper price for ſuch a ſale? It cannot be the money given to the ſeller, becauſe the moment he ſells himſelf every thing that belongs to him becomes the property of his maſter: now a ſale without a price is as chimerical, as a contract without a condition. There could never be but one juſt law in favour of ſlavery; this was that Roman law which made a debtor become the ſlave of a creditor: and even this law, to be equitable, ought to limit the ſlavery, both with reſpect to its degree, and time of duration. Slavery can only be tolerated in deſpotic ſtates, where freemen, too weak againſt the government, endeavour to become, by their uſefulneſs, the ſlaves of thoſe who tyranniſe over the ſtate; or in thoſe climates, where heat ſo enervates the body and weakens the courage, that men cannot be incited to a laborious taſk but by the fear of puniſhment. Near to civil ſlavery

may be placed domeſtic ſlavery, that is, that in which women are kept in certain countries. This can take place in thoſe countries of Aſia where they are in a condition to live with men before they can make uſe of their reaſon; marriageable by the law of the climate, children by that of nature. This ſubjection becomes ſtill more neceſſary in thoſe countries where polygamy is eſtabliſhed: a cuſtom which M. de Monteſquieu does not pretend to juſtify, in ſo far as it is contrary to religion; but which, in places where it is received, and, only ſpeaking politically, may have a foundation to a certain degree, either from the nature of the climate, or the relation which the number of women bears to that of men. M. de Monteſquieu ſpeaks upon this occaſion of repudiation and divorce; and he ſhows, from good reaſons, that repudiation once admitted ought to be permitted to women as well as to men.

If the climate has ſo much influence on domeſtic and civil ſlavery, it has no leſs on political ſlavery; that is, upon what ſubjects one nation to another. The people in the north are ſtronger and more courageous than thoſe of the ſouth: theſe muſt then in general be conquered,

quered, thoſe conquerors; theſe ſlaves, thoſe free. And hiſtory confirms this: Aſia has been eleven times conquered by the people of the north; Europe has ſuffered many fewer revolutions.

With reſpect to laws relative to the nature of the ſoil, 'tis plain, that democracy agrees better than monarchy to barren countries, where the earth has occaſion for all the induſtry of men. Liberty, beſides, in this caſe, is a ſort of recompence for the difficulty of labour. More laws are neceſſary for a people which follows agriculture, than for one which tends flocks; for this, than for a hunting people; for a people which makes uſe of money, than for one that does not: in a word, the particular genius of a nation ought to be attended to. Vanity, which augments objects, is a good ſpring for government; pride, which undervalues them, is a dangerous one. The legiſlator ought to reſpect, to a certain degree, prejudices, paſſions, abuſes. He ought to imitate Solon, who gave the Athenians not thoſe laws which were beſt in themſelves, but the beſt which they were capable of receiving: the gay character of this people required gentle, the auſtere character of the Lacedemonians, ſevere

laws. Laws are a bad method of changing the manners and cuſtoms; 'tis by rewards and example that we ought to endeavour to bring that about. 'Tis however true at the ſame time, that the laws of a people, when they don't groſsly and directly affect to ſhock its manners, muſt inſenſibly have an influence upon them, either to confirm or change them.

After having in this manner deeply conſidered the Nature and Spirit of Laws with relation to different kinds of climates and people, our author returns again to conſider ſtates in that relation which they bear to each other. At firſt, when comparing them in a general manner, he could only view them with reſpect to the prejudice which they can do each other: here he conſiders them with reſpect to thoſe mutual ſuccours which they can give. Now theſe ſuccours are principally founded on commerce. If the ſpirit of commerce naturally produces a ſpirit of intereſt, which is different from the ſublimity of moral virtues, it alſo renders the people naturally juſt, and averſe to idleneſs and living on plunder. Free people who live under moderate governments, muſt be more given to it, than enſlaved nations. No nation ought ever to exclude from its commerce

merce another nation without great reaſons. Beſides, liberty in this way is not an abſolute privilege granted to merchants to do what they will; a power which would be oft prejudicial to them. It conſiſts in laying no reſtraints on merchants but for the advantage of commerce. In a monarchy, the nobility ought not to apply to it, and ſtill leſs the prince. In a word, there are ſome nations to which commerce is diſadvantageous; but they are not ſuch as ſtand in need of nothing, but ſuch as ſtand in need of ever thing; a paradox which our author renders intelligible by the example of Poland, which wants every thing except corn, and which, by that commerce which it carries on with it, deprives the common people of the neceſſaries of life, to gratify the luxury of the nobility. M. de Monteſquieu takes occaſion, when treating of thoſe laws which commerce requires, to give us an hiſtory of its different revolutions: and this part of his book is neither the leaſt intereſting, nor the leaſt curious. He compares the impoveriſhment of Spain by the diſcovery of America, to the fate of that weak prince in the fable, ready to periſh for hunger, becauſe he had aſked the Gods that every thing that he touched ſhould be turned into gold. The uſe of money being one conſidera-

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ble part of the object of commerce, and its principal inſtrument, he was of opinion that he ought, in conſequence of this, to treat of the different operations with reſpect to money, of exchange, of the payment of public debts, of lending out money for intereſt, the rules and limits of which he fixes, and which he diſtinguiſhes accurately from that exceſs ſo juſtly condemned as uſury.

POPULATION and the number of inhabitants have an immediate connexion with commerce; and marriages, having population as their object, under this article M. de Monteſquieu goes to the bottom of this important ſubject. That which favours propagation moſt is general chaſtity: experience proves, that illicit amours contribute very little, and even ſometimes are prejudicial to it. The conſent of fathers has with juſtice been required in marriages: nevertheleſs ſome reſtrictions ought to be added; for the law ought in general to favour marriage. That law which forbids the marriage of mothers with their ſons, is, independently of the precepts of religion, a very good civil law; for, without mentioning ſeveral other reaſons, the parties being of very different ages, theſe ſort of marriages can rarely have propagation as their

their object. That law which forbids the marriage of a father with a daughter is founded upon very different reaſons. However (only ſpeaking in a political ſenſe) it is not ſo indiſpenſibly neceſſary to the object of population as the other, becauſe the power of propagating continues much longer in men; and the other cuſtom has, beſides, been eſtabliſhed among certain nations which the light of chriſtianity had not inlightned. As nature of herſelf prompts to marriage, that muſt be a bad government which is obliged to encourage it. Liberty, ſecurity, moderate taxes, baniſhing of luxury, are the true principles and ſupports of populouſneſs. However laws may, with ſucceſs, be made to encourage marriage, when, in ſpite of corruption, there is ſtill ſomething remaining in the people which attaches them to the love of their country. Nothing is finer than the laws of Auguſtus, to promote the propagation of the ſpecies. Unfortunately he made thoſe laws in the decline, or rather after the downfal of the republic; and the diſpirited citizens muſt have foreſeen, that they would no longer propagate any thing but ſlaves: and indeed the execution of thoſe laws was very faint during all the time of the Pagan Emperors. At laſt Conſtantine aboliſhed them when

when he became a chriſtian; as if chriſtianity had had in view to diſpeople the world when it recommended the perfection of celibacy to a ſmall number.

THE eſtabliſhment of hoſpitals, according to the different ſpirit of theſe foundations, may be hurtful or favourable to population. There may, and indeed there ought to be, hoſpitals in a ſtate where the moſt part of the citizens are maintained by their induſtry; becauſe this induſtry may ſometimes be unſucceſsful; but that relief which thoſe hoſpitals give ought to be only temporary, not to encourage beggary and idleneſs. The people are firſt to be made rich, and then hoſpitals to be built for unforeſeen and preſſing occaſions. Unhappy are thoſe countries where the multitude of hoſpitals and of monaſteries, which are only a kind of perpetual hoſpitals, makes all the world live at eaſe but thoſe who work!

M. DE MONTESQUIEU has hitherto only ſpoke of human laws; he now proceeds to thoſe of religion, which, in almoſt all ſtates, compoſe ſo eſſential an object of government. Every where he breaks forth into praiſes of chriſtianity; he points out its advantages and

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its grandeur; he endeavours to make it be loved; he maintains, that it is not impoſſible, as Bayle has pretended, that a ſociety of perfect chriſtians ſhould actually form a durable ſtate. But he alſo thought that he might be permitted to examine what different religions, humanly ſpeaking, might have ſuitable or unſuitable to the genius and ſituation of thoſe people which profeſs them. 'Tis in this point of view that we muſt read all that he has wrote upon this article, and which has been the ſubject of ſo many unjuſt declamations. It is eſpecially ſurpriſing that, in an age which preſumes to call ſo many others barbarous, what he has ſaid of toleration ſhould be objected to him as a crime; as if approving and tolerating a religion were the ſame; as if the goſpel itſelf did not forbid every other way of propagating it, but that of meekneſs and perſuaſion. Thoſe in whoſe heart ſuperſtition has not extinguiſhed every ſentiment of compaſſion and juſtice, will not be able to read, without being moved, the Remonſtrance to the Inquiſitors, that odious tribunal, which outrageouſly affronts religion when it appears to avenge it.

In a word, after having treated in particular of the different kind of laws which men can

have, there remains nothing more than to compare them all together, and to examine them in their relation with thoſe things concerning which they preſcribe rules.

Men are governed by different kinds of laws; by natural law, common to each individual; by the divine law, which is that of religion; by the eccleſiaſtical law, which is that of the policy of religion; by the civil law, which is that of the members of the ſame ſociety; by the political law, which is that of the government of that ſociety; by the law of nations, which is that of ſocieties with reſpect to each other. Theſe laws have each their diſtinct objects, which are carefully not to be confounded. That which belongs to the one ought never to be regulated by the other, leſt diſorder and injuſtice ſhould be introduced into the principles which govern men. In a word, thoſe principles which preſcribe the nature of the laws, and which determine their objects, ought to prevail alſo in the manner of compoſing them. A ſpirit of moderation ought, as much as poſſible, to dictate all their different diſpoſitions. Laws that are properly made will be conformed to the intention of the legiſlator,

lator, even when they appear to be in oppoſition to it. Such was the famous law of Solon, by which all who ſhould not take ſome part in the public tumults were declared infamous. It prevented ſeditions, or rendered them uſeful by forcing all the members of the republic to attend to its true intereſts. Even the oſtraciſm was a good law; for, on one hand, it was honourable to the citizen who was the object of it, and prevented, on the other, the effects of ambition: beſides, a great number of ſuffrages was neceſſary, and they could only baniſh every fifth year. Laws, which appear the ſame, have often neither the ſame motive, nor the ſame effect, nor the ſame equity. The form of government, different conjunctures, and the genius of the people, quite change them. In a word, the ſtyle of laws ought to be ſimple and grave. They may diſpenſe with giving reaſons, becauſe the reaſon is ſuppoſed to exiſt in the mind of the legiſlator; but when they give reaſons, they ought to be built upon evident principles: they ought not to reſemble that law which, prohibiting blind people to plead, gives this as a reaſon, becauſe they can't ſee the ornaments of magiſtracy.

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M. DE MONTESQUIEU, to point out by examples the application of his principles, has chosen two different people, the most celebrated in the world, and those whose history most interests us; the Romans and the French. He does not dwell but upon one point of the jurisprudence of the first, that which regards succession. With regard to the French, he enters into a greater detail, concerning the origin and revolutions of their civil laws, and the different usages abolished or still subsisting, which have been the consequences of them. He principally enlarges upon the feudal laws, that kind of government unknown to all antiquity, which will perhaps for ever be so to future ages, and which has done so much good and so much ill. He especially considers these laws in the relation which they have with the establishment and revolution of the French monarchy. He proves, against the Abbé du Bos, that the Franks actually entered as conquerors among the Gauls; and that it is not true, as this author pretends, that they had been called by the people to succeed to the rights of the Roman Emperors who oppressed them: a detail profound, exact and curious, but in which it is impossible for us to follow him.

SUCH

SUCH is the general analyſis, but a very imperfect one, of M. de Monteſquieu's work. We have ſeparated it from the reſt of his *Eloge*, not too much to interrupt the thread of our hiſtory.

AN ORATION

Pronounced the 24th of January, 1728.

By Preſident MONTESQUIEU:

When he was received into the *French* Academy, in room of the late M. DE SACY.

GENTLEMEN,

BY beſtowing upon me the place of MR. DE SACY, you have not ſo much taught the public what I am, as what I ought to be.

IT was not your intention to compare me with him, but to point him out to me as a model.

FORMED for ſociety, he was amiable, he was uſeful in it: his manners were eaſy and agreeable; his morals were ſtrict and ſevere.

TO a fine genius he joined a ſtill more excellent heart: the qualities of his head held only

only the ſecond place in him; they were an ornament to his merit, but not its principal ſource.

He wrote to inſtruct; and while inſtructing, he always made himſelf be beloved. Every thing in his works breathes a ſpirit of candor and probity. They make us feel and confeſs the goodneſs of his heart: we never diſcover the great man, but along with the man of honour.

He followed virtue from natural inclination; he was ſtill more attached to it by his ſtudies. He was of opinion that having wrote upon morality, it became him to be more ſtrict in his conduct than others; that there could be no excuſe for him, ſince he had laid down the rules of duty; that it would be ridiculous if he himſelf could not do what he believed all men capable of doing; that it would be an abandoning of his own maxims; and that he would at the ſame time have had reaſon to bluſh for what he had done, and for what he had ſaid.

In what a noble manner did he exerciſe his profeſſion? All who ſtood in need of his aſ-

ſiſtance became his friends. At the end of each day, he hardly met with any other reward but that of ſome additional good actions: always leſs rich, and always more diſintereſted, he hath left his children ſcarce any thing more than the honour of having had ſo illuſtrious a father.

GENTLEMEN, you love virtuous men; you don't overlook even in the fineſt genius any ill quality of the heart; and you look upon talents, without virtue, as fatal preſents, only proper to add ſtrength to our vices, or to render them more conſpicuous.

AND by this you are indeed worthy of thoſe great protectors who have intruſted you with their glory, who have wiſhed to be tranſmitted down to poſterity, but who have wiſhed to be ſo along with you.

MANY orators and poets have celebrated them; but it is only you who have been eſtabliſhed to render them, ſo to ſpeak, a perpetual homage.

FULL of zeal and admiration for thoſe great men; you are always a recalling them to our remembrance. You are continually celebrating them;

them; and yet ſo ſurpriſing is the effect of your art, your eulogiums appear always new.

You always excite our admiration and wonder, when you celebrate that great miniſter, who out of chaos reduced the rules of monarchy to a regular ſyſtem; who taught France the ſecret of her ſtrength, Spain that of her weakneſs; freed Germany from her chains, gave her new ones; broke every power in its turn, and deſtined, ſo to ſpeak, *Lewis the Great* for the great actions which he afterwards performed.

You never reſemble each other in your *Eloges* of that Chancellor, who neither abuſed the confidence of kings, nor the obedience and ſubmiſſion of the people; and who, in the exerciſe of magiſtracy, was without paſſion like the laws, which abſolve and puniſh without love or hatred.

But above all we are charmed to behold you with emulation ſtrive to draw the portrait of *Lewis the Great*, that portrait every day begun and never finiſhed, every day more advanced and more difficult. Hardly can we conceive the wonders of that reign which you ce-

lebrate. When you repreſent to us ſciences every where encouraged, arts protected, *belles lettres* cultivated, we imagine we hear you talking of a reign of peace and tranquillity. When you ſing of wars and victories, you ſeem to us to be relating the hiſtory of ſome nation ruſhing from the north to change the face of the earth. Here we ſee the king, there the hero. 'Tis thus that a majeſtic river is turned into a torrent that deſtroys every thing that oppoſes its paſſage: 'tis thus that the ſky appears to the huſbandman clear and ſerene, whilſt, in the neighbouring country, it is covered over with fire, lightning and thunder.

GENTLEMEN, you have aſſociated me with yourſelves in your labours, you have raiſed me to your own dignity; and I return you thanks for permitting me to know you better, and more nearly to behold and admire you.

I RETURN you thanks for giving me a particular right to write the actions of our young monarch. May he delight to hear thoſe encomiums which are given to pacific princes! May that immenſe power which is put in his hands, be a pledge of the happineſs of all! May all the earth repoſe itſelf under his throne! May

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he be the king of one nation, and the protector of every other! May every people love him; may his ſubjects adore him; and may there not be one ſingle perſon in the univerſe who ſhall grieve at his happineſs, or dread his proſperity! May thoſe fatal jealouſies, which render men the enemies of men, at laſt periſh! May human blood, that blood which always pollutes the earth, be ſpared! And that this great object may be obtained, may that miniſter who is neceſſary to the world, who is ſuch a one as the people of France ſhould have aſked of Heaven, continue to give counſels which penetrate the heart of a prince always ready to do every good action that is propoſed to him, or to repair that ill which he was not the author of, and which time has produced!

Lewis has ſhewn, that as people are ſubjected to the laws, princes are ſo to their promiſes, which are ſacred: That great kings who can't be ſo by any other power, are invincibly bound by thoſe chains which they make for themſelves, like that God whoſe repreſentatives they are, who is always independent, and always faithful to his promiſes. How many virtues does a faith, ſo religiouſly obſerv-

ed, preſage! Such ſhall be the deſtiny of France, that after having been agitated under the *Valois*, ſettled under *Henry*, aggrandized under his ſucceſſor, victorious or invincible under *Lewis the Great*, it ſhall be perfectly happy under him who ſhall not be obliged to conquer, and who ſhall place all his glory in governing.

AN ESSAY UPON TASTE,

In Subjects of NATURE, and of ART.

A FRAGMENT.

ACCORDING to the preſent conſtitution of our being, the ſoul enjoys three ſorts of pleaſure. That derived from its very exiſtence; that which reſults from its union with the body; and that founded upon the turn and prejudices it has received from certain inſtitutions, cuſtoms, and habits.

'TIS the different pleaſures of the Soul which form the objects of Taſte; as, the Beautiful, the Good, the Agreeable, the Simple, the Delicate, the Tender, the Graceful, the inexpreſſible charm, the Noble, the Grand, the Sublime, the Majeſtic, *&c.* For example, when we receive pleaſure from the view of

what we perceive to be uſeful to ourſelves, we ſay that it is Good; when we feel pleaſure in beholding it, without perceiving any preſent advantage, we call it Beautiful.

This the antients did not properly diſtinguiſh; they conſidered all the relative qualities of the mind as merely poſitive: hence thoſe dialogues in which Plato makes Socrates reaſon, thoſe dialogues ſo much admired by the antients, are at preſent inſupportable, becauſe they are founded upon a falſe philoſophy; for all reaſonings drawn from the Good, the Beautiful, Perfect, Wiſe, Fooliſh, Hard, Soft, Dry, Wet, when treated as Things poſitive, are now of no weight.

The ſources of the Beautiful, the Good, the Agreeable, *&c.* are then in ourſelves; and to inquire into their cauſes, is to inquire into the cauſes of our mental Pleaſures.

Let us then examine the Mind; let us ſtudy it in its Actions, and in its Paſſions; let us ſeek for it in its Pleaſures, 'tis there where it ſhews itſelf moſt. Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Muſic, Dancing, the different kinds of games, and in a word the

Works

Works of Nature and Art, can give it pleaſure: let us ſee why, how, and when, they give it; let us endeavour to account for our ſenſations: this may contribute to form the Taſte; which is nothing elſe but an ability of diſcovering, with delicacy and quickneſs, the degree of pleaſure which every thing ought to give to man.

OF THE

PLEASURES

OF THE

SOUL.

THE Soul, independently of thoſe Pleaſures it derives from the ſenſes, has ſome which it would have without them, and are proper to itſelf. Such are thoſe it derives from Curioſity, the Ideas of its own Grandeur and Perfections, the Idea of its Exiſtence, oppoſed to the thought of Annihilation, the Pleaſure of embracing the whole of a General Idea, that of viewing a multiplicity of objects at once, and that of comparing, joining, and ſeparating Ideas. Theſe Pleaſures are, from the nature of the Soul, independent of the ſenſes, becauſe they belong to every being that thinks: and it is of ſmall conſequence to examine here, whether the Soul has theſe Pleaſures, as a ſubſtance united to the body, or as ſeparated from it, becauſe it always has them, and they are the objects of Taſte: on which account we ſhall not diſtinguiſh

tinguiſh here the Pleaſures that flow from the nature of the Soul, from thoſe that reſult from its union with the body; theſe we ſhall call natural Pleaſures, and diſtinguiſh them from thoſe which the Soul creates to itſelf, by certain aſſociations with theſe natural Pleaſures; and in the ſame manner, and for the ſame reaſon, we ſhall diſtinguiſh natural and acquired Taſte.

It is proper we ſhould know the ſources of thoſe Pleaſures of which Taſte is the judge. The knowledge of natural and acquired Pleaſures may ſerve to rectify our natural and acquired Taſte. We muſt begin with conſidering the nature of our being, and know what its Pleaſures are, to be able at laſt to meaſure thoſe Pleaſures, and even ſometimes to feel them.

If the Soul had not been united to the body, it would have had clear intelligence, and it is probable that it would have loved what it fully underſtood: at preſent we ſcarcely love any thing that we are thoroughly acquainted with.

Our manner of exiſting is intirely arbitrary; we might have been made as we are, or

otherwiſe: but if we had been made otherwiſe, we ſhould have had different feelings; one organ, more or leſs, in our machine, would have given riſe to another kind of eloquence, another kind of poetry; a different contexture of the ſame organs would have ſtill produced another ſort of poetry: for example, if the conſtitution of our organs had rendered us capable of a longer attention, all the rules about proportioning the diſpoſition of a ſubject to the meaſure of our attention, would have been at an end; if we had been made capable of more penetration, all the rules founded upon the degree of our penetration, would have fallen to the ground. In a word, all the laws formed from the contexture of our machine would be different if our machine was not formed in that manner.

If our ſight had been weaker, and more confuſed, fewer mouldings, and greater uniformity, would have been neceſſary in the parts of architecture; if it had been more diſtinct, and the mind capable of embracing more things at once, more ornaments would have been proper in architecture: if our ears had been made as thoſe of certain animals, our muſical

muſical inſtruments muſt have been much altered. I am very ſenſible, that the relations which things have among themſelves would have ſubſiſted; but the relation which they have with us being changed, things which at preſent have a certain effect upon us, would have it no more: and as the perfection of art conſiſts in preſenting things to us in ſuch a way as to give us the greateſt Pleaſure poſſible, there muſt have been a change made in the arts, becauſe there muſt have been one made in the manner moſt proper to give us Pleaſure.

We are at firſt ready to believe that the knowledge of the different ſources of our Pleaſures is ſufficient to conſtitute Taſte; and that when we know what philoſophy has told us on the Subject, we have Taſte, and may boldly judge of works. But natural Taſte is not a theoretical knowledge; 'tis a quick and exquiſite application of rules which we don't even know. It is not neceſſary to know, that the Pleaſure, we receive from any thing we think beautiful, ariſes from ſurprize; 'tis enough that it does ſurpriſe us, and that it ſurpriſes us as much as it ought, and that neither more nor leſs.

THUS what may here be ſaid, and all the precepts that might be given to form the Taſte, can only relate immediately and directly to that which is acquired, though it may have an indirect relation to natural Taſte: for the acquired Taſte affects, changes, augments, and diminiſhes the natural Taſte; as the natural Taſte affects, changes, augments, and diminiſhes that which is acquired.

THE moſt general definition of Taſte, without conſidering whether it be good or bad, juſt or not, is that ariſing from ſenſation; but this does not prevent its being applied to things that are intellectual, the knowledge of which gives ſuch pleaſure to the Soul, that by ſome philoſophers it was conſidered as the only felicity. The Soul underſtands by its Ideas, and by its Senſations; it receives Pleaſure by thoſe Ideas, and thoſe Senſations: for tho' we oppoſe Idea to Senſation, yet while it ſees a thing, it feels it; and there are no objects ſo intellectual, that it does not ſee, or believes it ſees, and conſequently that are not felt.

Of the MENTAL FACULTIES.*

AMONG the faculties of the mind are genius, good ſenſe, diſcernment, juſtneſs, capacity, and taſte.

THE exiſtence of theſe faculties conſiſts in having the organs well conſtituted relatively to the things to which theſe faculties are applied. If this diſpoſition of mind is very particular, it is named a Talent or Capacity for any thing; if it has an intimate connection with certain delicate Pleaſures, it is called Taſte; if it is a diſpoſition or turn peculiar to a people, it is called their Spirit; as the art of war and agriculture among the Romans, hunting among the ſavages, &c.

Of CURIOSITY.

THE Soul is made to think, that is, to perceive; now ſuch a being muſt have Curioſity;

* The title of this article is, *De l'Eſprit*, a word which includes not only the Mind, but almoſt all its faculties. Indeed the difference of the two languages renders it perhaps impoſſible to do juſtice to our author in tranſlating this Eſſay.

for

for as all things are in a chain, where every idea precedes one, and is followed by another, we cannot like to ſee one thing, without deſiring to ſee another; and if we had no deſire for this, we could have no pleaſure in that. Thus, when a part of a picture is ſhewed us, we wiſh to ſee the part that is concealed from us, in proportion to the Pleaſure which that part we have ſeen has given us.

'Tis then the Pleaſure which one object gives us that incites us to follow another; 'tis on this account that the Soul is always in purſuit of novelty, and is never at reſt.

Thus, we ſhall always be certain of pleaſing the Mind, by making it ſee a great many things, or more than it had hoped to ſee.

By this we may explain the reaſon why we behold with Pleaſure a very regular garden, and at the ſame time are pleaſed when we view a rural uncultivated ſcene: 'tis the ſame cauſe which produces theſe effects.

As we love to ſee a great many objects, we wiſh to extend our view, to be in different places and to enlarge our proſpects; in ſhort, the mind

mind ſtretches beyond all bounds, and wiſhes, if I may uſe the expreſſion, to extend the ſphere of its preſence: hence ariſes the pleaſure of viewing diſtant objects. But how is this to be done? in cities our proſpect is confined by houſes; and in the country, by a thouſand obſtacles; ſcarce can we ſee a few trees. But here Art comes to our aſſiſtance and diſcovers Nature who ſeeks to be concealed; hence we are in love with Art, and admire her more than Nature, that is, than Nature concealed from our ſight: but when we find beautiful ſituations, when the eye, left at liberty, can range far over the meadows, the rivulets, the hills, and thoſe diſpoſitions of nature, which are in a manner created on purpoſe to captivate the eye, we are quite otherwiſe enchanted than when we view the gardens of Le Notre; becauſe Nature is always an original, and Art only copies her. Thus in painting we are better pleaſed with a rural landſkip, than with the moſt beautiful garden upon earth; becauſe painting chuſes Nature only where ſhe is moſt beautiful, where the eye can extend its view as far as it can reach, and where ſhe may be ſeen with moſt pleaſure.

That which commonly conſtitutes a great idea, is, when ſomething is ſaid, that makes

us perceive a great many others, and discovers to us all at once what we could not have expected but after a great deal of reading.

FLORUS in a few words represents to us all Hanibal's faults: "When he might, says he, "have made use of his victory, he chose ra-"ther to enjoy it:" *Cum victoria posset uti, frui maluit.*

HE gives us an idea of the whole Macedonian war, when he says, "To have entered in-"to it was victory:" *Introisse victoria fuit.*

HE gives us a view of the whole life of Scipio, when, speaking of his youth, he says, "This will be that Scipio, who grows up for "the destruction of Africa:" *Hic erit Scipio qui in exitium Africæ crescit.* You think you see a child who increases and grows up like a giant.

IN a word, he makes us see the great character of Hanibal, the state of the world, and all the grandeur of the Roman people, when he says, "Hanibal, a fugitive from Africa, "sought over all the world an enemy to the "Roman people:" *Qui, profugus ex Africa, hostem populo Romano quærebat.*

Of

Of the Pleasures of ORDER.

It is not enough to preſent a great many objects to the Soul; they muſt be preſented with Order: for then we remember what we have ſeen, and we begin to imagine what we ſhall ſee; our mind congratulates itſelf on its own extent and penetration: but in a work where there is no Order, the Mind, every moment, finds that Order, into which it wiſhes to put things, quite embroiled. The ſeries which the author has formed, and that which we make to ourſelves, claſh together; the Mind retains nothing, foreſees nothing; it is mortified by the confuſion of its ideas, by the ignorance in which it remains; it is in vain fatigued, and can enjoy no pleaſure: on which account, when the deſign is not to expreſs or ſhew confuſion, they always put a ſort of Order in confuſion itſelf: thus painters make a groupe of their figures; thus thoſe who paint battles, place, upon the moſt conſpicuous place of the picture, thoſe objects which the eye ought to diſtinguiſh, and what is diſordered and confuſed in the moſt remote and leaſt obvious place.

Of the Pleasures of VARIETY.

But if Order in objects is neceſſary, Variety is ſo alſo: without this the Soul grows languid; for objects, which reſemble each other, appear to it to be the ſame; and if one part of a picture, which is ſhewn us, ſhould reſemble another which we have ſeen, this object would be new without appearing to be ſo, and would afford us no Pleaſure. And, as the beauties of the Works of Art conſiſt in the Pleaſures which they afford us, they ought to be made as fit as poſſible to vary thoſe Pleaſures; the Mind ought to be ſhewn objects which it has not ſeen; the ſentiment it is inſpired with ought to be different from that which it had before.

'Tis thus that hiſtories pleaſe us by the Variety of relations; romances, by the Variety of prodigies; theatrical pieces, by the Variety of paſſions; and that they, who know properly how to inſtruct us, vary, as much as they can, the uniform ſtrain of inſtruction.

A long uniformity renders any thing inſupportable; the ſame order of periods, a great while

while continued, quite fatigues us in an oration; the ſame numbers, and the ſame cadences, make a long poem extremely tireſome. If it be true that they have finiſhed the famous road from *Moſcow* to *Peterſburg*, the traveller muſt be tired to death, ſhut up between the two rows of that alley; and one, who ſhould travel a long time upon the Alps, would come down from them diſguſted with ſituations the moſt agreeable, and points of view the moſt charming.

THE Soul loves Variety; but it does not love it, as we have ſaid, but becauſe it is formed to know and to ſee: it muſt then be poſſible for it to ſee, and the Variety muſt permit it to do ſo; that is to ſay, an object muſt be ſimple enough to be perceived, and varied enough to be perceived with Pleaſure.

THERE are ſome things which appear varied, and are not ſo; and others which appear uniform, and are much varied.

THE Gothic architecture appears extremely varied, but the confuſion of its ornaments fatigues us by their ſmallneſs; which makes it impoſſible for us to diſtinguiſh them from each

other, and their number prevents the eye from fixing upon any one of them: ſo that it diſguſts us by thoſe very parts which were intended to render it agreeable.

A BUILDING of the Gothic order is a kind of riddle to the eye which beholds it; and the Mind is embarraſſed in the ſame way as when an obſcure poem is preſented to it.

THE Grecian architecture, on the contrary, appears uniform, but as it has as many diviſions as it ought, and as are proper to make the Mind ſee preciſely as much as it can without being fatigued, and at the ſame time enough to give it employment, has that Variety which makes it be beheld with Pleaſure.

GREAT objects ought to have great parts; large men have large arms, great trees have great branches, huge mountains are divided into other mountains bigger and leſs in proportion; tis the nature of things which does this.

THE Grecian architecture, which has few diviſions and grand ones, imitates the nature of things; the Soul is ſtruck with a certain majeſty, which every where abounds in it.

'TIS

'Tis thus that painting divides, into groupes of three or four figures, what it repreſents in a picture; it imitates Nature; a numerous troop is always divided into platoons; 'tis thus too that the painter makes grand diviſions of his light and ſhade.

Of the Pleasures of SYMMETRY.

I have ſaid that the Mind loves Variety; however, in moſt things, it loves to ſee a certain Symmetry. This ſeems to imply a ſort of contradiction: I thus explain it.

One of the principal cauſes of the Pleaſure of our Soul, when it perceives objects, is the facility with which it perceives them; and the reaſon that makes proportion pleaſe the Mind, is, that it ſaves it trouble, that it gives it eaſe, and that, ſo to ſpeak, it cuts the work into halves.

From this a general rule is derived; every where that Symmetry is uſeful to the Soul, and can aſſiſt its functions, it is agreeable to it; but wherever it is uſeleſs to it, it is inſipid becauſe it takes away Variety. Now thoſe things which we

we ſee in ſucceſſion ought to have Variety, for our Mind has no difficulty to perceive them; thoſe, on the contrary, which we perceive all at once, ought to have Symmetry. Thus, as we perceive with one glance of our eye the front of a building, a parterre, a temple, they are with propriety proportioned; which pleaſes the Mind by that facility which it gives it of embracing all at once the whole object.

As it is neceſſary that an object, which we ought to ſee all at once, ſhould be ſimple, it is neceſſary too that it be one, and that all its parts have a relation to the principal object: 'tis for this reaſon alſo that we love Symmetry, it makes an united whole.

'Tis according to Nature, that a whole be compleat, and the Mind, which ſees this whole, wiſhes that it may have no part imperfect. 'Tis on this account alſo that we love Symmetry; there muſt be a ſort of poizing or balancing; and a building with one wing, or one wing ſhorter than another, is as unfiniſhed, as a body with one arm, or one arm too ſhort.

Of CONTRASTS.

THE Soul loves Symmetry, it alſo loves Contraſts; this requires to be a good deal explained. For example: if Nature requires of painters and ſculptors to proportion the parts of their figures, it requires alſo that they contraſt their different attitudes. One foot placed like another, one member extended like another, are inſupportable; the reaſon of it is, becauſe this Symmetry makes the attitudes be almoſt always the ſame; which we may obſerve in Gothic figures, which by this almoſt always reſemble each other; thus there is no more variety in the Works of Art. Beſides, Nature has not made us thus, and, as ſhe has given us motion, ſhe has not formed us in our actions and manners like Pagods; and if men thus ſtiff and conſtrained are intolerable, what muſt it be in the productions of Art.

THE attitudes muſt then be contraſted, eſpecially in works of ſculpture, which, naturally languid, cannot be animated but by the force of Contraſt and ſituation.

BUT,

But, as we ſaid that the Variety which they have endeavoured to give the Gothic, has made it quite uniform; it has often happened, that that Variety, which they have endeavoured to give us by the means of Contraſts, has become a vicious Symmetry and Uniformity.

This is not perceived in certain works of painting and ſculpture only, but alſo in the ſtyle of ſome writers, who, in every phraſe, contraſt the beginning with the end by perpetual antitheſes; ſuch as St. *Auguſtine* and other authors of the low Latin, and ſome of our moderns, as *St. Evremont*. The turn of the phraſe always the ſame, and always uniform, diſpleaſes extremely; this perpetual Contraſt becomes Symmetry, and this oppoſition always ſtudiouſly ſought for becomes Uniformity.

The Mind finds ſo little Variety in it, that when you have ſeen one part of the phraſe, you gueſs at the other: you ſee words oppoſed to each other, but oppoſed always in the ſame manner: you ſee a turn of phraſe, but it is always the ſame.

MANY painters have fallen into this fault, of putting Contraſts every where, and without Art: ſo that when one ſees one figure, the diſpoſition of thoſe next it can eaſily be divined: this continual diverſity becomes ſomething of a reſemblance. Beſides, Nature, which places every thing in diſorder, never diſcovers an affectation of a perpetual Contraſt; without adding further, that ſhe does not put all bodies in motion, and in a forced motion; ſhe is more various than to do this; ſhe places ſome in reſt, and gives to others different kinds of movement.

IF the intelligent part of the Soul loves Variety, the ſenſitive part of it is no leſs fond of it; for the Soul cannot long bear the ſame ſituation, becauſe it is joined to a body which can't endure it. That our Soul may be excited, the ſpirits muſt flow in the nerves: but there are in this two things, a laſſitude in the nerves, and an intermiſſion of ſpirits which flow no more, or are diſſipated from thoſe places where they run.

THUS at length every thing fatigues us, eſpecially great Pleaſures: we quit them always with

with as much Pleaſure as we began them; for the fibres, which were the organs of them, have need of reſt; we muſt make uſe of others more proper to be of ſervice to us, and, ſo to ſpeak, make a proper diviſion of our toil.

Our Soul grows tired with enjoyment; not to perceive any pleaſure at all is to fall into a ſtate of lifeleſs inſenſibility, which quite oppreſſes it. We find a remedy for all this by varying its modifications: it feels, and it does not grow tired.

Of the Pleasures of SURPRIZE.

This diſpoſition of the Soul, which carries it always to different objects, makes it reliſh all the Pleaſures which flow from Surprize; a ſentiment which pleaſes the Soul by the object which it beholds, and by the ſuddenneſs of the action; for it perceives or feels ſomething which it does not expect, or in a manner which it did not expect.

A thing may ſurpriſe us as wonderful, and, at the ſame time, as new, and alſo as unexpected; and, in theſe laſt caſes, the principal ſentiment is united to this acceſſory one, that the thing is new or unexpected.

'Tis

'Tis by this that games of hazard intereſt us; they preſent us with a continued ſeries of unexpected events: 'tis by this that ſocial games pleaſe us; they too are a ſet of unforeſeen events, brought about by addreſs joined to chance.

'Tis by this alſo that we are pleaſed with theatrical pieces; they are unravéled by degrees, the events are concealed till they happen, new ſubjects of Surprize are always prepared for us, and they often afford us a ſenſible pleaſure, by ſhewing the events to be ſuch as we ought to have foreſeen they would be. In a word, works of genius are commonly read for no other reaſon but becauſe they procure an agreeable Surprize, and make amends for the inſipidity of converſations that have not this effect.

Surprize may be produced either by the object, or by the manner of producing it: for we ſee an object greater or leſs than it is in fact, or different from what it is; or we ſee the ſame object, but with an additional idea which ſurpriſes us. Such, in any thing, is the acceſſory idea of the difficulty of making it, or the perſon who made it, or the time when it was made,

made, or the manner how it was made, or ſome other circumſtance connected with it.

SUETONIUS deſcribes the crimes of Nero with a coolneſs of blood which ſurpriſes us, by making us almoſt believe that he does not feel ſufficient horror for what he deſcribes; but he ſuddenly changes his ſtyle, and ſays, " The " univerſe having ſuffered ſuch a monſter " fourteen years, at laſt abandoned him:" *Tale monſtrum per quatuordecim annus perpeſſus terrarum orbis tandem deſtituit.* This produces in the Mind different kinds of Surprize: we are ſurpriſed at the author's change of ſtyle; at the diſcovery of his different manner of thinking; at his method of relating in ſo few words one of the greateſt revolutions that ever happened: thus the Soul finds a vaſt number of different ſenſations that concur to move it, and to inſpire it with Pleaſure.

Of DIFFERENT CAUSES that produce SENSATION.

WE ought carefully to obſerve, that one Senſation has commonly more than one Cauſe in the Mind. 'Tis, if I dare venture to make uſe

uſe of the term, a certain doſe produced by Force and Variety. Genius conſiſts in knowing how to ſtrike ſeveral organs at once; and if we examine different writers, we ſhall perhaps perceive, that the beſt of them, and thoſe who have pleaſed moſt, are thoſe who have excited in our Mind moſt Senſations at one time.

Pray obſerve the multiplicity of Cauſes. We like to view a garden finely laid out, better than a confuſion of trees. 1. Becauſe our proſpect, which would be confined, is not ſo. 2. Every walk is one, and forms one grand object; whereas, amidſt confuſion, every tree is one object, and a little one. 3. We ſee an arrangement which we were not accuſtomed to ſee. 4. We are pleaſed with the pains which has been taken. 5. We admire the care they take perpetually to reſiſt Nature, which by ſpontaneous productions would put every thing in confuſion. This is ſo true, that a garden quite neglected is intolerable. Sometimes the difficulty of a work, ſometimes the eaſineſs of it, pleaſes us; and, as in a magnificent garden we admire the grandeur and expence of its owner, we obſerve ſometimes with delight,

that they have had the art to pleaſe us with ſmall expence and labour.

GAMING pleaſes us, becauſe it ſatisfies our avarice, that is, our hope of poſſeſſing more: it flatters our vanity by an idea of that preference which fortune gives us, and the notice which others take of our luck: it ſatisfies our curioſity by preſenting a ſort of ſhew to us. In a word, it gives us all the different Pleaſures of Surprize.

DANCING pleaſes us by its nimble activity; by a certain grace; by the beauty and variety of attitudes; by its harmony with the muſic, the perſon who dances being, as it were, an inſtrument which accompanies it: but, above all, it pleaſes us by a particular diſpoſition of our brain, by which it is ſo conſtituted that it refers and aſſociates the idea of all the motions to certain other motions, and the greateſt part of the attitudes, to other attitudes.

Of SENSIBILITY.

THINGS almoſt always pleaſe and diſpleaſe us in different reſpects. For example, Italian eunuchs ought to give us little Pleaſure. 1. Becauſe

cauſe it is not ſurpriſing that, * trim'd as they are, they ſhould ſing well; they are like an inſtrument from which the workman has cut off wood, to make it produce ſounds. 2. Becauſe the paſſions which they act are too much ſuſpected of being falſe. 3. Becauſe they are neither of the ſex we love, nor of that which we eſteem. On the other hand, they may pleaſe us, becauſe they preſerve a long time the air of youth; and alſo becauſe they have a voice extremely flexible, and which is peculiar to themſelves. Thus every thing gives us a Feeling which is compoſed of a great many others, which ſometimes weaken and counteract each other.

The Soul often forms reaſons to itſelf of its Pleaſure; and it ſucceeds in this principally by thoſe aſſociations of ideas which it connects with certain objects. Thus, any thing which has pleaſed us, pleaſes us ſtill for that very reaſon that it has pleaſed us, becauſe we join the new to the old idea: thus, an actreſs who has pleaſed us on the ſtage, pleaſes us too in a private room; her voice, her action, the remembrance of having ſeen her admired, what do I

* Accommodés.

ſay ?—the idea of the Princeſs joined to that of herſelf; all this makes a ſort of compoſition, which forms and produces a Pleaſure. We are all full of acceſſory ideas: a lady who ſhould happen to have a great character, and a trifling defect, might make this be regarded as a beauty, and bring it into faſhion. The greateſt part of thoſe ladies, whom we love, have nothing for them but the prepoſſeſſion of their birth or their fortune, the honours or eſteem of certain people.

Of DELICACY.

People of Delicacy are thoſe who, to every idea or to every Taſte, join a great many acceſſory Ideas and Taſtes. Indelicate people have only one idea; their Mind can neither compound nor diminiſh; they neither add nor take away from what Nature has given: while people of Delicacy when in love form to themſelves the greateſt part of the Pleaſures of love.

Polyxena and Apicius brought to table a great many Senſations unknown to us vulgar eaters; and thoſe who judge with Taſte of the works of wit have, and have formed to themſelves

ſelves an infinite number of Senſations which other men have not.

Of the JE NE SCAIS QUOI.

THERE is ſometimes in perſons and things a certain inviſible charm, a natural grace, which cannot be defined, and which we have been obliged to call the *I don't know what*. It appears to me, that it is an effect principally derived from Surprize. We are ſtruck with this, that a perſon pleaſes us more, than it appeared to us at firſt that ſhe ought to have done, and we are agreeably ſurpriſed that ſhe has known how to overcome thoſe defects which our eyes pointed out to us, and which the heart no more believes ſhe had: you ſee the reaſon why ordinary women have very often graces, and the handſome ones ſeldom have them: for a beautiful perſon commonly produces the contrary effect from that which we expected of her; ſhe becomes leſs lovely in our eyes, after having ſurpriſed us with what is fine, ſhe ſurpriſes us with what is not ſo; but the impreſſion of what is good is old, that of what is bad is new; thus handſome people rarely produce ſtrong paſſions, which are almoſt conſtantly reſerved for thoſe who have graces, that is to

ſay, charms which we did not expect, and which we had no reaſon to expect. Rich dreſſes are ſeldom graceful, thoſe of ſhepherdeſſes often are ſo. We admire the majeſty of the draperies of *Paul Veroneſe*; but we are touched with the ſimplicity of *Raphael*, and the purity of *Corregio*. *Paul Veroneſe* promiſes us a great deal, and pays what he promiſed: *Raphael* and *Corregio* promiſe little, and pay a great deal; and this pleaſes us more.

Graces are more commonly found in the Mind, than the countenance: for a beautiful face appears immediately, and conceals nothing; but the Mind does not ſhew itſelf but by little and little, when it chuſes it, and as much as it chuſes; it can conceal itſelf to appear again, and produce that ſort of Surprize which conſtitutes Grace.

Grace is ſeldomer found in the face than in the manner; for our manner is produced every moment, and can create Surprize: in a word, a woman can be beautiful but one way, ſhe can be graceful a thouſand.

The law of the two ſexes has eſtabliſhed, among civilized and ſavage nations, that men ſhould

ſhould aſk, and women only grant: hence it happens, that Grace is more peculiarly attached to the women. As they have all to defend, they have all to conceal; the leaſt word, the leaſt geſture, every thing which, without ſhocking the firſt of duties, ſhews itſelf in them, every thing which appears at liberty becomes a grace; and ſuch is the wiſdom of Nature, that that which would be nothing without the law of modeſty, becomes of infinite value after that happy law which conſtitutes the felicity of ſociety.

As conſtraint and affectation cannot ſurpriſe us, Grace is neither found in conſtrained nor affected manners, but in a certain freedom or eaſe which is between the two extremes, and the Mind is agreeably ſurpriſed to perceive, that they have kept clear of two rocks.

It would ſeem that our natural manners ought to be the moſt eaſy, they are the leaſt ſo of any: for education, which conſtrains us, makes us always loſe our natural manner; we are then charmed to ſee it return.

Nothing pleaſes us ſo much in dreſs, as when it appears in that negligence, or even in

that diſorder, which conceals from us thoſe pains which neatneſs does not require, and which vanity alone could have made us take; and one's wit is never graceful, but when what is ſaid appears to be hit off, and not ſtudied.

When you ſay things which have coſt you pains, you may indeed ſhow that you have wit, but not a graceful wit. To make this appear, you muſt not ſeem to perceive it yourſelf; that others, who from ſomething naturally unaffected and ſimple in you, did not expect it of you, may be agreeably ſurpriſed by perceiving it.

Thus Graces are not acquired; to have them, one muſt be *ſimple and unaffected*; but how can one ſtudy to be ſo?

One of the moſt beautiful fictions of Homer is that of the girdle, which gave Venus the power of pleaſing. Nothing is more proper to make us conceive that magic and power of the Graces, which ſeem to be given to a perſon by an inviſible power, and are diſtinguiſhed from beauty itſelf. Now this girdle could not be given but to Venus; it could not agree with the majeſtic beauty of Juno; for majeſty requires a certain gravity, that is, a conſtraint oppoſite

to

to the ſimplicity of the Graces: it could not agree with the proud beauty of Pallas; for pride is contrary to the ſweetneſs of the Graces, and may often be ſuſpected of affectation.

The Progression of SURPRIZE.

That which conſtitutes great beauties, is, when a thing is ſuch, that the Surprize at firſt is inconſiderable, that it ſupports itſelf, increaſes, and at laſt leads us to admiration. The works of Raphael ſtrike little at firſt ſight; he imitates Nature ſo well, that one is no more at firſt ſurpriſed than when one ſees the object itſelf, which would cauſe no Surprize at all: but an uncommon expreſſion, the ſtrong colouring or odd attitudes of an inferior painter ſtrike us at firſt, becauſe we have not been accuſtomed to ſee them elſewhere. We may compare Raphael to Virgil, and the Venetian painters, with their conſtrained attitudes, to Lucan. Virgil, more natural, ſtrikes us at firſt leſs, to ſtrike us more afterwards: Lucan ſtrikes immediately, to ſtrike us afterwards leſs.

The exact proportion of the famous church of St. Peter makes it appear at firſt not ſo great as it is; for we don't know immediately where

to

to begin to judge of its greatneſs. If it had been narrower, we would have been ſtruck with its length; if it had not been ſo long, we would have been ſtruck with its breadth. But, in proportion as we examine it, the eye perceives it grow larger, our aſtoniſhment increaſes. We may compare it to the Pyrenees, where the eye, which at firſt thought it could meaſure them, diſcovers mountains beyond mountains, and always loſes itſelf more and more.

It often happens that our Mind feels a Pleaſure from a Sentiment which it cannot quite explain; and when a thing appears to it to be abſolutely different from what it knows it to be, this gives it a Sentiment of Surprize out of which it cannot extricate itſelf. For example: the dome of St. Peter's is immenſe; 'tis known, that Michael Angelo, viewing the Pantheon, which was the largeſt temple of Rome, ſaid, that he would make one like it, but that he would ſituate it in the air. He made then after this model the dome of St. Peter's; but he made the pillars ſo ſtrong, that this dome, which is like a mountain over our heads, appears light to the eye which obſerves it. The Mind remains uncertain between what

what it ſees, and what it knows to be the caſe, and is aſtoniſhed to ſee a maſs ſo enormous, and ſo light at the ſame time.

Of BEAUTIES which reſult from an Embarraſſment of the SOUL.

THE Mind is often ſurpriſed, becauſe it cannot reconcile what it ſees with what it has ſeen. There is in Italy a great lake which they call the *Greater Lake*; 'tis a little ſea, the banks of which ſhew nothing but what is wild. Fifteen miles in the lake there are two iſlands, a quarter of a mile in circumference, which they call the Borromees, which is, in my opinion, the moſt inchanting abode in the world. The Mind is aſtoniſhed at the romantic Contraſt, and recalls with Pleaſure the wonders of romance, where, after having paſſed over rocks and barren countries, you find yourſelf in fairy land.

ALL Contraſts ſtrike us, becauſe the oppoſite objects heighten each other. Thus, when a little man is near a tall one, the little one makes the other appear taller, and the great one makes the other ſeem leſs.

THESE

These kinds of Surprizes conſtitute the Pleaſure which we find in all Beauties of Oppoſition, in Antitheſes, and ſuch figures. When Florus ſays, " Sora and Algidum, who would " believe it! were formidable to us; Satricum " and Corniculum were provinces; we under- " value the Boritians, the Verulians, yet we " gloried in triumphing over them; Prænesté, " where our pleaſure-houſes now are, was the " ſubject of vows which we went to make at " the capitol:" this author, I ſay, points out to us, at the ſame time, the grandeur of the Romans and the ſmallneſs of their beginnings, and our aſtoniſhment is raiſed by both theſe.

We may remark here how great a difference there is between antitheſes of ideas and antitheſes of expreſſion. The antitheſis of expreſſion is not concealed; that of ideas is ſo: the one always aſſumes the ſame appearance; the other changes it as it pleaſes: the one is varied; the other not.

The ſame Florus, ſpeaking of the Samnites, ſays, " that their cities were deſtroyed in ſuch " a way that it was difficult to find out at pre- " ſent what could have been the ſubject of ſo " many

" many triumphs :" *Ut non facile appareat materia quatuor & viginti triumphorum :* and by the ſame words which point out to us the deſtruction of this people, he makes us perceive the greatneſs and obſtinacy of their courage.

When we want to hinder ourſelves from laughing, our laughter increaſes, on account of that Contraſt which is between the ſituation in which we find ourſelves, and that in which we ought to be: in the ſame way as when we perceive in a face a very great fault, as, for example, a very large noſe, we laugh becauſe we ſee a Contraſt with the other features of the face, which ought not to be. Thus Contraſts are the cauſe of faults, as well as beauties. When we perceive that they are without any reaſon, that they heighten or diſcover another fault, they are the great cauſes of uglineſs, which, when it ſtrikes us ſuddenly, can excite a certain joy in our ſoul, and make us laugh. If our Mind views it as a misfortune in the perſon who poſſeſſes it, it can excite pity: if it views it with the idea of what may hurt us, and with an idea of compariſon with what uſed to move us and excite our deſires, it views it with a ſentiment of averſion.

In the ſame way, our thoughts, when they contain an oppoſition contrary to good ſenſe, when this oppoſition is common and eaſily found out, don't pleaſe us, and are faults, becauſe they occaſion no Surprize; and if, on the contrary, they are too much ſtudied, they don't pleaſe us neither. In a work, we ought to be ſtruck with them becauſe they are there, and not becauſe the writer has laboured to ſhew them; for then we are only ſurprized at the folly of the author.

One of the things which pleaſes us moſt is the Simple; but 'tis alſo the moſt difficult ſtyle to acquire: the reaſon of which is, becauſe it is preciſely betwixt the Noble and the Low, and it is very difficult to be always going by it without falling into it.

Musicians have acknowledged, that the muſic, which is eaſieſt ſung, is moſt difficult to compoſe; a certain proof that our Pleaſures, and that Art which ſupplies us with them, have certain limits.

To read the pompous verſes of Corneille, and the eaſy natural ones of Racine, who would

would imagine that Corneille compoſed with eaſe, and Racine with a great deal of trouble?

What is low, is the Sublime of the vulgar, who are pleaſed to ſee a thing made for them, and adapted to their capacity.

The ideas which occur to thoſe who are well educated, and have great minds, are either ſimple, or noble, or ſublime.

When a thing is pointed out to us with circumſtances which add to its grandeur, this appears noble to us: this is eſpecially perceived in compariſons, where the Mind ought always to gain, and never to loſe: for they ought always to add ſomewhat to make the thing appear greater, or, if grandeur be not the object, finer and more delicate; but particular care muſt be taken not to point out any connexion it may have with what is low; for the Mind would have concealed this if it had diſcovered it.

As the aim is to repreſent things in a delicate way, the Mind likes better to compare a manner to a manner, an action to an action, than

than a thing to a thing, as a hero to a lion, a woman to a ſtar, a ſwift man to a ſtag.

MICHAEL ANGELO is the greateſt maſter for giving a nobleneſs to all his ſubjects. In his famous Bacchus he does not do like the Flemiſh painters, who repreſent to us a figure almoſt falling, and, ſo to ſpeak, in the air. This would be unworthy of the majeſty of a God. He paints him firm upon his legs, but he ſo happily gives him the gay air of one who is drunk, and ſuch a pleaſure in viewing the liquor, which he pours into his cup, that there is nothing ſo admirable.

IN that picture of the Paſſion which is in the gallery of Florence, he has painted the Virgin ſtanding, who beholds her crucified ſon, without grief, without pity, without regret, without tears. He ſuppoſes her inſtructed in this great myſtery, and by that makes her bear with grandeur the view of his death.

THERE are none of Michael Angelo's works in which he has not put ſomething noble. We find even *the Great* in his ſketches, as in thoſe verſes which Virgil has not finiſhed.

JULIO

JULIO Romano, in the Chamber of Giants at Mantua, where he has repreſented Jupiter thundring, makes all the Gods appear terrified; but Juno is near Jupiter, ſhe points out to him, with an undaunted air, a giant at whom he ſhould dart his thunder: by this he gives her an air of grandeur which the other Deities have not: the nearer they are to Jove, the bolder they are, and this is very natural; for in a battle, fear ceaſes near him who has the advantage * * * * * * * *

NEW

PERSIAN LETTERS,

Added to the LAST EDITION

OF

Preſident MONTESQUIEU's

WORKS.

NEW PERSIAN LETTERS, &c.

LETTER XV.

The First Eunuch to Jaron the Black Eunuch at Erzeron.

MAY Heaven again bring thee ſafe to theſe parts, and guard thee from every danger! Tho' I have ſcarce ever known that engagement which is called friendſhip, and have wrapped myſelf quite up in myſelf, yet thou haſt made me feel that I have a heart; and while I was as braſs to all the other ſlaves who were under my command, I with pleaſure beheld thy infancy grow up.

The time came when my maſter caſt his eyes upon thee. Nature had not yet whiſpered its dictates, when the cruel iron ſeparated thee from what was natural. I will not ſay whether I lamented thee, or whether I felt a

ſecret pleaſure in beholding thee elevated even to my own condition. I appeaſed thy tears and thy cries. Methought I ſaw thee born a ſecond time, and quit a ſtate of ſlavery where thou muſt always have obeyed, to enter upon one where thou oughteſt always to command. I took care of thy education. Severity, always inſeparable from giving inſtructions, kept thee a long time from knowing that thou waſt dear to me. Thou waſt ſo however: and I will tell thee, that I loved thee as a father loves his ſon, if theſe names of father and ſon could be ſuitable to our deſtiny.

Thou art about to paſs through countries inhabited by Chriſtians, who have never believed. It is impoſſible but that thou muſt there contract ſome impurities. How can the Prophet propitiouſly behold thee in the midſt of ſo many millions of his enemies. I wiſh my maſter, when he returns, would make a pilgrimage to Mecca. You would both purify yourſelves in the land of angels.

From the Seraglio at Iſpahan, the 10th of the Moon Gemmadi, 1711.

LET-

LETTER XXII.

JARON to the FIRST EUNUCH.

IN proportion as Uſbek is removed from the Seraglio, he turns his head towards thoſe women who are conſecrated to him: he ſighs, he ſheds tears; his grief increaſes, his ſuſpicions grow ſtrong. He wants to augment the number of their guardians: he is about to ſend me back, with all the Blacks that accompany him. He fears nothing for himſelf; he is anxious for what is a thouſand times more dear to him than himſelf.

I COME then to live under thy laws, and to ſhare thy toils. Great God! how many things are neceſſary to render one man happy! Nature ſeemed at the ſame time to have placed women in a ſtate of dependance, and to have freed them from it. Diſorder aroſe among the two ſexes, becauſe their rights were reciprocal. We have entered upon a new plan of harmony: we have put hatred between the women and us; and love between men and women.

My brow is about to become ſevere, I ſhall aſſume a gloomy air, joy ſhall be baniſhed from my lips; my external appearance ſhall be compoſed, my mind unquiet and uneaſy. I ſhall not wait for the wrinkles of old age, to ſhew all its peeviſhneſs.

I SHOULD have taken pleaſure in following my maſter to the weſt; but my will is his property. He wants me to guard his women: I will guard them with fidelity. I know how to conduct myſelf with the ſex, which, when it is not permitted to be vain, becomes proud; and which it is leſs eaſy to humble than to annihilate. I proſtrate myſelf in thy ſight.

From Smirna, the 12th of the Moon Zilcade, 1711.

LETTER LXXVII.

IBBEN to USBEK at PARIS.

MY dear Uſbek, it appears to me, that to a true Muſſulman misfortunes are not ſo much chaſtiſements as threatnings. Thoſe days are happy ones indeed which lead us to expiate our offences. 'Tis the time of proſperity which ought to be abridged. To what purpoſe does all our impatience ſerve, but to diſcover that we want to be happy independently of him who imparts felicity to us, becauſe he is felicity itſelf.

IF a being is compoſed of two eſſential parts, and the neceſſity of preſerving their union is the ſtrongeſt mark of ſubmiſſion to the orders of the Creator, this may be made a religious law. If this neceſſity of preſerving their union is the beſt ſurety of the actions of men, it may be made a civil law †.

From Smirna, the laſt day of the Moon Saphar, 1715.

† To underſtand this Letter, it muſt be obſerved, that it is an anſwer to the 76th, in which Uſbek argues for the lawfulneſs of ſuicide when a perſon is extremely unfortunate.

LET-

LETTER XCI.

USBEK to RUSTAN at ISPAHAN.

THERE has appeared here a perſon aſſuming the character of Ambaſſador from Perſia, who inſolently expoſes to ridicule the two greateſt Kings of the earth. He brings to the French Monarch preſents, which ours would not offer to a King of Irimett or Georgia; and by his low avarice he has diſhonoured the majeſty of two empires.

HE hath rendered himſelf ridiculous before a people which pretends to be the moſt polite of any in Europe, and made it be ſaid in the weſt, that the King of Kings reigns only over Barbarians.

HE hath received honours which he ſeemed to wiſh had been refuſed him: and as if the Court of France had the Perſian grandeur more at heart than he himſelf had, it has made him appear with dignity before a people which deſpiſes him.

TELL

TELL not this at Iſpahan; ſpare the head of a wretch. I don't want that our miniſters ſhould puniſh him for their own imprudence, and the unworthy choice which they have made.

From Paris, the laſt of the Moon Gemmadi, 1715.

LETTER CXI.

USBEK to * * *.

THE reign of the late King was ſo long, that the end had made the beginning of it be forgot. 'Tis the faſhion at preſent only to be taken up about thoſe events which happened during his minority, and no body reads any thing now but the memoirs of thoſe times.

HERE is a ſpeech which one of the Generals of the city of Paris made in a council of war; and, I confeſs, I can perceive very little in it.

" GENTLEMEN, tho' our troops have been
" repulſed with loſs, I believe it won't be dif-
" ficult for us to repair this misfortune. I
" have compoſed ſix couplets of a ſong ready
" to be publiſhed, which, I'm perſuaded, will
" reſtore our affairs to an equilibrium. I have
" made choice of ſome excellent voices, which
" iſſuing from the cavity of certain ſtrong
" breaſts, will wonderfully move the people.
" They are ſet to an air which hitherto has
" had a ſingular effect. If this does not do,
" we'll publiſh a print repreſenting Mazarin as
" hanged.

" LUCKILY for us, he does not ſpeak good
" French, and ſo murders it, that it is impoſ-
" ſible but that his affairs muſt decline. We
" don't fail to make it be taken notice of to the
" people, with what a ridiculous accent he
" pronounces. A few days ago we ſo much ri-
" diculed a blunder which he had made in
" grammar, that it has been made a joke of in
" every ſtreet.

" I HOPE, before eight days, the people will
" make the name of Mazarin a general word
" to expreſs all beaſts of burden and carriage.

" SINCE

" SINCE our defeat, our muſic about original
" ſin has ſo vexed him, that, not to ſee his
" party reduced to one half, he has been ob-
" liged to ſend back all his pages.

" RECOVER your ſpirits then, have courage
" and aſſure yourſelves that we will drive
" him over the mountains by the force of
" our hiſſes."

From Paris, the 4th of the Moon
Chahban, 1718.

LETTER CXXIV.

USBEK to RHEDI at VENICE.

WHAT can be the motive of that immenſe liberality which Princes laviſh upon their ſubjects? Do they want to attach them to them? They have already gained them as much as they can. And, beſides, if they gain ſome of their ſubjects by bribing them, they muſt loſe an infinite number of others by impoveriſhing them.

WHEN

WHEN I reflect on the ſituation of Princes always ſurrounded with avaricious and inſatiable men, I can't help pitying them; and I pity them ſtill more, when they have not courage to refuſe demands which are always burdenſome to thoſe who aſk nothing.

I NEVER hear people talk of the liberality of Princes, of the favours and penſions which they grant, without giving way to a thouſand reflexions: a crowd of ideas preſent themſelves to my mind: methinks I hear this decree publiſhed:

" THE unwearied courage of ſome of our " ſubjects in aſking penſions from us, having, " without ceaſing, fatigued our royal magni- " ficence, we have at laſt yielded to the mul- " titude of requeſts preſented to us, which " have hitherto been the greateſt uneaſineſs of " the throne. They have repreſented to us, " that ſince our acceſſion to the throne, they " have never failed to be at our levee; and " that as we paſſed along, we have always ſeen " them immoveable as poſts; and that they " have raiſed themſelves as much as poſſible " above the ſhoulders of the higheſt, that they

" might

" might behold our Serenity. We have alſo " received ſeveral petitions from ſome of the " fair ſex, ſupplicating us to obſerve, that it is " notorious that they are of a very reſerved " converſation: and ſome of them who are " very antient, ſhaking their heads, have pray- " ed us to remember that they have been the " ornaments of the Courts of the Kings our " predeceſſors; and that if the Generals of their " armies rendered the ſtate formidable by " their military actions, they rendered the " Court no leſs ſo by their intrigues. Deſiring " therefore to treat theſe ſuppliants kindly, " and grant them all their petitions, we have " commanded what follows:

" That every labourer, having five child- " ren, ſhall daily retrench the fifth part of the " bread which he gives them. We alſo enjoin " fathers of families to make as exact a dimi- " nution from each in their houſe, as can be.

" We expreſsly forbid all thoſe who apply " themſelves to improve their eſtates, or who " let them out in farms, to make any repairs " in them whatſoever.

" We

" We alſo order, that all perſons of low " trades, and mechanics, who have never been " at the levee of our Majeſty, ſhall hereafter " purchaſe no cloaths for themſelves, their " wives and their children, but once in every " four years: further, ſtrictly forbidding them " thoſe little rejoicings which they uſed to ce- " lebrate in their families upon the principal " holidays of the year.

" And, foraſmuch as we are informed, that " the greateſt part of the citizens of our good " towns are intirely buſied in providing an " eſtabliſhment for their daughters, who have " rendered themſelves reſpectable in our ſtate " only by a dull and joyleſs modeſty; We " order, that they delay marrying them, till ſuch " time as their daughters, having attained to the " age appointed by the ordinances, may have " it in their power to force them to it. We " charge our magiſtrates not to take care of " the education of their children."

From Paris, the firſt of the Moon Chalval, 1718.

LET-

LETTER CXLIV.

USBEK to RICA.

I MET, a few days ago, in a houſe in the country whither I had gone, with two learned men who are very celebrated here. Their characters appeared to me remarkable. The converſation of the one, nicely weighed, might be reduced to this: What I ſay is true, becauſe I have ſaid it. The converſation of the ſecond had another aim: What I have not ſaid is not true, becauſe I have not ſaid it.

I LIKED the firſt well enough: for that a man ſhould be poſitive, is abſolutely nothing to me; but that he ſhould be impertinent, is a great deal. The firſt defends his opinions; 'tis his property: the ſecond attacks the opinions of others; and this is the property of all the world.

O MY dear Uſbek, how ill does vanity ſerve thoſe who have a ſtronger doſe of it, than is

neceſſary for the preſervation of nature. Theſe people ſeem to want to be admired by being diſagreeable to us. They want to be ſuperior to, and they are not even upon a level with, the reſt of the world.

Men of modeſty, approach, that I may embrace you! You are the delight and joy of ſocial life. You believe that you poſſeſs no accompliſhments, and I tell you that you poſſeſs every one. You imagine that you make no body appear little; and yet you make all the world do ſo. And when I compare you in my mind with thoſe imperious and conceited men whom I ſee every where, I place them at your feet.

From Paris, the 22d of the Moon Chahban, 1720.

LETTER CXLV.

USBEK to * * *.

A MAN of wit is commonly nice in his choice of company. He likes few people: he grows tired and dull, when he is with any of that vaſt number of people whom he is pleaſed to call bad company; it is impoſſible but he muſt make them at leaſt in ſome degree perceive his diſguſt: all theſe then become his enemies.

SURE of pleaſing if he would, he often neglects to do it.

HE is naturally inclined to criticiſe, becauſe he perceives more things than others do, and is more ſtruck with them.

HE almoſt always ruins his fortune, becauſe his genius ſupplies him with a vaſt number of methods of doing it.

He fails in his enterprizes, becauſe he riſks a great deal. His foreſight, which is always very great, makes him perceive objects which are at too vaſt a diſtance; and, beſides, in the infancy of a project, he is leſs ſtruck with the difficulties which attend the thing itſelf, than with thoſe expedients which he finds out, and which he draws from himſelf.

He neglects ſmall details, upon which however the ſucceſs of almoſt all great affairs depends.

The man of middling abilities, on the contrary, makes an advantage of every thing: he perceives clearly, that nothing ought to be loſt by negligence.

The public approbation commonly attends the middling genius. People like to add to the one, and are delighted to take away from the other. While envy burſts upon the one, and people excuſe nothing in him; every thing is overlooked in the other, vanity declares for him.

BUT if a man of wit has ſo many diſadvantages, what ſhall we ſay of the hard condition of men of learning?

I NEVER think of it, without recalling to my mind a letter of one of them to a friend of his. Here it is:

SIR,

"I AM a man buſied every night in looking "through teleſcopes of thirty feet at thoſe "great bodies which roll over our heads; and "when I want to refreſh myſelf, I take my "ſmall microſcopes, and obſerve a little worm "or a mite.

"I AM not rich, and have only one cham-"ber. I dare not even light a fire in it, be-"cauſe I keep my thermometer there, and the "unuſual heat would make it riſe. Laſt win-"ter I thought to have died of cold; and "tho' my thermometer, which was at the "higheſt degree, gave me warning that my "hands were about to freeze, I did not alter "my method; and I have the comfort of "being exactly informed of the moſt inſen-

" ſible alterations of the weather all the laſt " year.

" I KEEP very little company; and of all " the people that I ſee, I don't know one. " But there is one man at Stockholm, ano- " ther at Leipſick, another at London, whom " I have never ſeen, and whom I ſhall cer- " tainly never ſee, with whom I keep ſo exact " a correſpondence, that I don't allow a poſt " to paſs without writing to them.

" BUT tho' I know no body in the neigh- " bourhood, I bear ſo bad a character in it, " that I'll be at laſt obliged to change my " place of reſidence. About five years ago, " I was rudely attacked by one of my neigh- " bours for having diſſected a dog which, ſhe " pretended, belonged to her. A butcher's " wife, who was preſent, joined her party; " and while the one loaded me with reproach- " es, the other threw ſtones at me and Dr. * * " who was with me, and who received a ter- " rible ſtroke upon the Os frontal and occipital, " by which the ſeat of his reaſon got a great " ſhock.

" SINCE

" SINCE that time, whenever a dog wan-
" ders from the ſtreet, 'tis immediately de-
" cided that it has paſſed through my hands.
" A good woman, who had loſt a ſmall one,
" which ſhe ſaid ſhe loved better than her
" children, came t'other day and fainted in my
" chamber; and, becauſe ſhe did not find
" her dog, carried me before a magiſtrate. I
" believe I never ſhall be freed from the ma-
" lice of thoſe importunate women, who, with
" their ſhrill voices, perpetually ſtun my ears
" with the funeral orations of all the automa-
" tons which have died theſe ten years. I
" am, *&c.*"

ALL the learned were formerly accuſed of magic; I am not ſurpriſed at it. Every one ſaid to himſelf, I have carried natural talents as far as they can go, and yet a certain learned man has advantages over me: there muſt be ſomething deviliſh in it.

AT preſent theſe kind of accuſations have fallen into diſrepute. They have taken another way: and a man of learning can hardly eſcape the reproach of irreligion or hereſy. In vain

is he abſolved by the people ; the wound is made, it will never cloſe up. 'Tis always a tender place. An adverſary may come thirty years after, and modeſtly ſay to him, " God " forbid that I ſhould affirm, that that of " which you are accuſed is true, but you have " been obliged to defend yourſelf." 'Tis thus that they turn even his juſtification againſt him.

If he has wrote ſome hiſtory, and diſcovered a nobleneſs of genius, and uprightneſs of heart, they ſtir up a thouſand perſecutions againſt him. They endeavour to inſtigate the magiſtrate againſt him for a fact which happened a thouſand years ago. And they would at leaſt have his pen be kept captive, if it be not venal.

More happy, however, than thoſe baſe men who abandon their fidelity for a ſmall penſion ; who, taking all their impoſtures in the detail, don't ſell them for a farthing a-piece ; who overturn the conſtitution of the Empire, diminiſh the rights of one power, augment thoſe of another, give to Princes, take away from the people, revive obſolete claims, flatter the faſhionable paſſions of the times, and the vices of the throne ; impoſing upon

upon poſterity by ſo much the more unworthily, as it has fewer means of detecting the falſhood of their teſtimony.

But 'tis not enough for an author to undergo all theſe inſults; 'tis not enough for him to have been in continual uneaſineſs about the ſucceſs of his work. At laſt that work which coſt him ſo much appears. It leads him into diſputes from all parts. And how can he avoid them? He had an opinion; he ſupported it by his writings; he did not know that one at two hundred leagues diſtance from him had ſaid the direct contrary. However, war is declared on this account. Beſides, can he expect to acquire any conſideration? No; he is at moſt only eſteemed by thoſe who have applied to the ſame ſcience that he himſelf has. A philoſopher has a ſovereign contempt for a man who has his head loaded with facts; and he in his turn is looked upon as a viſionary by him who has a good memory.

As for thoſe who make profeſſion of a diſdainful ignorance, they would wiſh that all the human race was buried in that oblivion in which they themſelves will be.

A MAN who does not poſſeſs a particular talent ſatisfies himſelf by deſpiſing it: he removes this obſtacle which ſtands between him and merit; and by this he finds himſelf upon a level with him whoſe labours he is afraid of.

IN a word, a privation of pleaſure, and a loſs of health, muſt be joined to an uncertain reputation.

From Paris, the 26th of the Moon Chahbab, 1720.

LETTER CLVII.

ZACHI to USBEK at PARIS.

OH heavens! a Barbarian has affronted me even in his manner of puniſhing me! He hath inflicted upon me that puniſhment which begins by giving an alarm to modeſty; that puniſhment which humbles one to the greateſt degree; that puniſhment which carries one back, ſo to ſpeak, to infancy.

MY ſoul, at firſt annihilated with ſhame, reaſſumed its conſciouſneſs, and began to diſdain itſelf, when my cries made the walls of my apartment reſound. I was heard aſking pardon of the vileſt of mankind, and trying to move his compaſſion, in proportion as he was more inexorable.

SINCE this time, his inſolent and ſervile ſoul hath got the aſcendant over mine. His preſence, his looks, his words, all misfortunes combine to oppreſs me. When I am alone, I have at leaſt the conſolation of ſhedding tears;

tears: but when he preſents himſelf to my view, fury ſeizes me; I find it impotent, and I fall into deſpair.

THE tyger dares to tell me, that thou art the author of all theſe barbarities. He would deprive me of my very love, and profane even the ſentiments of my heart: when he pronounces to me the name of him I love, I am able to complain no longer; I can only die.

I HAVE ſupported thy abſence, and I have preſerved my love by the ſtrength of this very love. Nights, days, moments, all have been for thee; I was proud of my love itſelf, and thine made me be reſpected here. But at preſent . . . . . no, I can no longer bear that humiliation into which I am fallen. If I am innocent, return to love me: return, if I am guilty, that I may expire at thy feet.

From the Seraglio of Iſpahan, the Second of the Moon Maharram, 1720.

LETTER CLVIII.

ZELIS to USBEK at PARIS.

AT the diſtance of a thouſand leagues, you condemn me as guilty. At a thouſand leagues diſtance from me, you puniſh me.

WHAT tho' a barbarous eunuch lays his vile hands upon me; he acts by your order: 'tis the tyrant who injures me, and not he who executes the tyranny.

YOU may, as your fancy dictates to you, redouble my cruel uſage. My heart is tranquil, ſince it can no more love you. Your ſoul degrades itſelf, and you become cruel. Be aſſured that you are not happy. Adieu.

From the Seraglio at Iſpahan, the Second of the Moon Maharram.

LETTER CLX.

SOLIM to USBEK at PARIS.

I HAVE taken my meaſures: thy misfortunes are about to diſappear: I go to puniſh.

I ALREADY feel a ſecret joy: my ſoul and thine ſhall ſoon be appeaſed: We go to exterminate vice, and to make innocence tremble.

O YE who ſeem only to be made, that you may be acquainted with no ſenſual pleaſure, and to diſdain your very deſires! eternal victims of modeſty and ſhame! why can't I introduce you, in vaſt numbers, into this unhappy ſeraglio, to aſtoniſh you with the blood I am going to ſhed!

From the Seraglio at Iſpahan, the 8th of the Moon Rebiab, 1720.

THE

TEMPLE

OF

GNIDUS.

———*Non murmura veſtra, columbæ,*
Brachia non hederæ, non vincant oſcula conchæ.

Fragment of an Epithalamium of the Emperor GALLIENUS.

THE PREFACE.

AN ambaſſador of France at the Ottoman Porte, known by his taſte for literature, having purchaſed many Greek manuſcripts, brought them to France; and, ſome of them falling into my hands, I found among them the work of which I here give a tranſlation.

FEW of the Greek authors have been handed down to us: they have either periſhed in the ruin of libraries, or by the negligence of the families who have had them in their poſſeſſion.

WE, however, receive from time to time ſome pieces of theſe treaſures. We have found works even in the tombs of their authors; and, what is much the ſame, this was diſcovered among the books of a Greek Biſhop.

WE know neither the name of the author, nor the time in which he lived. All that we

can ſay of him is, that he was not anterior to Sappho, ſince he quotes her in his work.

As to my tranſlation, it is a faithful one. The beauties that were not in my author, I ſuppoſed, did not deſerve the name of beauties; and I have often choſen a leſs lively manner of expreſſion, in order the better to expreſs his thought.

I HAVE been encouraged to undertake this tranſlation by the ſucceſs which has attended that of Taſſo. He who performed it will not be offended at my having followed his example. He has there diſtinguiſhed himſelf in ſuch a manner, as to be under no apprehenſions from thoſe whom he has inſpired with the warmeſt ſpirit of emulation.

THIS little romance is a kind of picture in which are ſelected the moſt agreeable objects. The public will here find ſmiling images, magnificent deſcriptions, and ingenuous ſentiments.

IT has the marks of an original; which has made the critics demand, after what model it was formed. This muſt greatly inhance its merit,

merit, eſpecially as the work is, in other reſpects, far from being deſpicable.

Some of the learned have not diſcovered in it what they term art; and they alledge, that it is not written according to the rules: but if the work has pleaſed, it is a proof that the heart has not communicated to them all its rules.

A man who attempts a tranſlation, cannot patiently bear that others ſhould not eſteem his author as much as he does himſelf; and I confeſs that theſe gentlemen have often filled me with a furious reſentment: but I deſire them to leave the young men to judge of a book, which, in whatſoever language it was written, was certainly wrote for their uſe. I intreat them, therefore, not to trouble themſelves with their deciſions; for none but the heads that are well curled and powdered, can know all the merit of the Temple of Gnidus.

With reſpect to the fair ſex, to whom I owe the few happy moments I can reckon in my life, I heartily wiſh that this work may pleaſe them. I admire them ſtill; and their

not being more the ſubject of my aſſiduities is a ſource of regret.

If men of gravity ſhould deſire from me a leſs trifling work, I am able to ſatisfy them. Theſe thirty years have I laboured at a book of no more than twelve pages, which is to contain all we know of metaphyſics, politics, and morality, and all that very great authors have forgotten in the volumes they have publiſhed on thoſe ſciences.

THE TEMPLE OF GNIDUS.

CANTO I.

VENUS chuſes to reſide at Gnidus, rather than at Paphos and Amathus, and never deſcends from Olympus without viſiting the Gnidians. So much has ſhe accuſtomed theſe happy people to her ſight, that they no longer feel that ſacred horror inſpired by the preſence of the Gods. Sometimes ſhe covers herſelf with a cloud, and is known by the divine odour that flows from her hair perfumed with ambroſia.

THE city is in the midſt of a country on which the Gods have laviſhed their favours with a liberal hand. The inhabitants enjoy an eternal ſpring; the earth, happily fertile, pre-

vents all their wiſhes; their flocks feed without number; the birds inceſſantly ſing, ſo that you would think the woods were vocal; rivulets murmur in the plains; a gentle heat renders every thing blooming; and the air the people breathe inſpires only pleaſure.

NEAR the city is the palace of Venus, the foundations of which were laid by Vulcan; who laboured for his faithleſs ſpouſe while he ſtrove to make her forget the cruel affront he had given her before the Gods.

IT would be impoſſible for me to give an idea of the beauties of this palace; for none but the Graces can deſcribe what they have performed. Gold, azure, rubies, diamonds, ſhine on all ſides; but here I paint only riches, and not beauty.

THE gardens are inchanting; they are under the care of Flora and Pomona, and are cultivated by the nymphs. Fruits ſpring up under the hand that plucks them; and bloſſoms ſucceed the fruit. When Venus walks in them ſurrounded by her Gnidians, you would think that in their wanton ſports they would deſtroy

deſtroy theſe delightful gardens; but by a ſecret virtue every thing is inſtantly repaired.

Venus loves to ſee the ſprightly dances of the girls of Gnidus. Her nymphs mingle with them; the Goddeſs herſelf bears a part in their ſports; ſhe ſtrips herſelf of her majeſty, ſits in the midſt of them, and ſees joy and innocence reign in their hearts.

At a diſtance is diſcovered a ſpacious meadow enamelled with flowers. The ſhepherd comes to gather them, with his ſhepherdeſs; but that which ſhe finds is always the moſt beautiful, and it is believed that this happens by the expreſs deſign of Flora.

The Cephiſus waters this meadow, and runs through it with a thouſand turnings. The river God ſtops the fugitive ſhepherdeſſes, and will oblige them to give him the tender kiſs they had promiſed him.

When the nymphs approach his banks, he ſtops, and the waves which fly find thoſe that are incapable of flying. But when one of them bathes, he is ſtill more amorous; his waters wind about her limbs; he ſometimes

riſes, the better to give her his embraces; he lifts her up; he flies; he takes her with him. Her timid companions begin to weep: but he ſupports her upon his waves, and charmed with the precious burden, leads her over his liquid plain: at length loth to part with her, he conducts her ſlowly to the bank, and reſtores comfort to her companions.

On the ſide of the meadow is a myrtle grove, where the paths make a variety of turnings. The lovers there come to recount their pains; and Love, who amuſes them, always conducts them through the moſt ſecret paths.

Not far from thence is an antient and ſacred wood, thro' which the light can with difficulty enter. Oaks, that ſeem immortal, bear up their heads to the heavens, which conceal them from our view. We there feel a religious fear; you would ſay that this was the abode of the Gods, ere man had ſprung from the earth.

On coming to an opening where the day breaks in, the people aſcend a little hill, on which is the temple of Venus, than which the univerſe has nothing more ſacred.

In this temple Venus firſt ſaw her Adonis, and the poiſon thrilled through the heart of the Goddeſs. What! ſaid ſhe, do I then love a mortal? Alas! I find I adore him. Let them no more addreſs their vows to me; Adonis is the only Deity at Gnidus.

It was in this place that ſhe aſſembled the Loves, when piqued with a raſh diſtruſt, ſhe conſulted them. She was in doubt whether ſhe ſhould expoſe herſelf naked to the view of the Trojan ſhepherd. She concealed her girdle under her hair; her nymphs ſprinkled her with perfumes; ſhe mounted her chariot drawn by ſwans, and arrived in Phrygia. The ſhepherd heſitated between Juno and Pallas; he ſaw her, and his looks were fixed and dying: the golden apple fell at the feet of the Goddeſs; he attempted to ſpeak, and his diſorder decided the diſpute.

It was to this temple that the young Pſyche came with her mother, when Cupid, who flew about the golden cieling, was himſelf ſurpriſed by one of her glances, and felt the pain he had made others ſuffer. Thus do I wound, ſaid he, I can neither ſupport my bow nor my arrows.

arrows. He then ſunk down on the breaſt of Pſyche, and cried, Oh! I now begin to feel that I am the God of Pleaſure.

When the people enter this temple, they perceive their hearts poſſeſſed by a ſecret charm: the ſoul is filled with that raviſhing delight, which the Gods themſelves never feel, but when they are in their celeſtial abodes.

Whatever is moſt ſmiling in nature is joined to every thing that art can invent as moſt noble, and moſt worthy of the Gods.

A hand, which was doubtleſs immortal, has every where adorned the place with paintings that ſeem to breathe. We there ſee the birth of Venus; the rapture of the Gods who ſaw her; her embarraſſment at appearing naked, and that modeſty which is the firſt of the Graces.

We there ſee the amours of Mars and that Goddeſs. The painter has repreſented the God of War in his chariot, in which he appears fierce, and even terrible: Fame flies before him; Fear and Death march, followed by his horſes covered with foam; he enters the throng,

throng, and a thick duſt begins to hide him from our view. In another place we ſee him laid languiſhingly on a bed of roſes, ſmiling on Venus; and you would not know him, were it not for ſome traces of the divinity which ſtill remain. The Pleaſures are employed in making wreaths and garlands, with which they bind the two lovers; their eyes melt in ſoftneſs; they ſigh, and only attentive to each other, are regardleſs of the little Cupids that play about them.

THERE is a ſeparate apartment, where the painter has repreſented the marriage of Vulcan and Venus: all the celeſtial court are there aſſembled: the God appears leſs gloomy, but as penſive as uſual. The Goddeſs looks with an air of coldneſs on the common joy; ſhe negligently gives him a hand which ſhe ſeems unwilling to reſign: ſhe caſts another way looks expreſſive of pain, and turns towards the Graces.

IN another picture we ſee Juno performing the marriage-ceremony. Venus takes the cup to ſwear an eternal fidelity to Vulcan: the Gods ſmile, and Vulcan hears her with pleaſure.

On the other ſide we ſee the impatient God drawing along his divine ſpouſe, who makes ſuch reſiſtance, that one would imagine her to be the daughter of Ceres, whom Pluto is going to raviſh, if the eye that had ſeen Venus could ever be deceived.

At ſome diſtance, we ſee her carried away towards the nuptial bed. The Gods follow in crowds; the Goddeſs diſputes, and endeavours to eſcape from the arms of thoſe who hold her. Her robe flys from her knees; the linen flutters: but Vulcan repairs this beautiful diſorder, and is more attentive to conceal than ardent to ſeize.

In ſhort, we ſee her juſt laid on the bed prepared by Hymen; Vulcan draws the curtains, and thinks of keeping her there for ever. The importunate throng retire; and he rejoices at ſeeing them go. The Goddeſſes play together: but the Gods appear dejected; and Mars's melancholy has ſomething gloomy, like the pangs of jealouſy.

Charmed with the magnificence of her temple, the Goddeſs herſelf has eſtabliſhed the worſhip

worſhip performed there: ſhe has regulated its ceremonies, inſtituted feſtivals, and is at the ſame time the deity and the prieſteſs.

THE worſhip paid her, almoſt over the whole earth, is rather a profanation than a religion. She has temples, in which all the maids in other cities proſtitute themſelves to her honour, and acquire a portion from the profits of proſtitution. She has others where every married woman goes once in her life to give up herſelf to him who has ſingled her out, and where ſhe throws into the ſanctuary the money ſhe has received. There are others again, where the courtezans of all countries, more honoured than the matrons, go to make their offerings. There is, in ſhort, another, where the men render themſelves eunuchs, and dreſs themſelves like women, in order to ſerve in the ſanctuary, conſecrating themſelves to the Goddeſs, and thoſe of her ſex.

BUT ſhe reſolved, that the people of Gnidus ſhould have a purer worſhip, and render her honours more worthy her acceptance. Her ſacrifices there are ſighs, and her offerings a tender heart. Every lover addreſſes his vows to his miſtreſs, and Venus receives them for her.

WHERE-

WHEREVER beauty is found, they pay it the ſame adoration as to Venus; for beauty, like her, is divine.

WITH hearts inflamed with love they enter the Temple, and embrace at the altars of Fidelity and Conſtancy.

THOSE who are treated with cruelty come there to vent their ſighs: they feel their torments diminiſh, and find their hearts filled with flattering hope.

JEALOUSY is a paſſion that may be felt, though it ought to be concealed. A man there adores in ſecret the caprices of his miſtreſs, as they adore the decrees of the Gods, which become more juſt when we preſume to utter our complaints.

AMONG the divine favours are reckoned the fire, the tranſports of love, and even all its fury: for the leſs a perſon is maſter of his own heart, the more is he devoted to the Goddeſs.

THOSE who have not loſt their hearts are the profane, who are not admitted into her Temple

Temple. They at a diſtance addreſs their vows to the Goddeſs, and beg to be delivered from that liberty, which is nothing more than the incapacity of forming deſires.

THE Goddeſs inſpires the girls with modeſty; and that virtue has ſuch charms as to ſet an additional value on all the treaſures they conceal.

BUT never in theſe fortunate places do they bluſh at a ſincere paſſion, an ingenuous ſentiment, a tender acknowledgement.

THE heart becomes fixed from the moment it has ſurrendered: but it is a profanation to ſurrender without love.

CUPID is attentive to the felicity of the Gnidians; he chuſes the arrows with which he wounds them. When he ſees an afflicted lover, whoſe paſſion meets with an unkind return, he takes an arrow dipped in the water of forgetfulneſs. When he ſees two lovers who begin to feel the tender paſſion, he inceſſantly lets fly againſt them freſh arrows: and on ſeeing one whoſe love has declined, he makes it ſuddenly revive or expire; for he ſhortens the

duration of a languiſhing paſſion, and will not ſuffer them to feel diſguſt before they ceaſe to love. Thus enraptured by the ſweets of a greater felicity, they forget the leſs.

CUPID took from his quiver the cruel arrows with which he wounded Phedra and Ariadne; they were mixed with love and hatred, and ſerved to ſhew his power, as thunder makes known the empire of Jupiter.

IN proportion as the God gives the pleaſure of loving, Venus adds the happineſs of pleaſing.

THE girls every day enter the ſanctuary to offer their prayers to Venus. They there expreſs the genuine ſentiments of their hearts. Queen of Amathus, ſaid one of them, my flame for Thyrſis is extinguiſhed; I do not intreat to have my love revived, but only that Ixiphiles may love me.

ANOTHER ſoftly ſays, Powerful Goddeſs! give me the power to conceal for ſome time my love to my ſhepherd, in order to inhance the value of the confeſſion I intend to make to him.

GODDESS

GODDESS of Cythera! ſays another, I ſeek ſolitude; the ſports of my companions no longer pleaſe me: perhaps I love. But if I am indeed in love, let it be with none but Daphnis.

AT their feſtivals the young men and maids go to repeat hymns in honour of Venus: and often do they celebrate her praiſe in ſinging their own amours.

A YOUNG Gnidian, taking his miſtreſs by the hand, ſung thus: Cupid, when firſt Pſyche appeared to thy view, thou doubtleſs woundedſt her with the ſame arrow as that with which thou haſt wounded my heart. Thy happineſs was not different from mine; for thou felteſt my flames, and I feel thy pleaſures.

FOR my part, I have ſeen what I deſcribe. I have been at Gnidus: I have ſeen Themira, and I have loved: I ſaw her again, and I loved her ſtill more. With her I will ſpend my life at Gnidus, and I ſhall be the moſt happy of all mortals.

We will viſit the Temple; and never ſhall a more faithful lover enter its walls. We will go to the palace of Venus, and I will imagine it to be the palace of my Themira. I will walk to the meadow, and gather flowers, which I will place in her boſom. Perhaps I may conduct her to the grove where ſo many paths meet, and when ſhe ſhall have ſtrayed —But Cupid, by whom I am inſpired, forbids my revealing his myſteries.

CANTO II.

THERE is at Gnidus another ſacred grove inhabited by the nymphs, where the Goddeſs delivers her oracles. The earth ſends forth no hollow ſound under your feet; the hair is not raiſed erect upon the head; and there is no prieſteſs as at Delphos, where Apollo fills with convulſive agitations the trembling Pythia: but Venus herſelf lends an ear to the requeſts of mortals, without ſporting with their hopes or fears.

A COQUETTE of the iſle of Crete came to Gnidus; ſhe was ſurrounded by all the young Gnidians; ſhe ſmiled at one, whiſpered to another, threw her arm upon a third, and called to two others to follow her. She was beautiful, and adorned with art, and the ſound of her voice was as deceitful as her eyes. O heavens! how were the faithful, the tender lovers, among the fair, alarmed! She preſented herſelf before the Oracle with as much confidence as a Goddeſs: but ſuddenly we heard a voice proceed from the ſanctuary: Perfidious wretch!

how dareſt thou carry thy artifices even into the places where I reign with candour and ſincerity? Severely ſhalt thou be puniſhed: I will take away thy charms; but leave thy heart as it is: thou ſhalt call about thee all the men thou ſeeſt; but they ſhall fly from thee as from a plaintive ghoſt, and thou ſhalt die rejected, and loaded with contempt.

At length came a courtezan of Nocretis ſhining with the ſpoils of her lovers. Go, ſaid the Goddeſs, thou deceiveſt thyſelf in believing that thou haſt added to the glory of my empire. Thy beauty proclaims that thou haſt pleaſure to beſtow; but none does it give: thy heart is like iron, and tho' thou ſhouldeſt ſee my ſon himſelf, thou couldeſt not love him. Go, beſtow thy favours on the baſe men who demand them, and whom they fill with diſguſt: go, ſhew them charms which ſhall ſuddenly vaniſh, and be loſt for ever. Thou art only fit to render my power deſpiſed.

Sometime after came a rich man, who collected tribute for the King of Lydia. Thou aſkeſt, ſaid the Goddeſs, one thing which I cannot perform, though I am the Goddeſs of Love. Thou aſkeſt for beauties, that thou

mayeſt taſte the raptures of love; but thou loveſt them not becauſe thou haſt bought them: thy treaſures are not uſeleſs; they ſerve to fill thee with diſguſt againſt every thing moſt charming in nature.

A YOUNG man of Doris, named Ariſteus, at length preſented himſelf. He had ſeen at Gnidus the charming Camilla, and was fallen deſperately in love with her. He perceived the exceſs of his paſſion, and came to aſk Venus that he might love her ſtill more.

I KNOW thine heart, ſaid the Goddeſs; thou art ſenſible of the power of love. I have found Camilla worthy of thee. I could have given her to the greateſt King upon earth; but Kings have leſs merit than ſhepherds.

I AT laſt appeared with Themira; when the Goddeſs ſaid: There is not in all my empire a mortal who knows how to ſubmit himſelf to my power better than thee; but what wouldſt thou have me do for thee? I cannot render thee more in love, nor Themira more charming. O great Goddeſs, ſaid I, I have a thouſand favours to aſk: May Themira think only of me; may ſhe ſee none but me; may

ſhe awake dreaming of me; may ſhe fear to loſe me when I am preſent; hope for me in my abſence; and always charmed with ſeeing me, ſtill regret every moment ſhe paſſes without me.

CANTO III.

AT Gnidus there are ſacred games which are renewed every year, and there women come from all parts to diſpute the prize of beauty; when ſhepherdeſſes are confounded with the daughters of Kings, for there beauty alone is the mark of empire. Venus herſelf preſides over them; ſhe decides without heſitation, and knows well the happy mortal whom ſhe has moſt favoured.

HELEN ſeveral times gained the prize: ſhe triumphed when ſhe was ſtolen by Theſeus; ſhe triumphed when ſhe was carried away by the ſon of Priam; in fine, ſhe triumphed when the Gods reſtored her to Menelaus, after his hopes had been kept alive for ten years: that Prince therefore, in the opinion of Venus herſelf, found as much happineſs in being her huſband, as Theſeus and Paris in being her lovers.

THERE came thirty girls of Corinth, whoſe hair fell in large ringlets on their ſhoulders.

There came ten from Salamis, who had not yet ſeen thirteen times the annual courſe of the ſun. There came fifteen from the iſle of Leſbos, who ſaid to each other, I am quite charmed, I never ſaw any thing ſo beautiful as you; if Venus ſaw you with the ſame eyes as I do, ſhe would crown you amidſt all the beauties of the univerſe.

THERE came fifty women of Miletus, who excelled in the whiteneſs of their complexion, and the regularity of their features; every thing ſhewed, or gave room to imagine, that their perſons were lovely, and that the Gods, who had formed them, would have made nothing ſo beautiful as they, had they ſought to obtain valuable perfections rather than external graces.

AN hundred women came from the iſland of Cyprus. We have paſſed our youth, ſaid they, in the temple of Venus; to her we have conſecrated our virginity, and our modeſty itſelf. We do not bluſh at our charms; our manners, ſometimes bold, and always free, ought to give us the advantage over a modeſty that is continually creating freſh alarms.

I saw the daughters of proud Sparta: their robes were open at the ſides from the girdle, in the moſt indecent manner; and yet they behaved like prudes, and maintained, that they would never violate the laws of modeſty, except for the love of their country.

O sea, famous for ſo many ſhipwrecks, thou preſerveſt the treaſures committed to thy care. Thou becameſt calm, when the ſhip Argo, laden with the golden fleece, ſailed on thy liquid plain; and when fifty beauties departed from Colchis, and truſted themſelves on thy waves, thou didſt bow under them.

I also ſaw Oriana, like a Goddeſs: All the beauties of Lydia ſurrounded their Queen. She had ſent before her an hundred girls, who had preſented to Venus an offering of two hundred talents. Candaules came himſelf, and was more diſtinguiſhed by his love than by the royal purple. He paſſed his days and nights in devouring with his looks the charms of Oriana; his eyes wandered over her beautiful form, and were never weary. I am happy, ſaid he; but alas! this is known only to Venus and myſelf; my felicity would be much heightened,

heightened, did it but inſpire envy! Lovely Queen, quit theſe vain ornaments; drop that troubleſome vail, and ſhew thyſelf to the univerſe; leave the prize of beauty, and demand altars raiſed to thine honour.

AFTERWARDS came twenty Babylonians, dreſſed in purple robes embroidered with gold: they imagined, that the richneſs of their apparel inhanced their value. Some carried, as a proof of their beauty, the riches it had enabled them to acquire.

THEN came an hundred Egyptian women whoſe eyes and whoſe hair were black: their huſbands were with them, and ſaid, The laws render us ſubject to you in honour of Iſis; but your beauty has a more powerful empire over us, than that of the laws: we obey you with the ſame pleaſure as we obey the Gods, and are the moſt happy ſlaves in the univerſe. Duty ſecures our fidelity to you; but only love can render you faithful to us. Be leſs ſenſible of the glory you acquire at Gnidus, than of the homage you may find in your own houſe from a tranquil huſband; who, while you are employed in affairs abroad, ought to wait in the family for the heart you bring him.

THERE

THERE came women from that powerful city which ſends veſſels to the ends of the univerſe: their heads were loaden with ſuperfluous ornaments, and all the parts of the earth ſeemed to have contributed to form their dreſs.

TEN beauties came from the place where the day begins to dawn; they were the daughters of Aurora, and in order to ſee her, roſe daily before that Goddeſs. They complained of the Sun, that he made their mother diſappear; and they complained of their mother, that ſhe did not ſhew herſelf to them, as ſhe did to other mortals.

I SAW under a tent a Queen of India ſurrounded by her virgins, who already gave hopes of their having the charms of their mothers: ſhe was ſerved by eunuchs, whoſe eyes were fixed on the earth; for ſince their breathing the air of Gnidus, they had felt the gloom of melancholy redoubled.

THE women of Cadiz, which is at the extremity of the earth, likewiſe diſputed for the prize. There is no country upon earth where beauty

beauty does not receive homage; but nothing leſs than the higheſt homage can ſatisfy the ambition of the fair.

THE girls of Gnidus at length appeared: beautiful without ornament, they had graces inſtead of pearls and rubies. Nothing was ſeen on their heads but the preſents of Flora; which were there more worthy of the embraces of Zephyrus. Their robes had no other merit beſides that of exhibiting the fineneſs of their ſhape, and of being ſpun with their own fingers.

AMONG all theſe beauties one could not ſee the young Camilla; who had ſaid, I will not diſpute the prize of beauty, it is ſufficient that my dear Ariſteus thinks me fair.

DIANA rendered theſe games celebrated by her preſence. She did not come to diſpute the prize; for the Goddeſſes do not compare themſelves to mortals. I ſaw her alone, and ſhe ſeemed as beautiful as Venus: I ſaw her with Venus, and ſhe was only Diana.

THERE never was ſo great a concourſe: nations were ſeparated from nations; the eye wandered

wandered from country to country, from the ſetting of the ſun to the riſing of Aurora. It ſeemed as if Gnidus comprehended the whole univerſe.

The Gods have divided beauty among the nations, as nature has divided it among the Goddeſſes. There we ſee the proud beauty of Pallas; here the grandeur and majeſty of Juno; farther ſtill, the ſimplicity of Diana, the delicacy of Thetis, the charms of the Graces, and ſometimes the ſmile of Venus.

It ſeemed as if each nation had a particular manner of expreſſing modeſty, and yet that every woman was reſolved to attract every eye. Some diſcovered the neck, and concealed the ſhoulders; others ſhewed their ſhoulders, and concealed their necks: thoſe who concealed the foot paid you with other charms; and here they bluſhed at what was there called decency.

The Gods are ſo charmed with Themira, that they never look at her without ſmiling at their work. Of all the Goddeſſes, there is none but Venus who ſees her with pleaſure, and whom the Gods do not rally with having a little jealouſy.

As

As we obſerve a roſe in the midſt of the flowers that ſpring in the graſs, Themira was diſtinguiſhed among ſo many beauties. They had not time to become her rivals; they were vanquiſhed before they feared her. She no ſooner appeared, than the eyes of Venus were fixed on her; and calling the Graces, Go, ſaid ſhe, and crown her, for of all the beauties I ſee, ſhe alone reſembles you.

CANTO IV.

WHILE Themira was employed with her companions in the worſhip of the Goddeſs, I entered a ſolitary wood, and there I found the tender Ariſteus. We had ſeen each other on the day when we went to conſult the Oracle; and our meeting was ſufficient to engage us to enter into converſation: for Venus places in the heart, on our ſeeing an inhabitant of Gnidus, the ſecret charm felt by two friends, when after a long abſence, they preſs in their arms the dear object of their inquietudes.

TRANSPORTED with each other, we found that we had reſigned our hearts: it appeared as if a tender friendſhip had deſcended from heaven in order to unite us. We related a thouſand paſſages of our lives, and this is, nearly, what I ſaid to him.

I WAS born at Sybaris, where Antilochus my father was the prieſt of Venus. In that city they make no difference between luxuries and

and neceſſities; all the arts are baniſhed that are capable of diſturbing a tranquil ſleep: prizes are given at the public expence to thoſe who diſcover new ſources of voluptuouſneſs: and the citizens remember only the buffoons that have afforded them diverſion, while they loſe all remembrance of the magiſtrates who have governed them with wiſdom.

THE people there take advantage of the fertility of the ſoil, which produces an eternal plenty; and the favours beſtowed by the Gods on Sybaris ſerve only to encourage ſoftneſs and luxury.

TO SUCH a degree are the men ſunk in effeminacy, that their dreſs is ſo like that of the women, they take ſuch care of their complexions, they curl their hair with ſuch art, and employ ſo much time in adorning themſelves at the glaſs, that there ſeems to be only one ſex in all the city.

THE women abandon themſelves, inſtead of ſurrendering, and the deſires and hopes of the day are finiſhed at its concluſion. They know not what it is to love, and to taſte the pleaſure of

of being beloved, and are ſolely employed about what is falſely called enjoyment.

WHAT with us are termed favours are there nothing leſs than their proper realities; and all thoſe circumſtances which ſo happily accompany them; all thoſe nothings that are of ſuch great value; all thoſe trifles that are of ſuch worth; every thing that prepares the way for the happy moment; ſo many conqueſts inſtead of one; ſo many enjoyments before the laſt; are all unknown at Sybaris.

YET, had they the leaſt modeſty, a ſmall appearance of that virtue would pleaſe: but they have it not; their eyes are accuſtomed to ſee, and their ears to hear every thing.

So far is the multiplicity of pleaſures from giving the Sybarites more delicacy, that they cannot diſtinguiſh one ſentiment from another.

THEY paſs life in a joy merely exterior; quitting one pleaſure that diſpleaſes them, for another that is ſtill more diſpleaſing; while every change affords a new ſubject of diſguſt.

THEIR ſouls, incapable of reliſhing pleaſure, ſeem to have no delicacy but for pain. Thus, a citizen was fatigued a whole night by the leaf of a roſe folded in his bed.

EASE and ſoftneſs have ſo weakened their bodies, that they cannot remove the leaſt burden, and can ſcarce ſupport themſelves on their feet. They faint away in the moſt eaſy carriages; and when at a feaſt, their ſtomachs continually fail them.

THEY paſs their lives reclined on ſophas, on which they are obliged to repoſe the whole day, without any relief from their fatigue; they are bruiſed if they attempt to languiſh out life in any other manner.

INCAPABLE of bearing the weight of arms; timorous before their fellow citizens, and daſtardly in the preſence of ſtrangers, they are ſlaves ready to ſubmit to the firſt maſter.

I WAS no ſooner capable of thinking, than I was filled with contempt for the unhappy Sybarites. I love virtue, and have always feared the

the immortal Gods. I will no longer, ſaid I, breathe this infectious air; all theſe ſlaves of ſoftneſs and indolence are made to live in their native country, and I to leave it.

I THEN went for the laſt time to the temple; and approaching the altars, where my father had ſo often ſacrificed; Great Goddeſs! ſaid I with a loud voice, I abandon thy temple, but not thy worſhip; in what part of the earth ſoever I am, I will offer incenſe to thee; but it ſhall be purer than that offered at Sybaris.

I DEPARTED, and arrived in Crete, an iſland filled with monuments of the extravagance of love. There were ſeen the brazen cow, the work of Dædalus, to deceive, or to gratify the luſt of Paſiphae; the labyrinths, whoſe intricacies love only could elude; the tomb of Phædra, which aſtoniſhed the Sun, as it had done his mother; and the temple of Ariadne, who, deſerted in the deſarts, and abandoned by an ungrateful wretch, did not repent of her having followed him.

I THERE ſaw the palace of Idomeneus, whoſe return from the ſiege of Troy was not

more happy than that of the other Greek captains: for thoſe who eſcaped the dangers of a reſentful element, found in their own houſes thoſe that were ſtill more fatal. Venus, exaſperated againſt them, gave them to the embraces of their perfidious wives, and they died by the hand they held moſt dear.

I QUITTED that iſle, ſo odious to a Goddeſs who was one day to give felicity to my life.

I REEMBARKED; and a tempeſt caſt me on ſhore at Leſbos, an iſland but little beloved by Venus, who has taken modeſty from the countenances of the women, weakneſs from their bodies, and timidity from their ſouls. Great Venus! ſuffer the women of Leſbos to burn with a lawful flame; and may human nature no longer ſuffer ſuch diſgrace.

AT Mitylene, the capital of Leſbos, reſided the tender Sappho, who, immortal as the Muſes, burnt with a fire which ſhe could not extinguiſh. Odious to herſelf, and diſguſted with her charms, ſhe hated, and yet courted her own ſex. How, ſaid ſhe, can a flame ſo vain become ſo cruel! Cupid, how much more formidable art thou when in ſport, than when enraged!

AT

At length I quitted Leſbos, and my fate led me to an iſland ſtill more profane; and that was Lemnos. Venus has there no temple: never do the Lemnians addreſs their vows to her. We reject, ſay they, a worſhip that ſoftens the heart. The Goddeſs has often puniſhed them; but they bear the puniſhment, without making an expiation for their crime, and are always more impious in proportion as they are afflicted.

I again put to ſea in ſearch of a country beloved by the Gods; and the winds conducted me to Delos. I ſtaid ſome time in that ſacred iſle. But, whether the Gods ſometimes previouſly inform us of what is to happen; or whether the ſoul retains from the emanations of the Divinity, with which it is inlightened, ſome knowledge of futurity; I perceived that my deſtiny, and that my happineſs itſelf, called me to another country.

One night when I was in that ſtate of tranquillity, in which the ſoul, being more itſelf, ſeems delivered from that chain wherewith it is bound; there appeared before me a female form, and I was at firſt at a loſs to know whe-

ther ſhe was a mortal or a Goddeſs. A ſecret charm was ſpread over her whole perſon: ſhe was not ſo beautiful as Venus, but was as raviſhing as that Goddeſs: all her features were not regular; but, together, they were full of charms: her hair fell negligently on her ſhoulders; but that negligence had a happy effect: her ſhape and ſtature were charming: ſhe had that air which nature alone beſtows, and which ſhe hides from the painters. She ſaw my aſtoniſhment: ſhe ſmiled. Ye Gods! what a ſmile! I am, ſaid ſhe, one of the Graces: Venus, who ſent me, would render thee happy; but thou muſt go, and adore her in the Temple of Gnidus. She vaniſhed: I ſtretched out my arms to hold her; my ſleep fled with her; and there only remained a ſweet regret at my no longer ſeeing her, mixed with the pleaſure of having beheld her.

I THEN quitted the iſle of Delos, and arrived at Gnidus. I may ſay, that I inſtantly breathed love. I felt—I cannot expreſs what I felt. I was not yet in love, but fought to love. My heart was inflamed, as if I had been in the preſence of ſome celeſtial beauty. I advanced, and ſaw at a diſtance ſeveral young girls playing in a meadow. I was immediately drawn towards them.

them. Senſeleſs as I am, ſaid I, I feel without love all the diſturbances of the lover: my heart flies already towards objects unknown, and thoſe objects fill it with inquietude. I approached; I ſaw the charming Themira. We were doubtleſs made for each other. I looked at none but her, and believe that I ſhould have died with grief, had ſhe not turned her eyes, and caſt ſome looks at me. Great Venus, cried I, ſince thou art to render me happy, may it be with this ſhepherdeſs: I renounce all other beauties; ſhe alone can fulfil thy promiſes, and all the vows I ſhall for ever make

CANTO V.

I CONTINUED talking to the young Ariſteus of my tender paſſion, which made him ſigh for his own, when I endeavoured to eaſe his heart by intreating him to diſburden it to me: and this is what he ſaid. I ſhall forget nothing; for I am inſpired by the ſame God that made him ſpeak.

IN all my ſtory you will find nothing but what is extremely ſimple: my adventures are only the ſentiments of a tender heart: theſe are my pleaſures, and theſe my pains; for as my love for Camilla forms the happineſs, it alſo forms the hiſtory, of my life.

CAMILLA is the daughter of one of the principal inhabitants of Gnidus; ſhe is beautiful, and has a countenance that makes an impreſſion on all hearts. The women who form deſires demand of the Gods the graces of Camilla: the men who ſee her would ſee her always, or fear longer to ſee her.

SHE

She is of a graceful ſtature; and has a noble, but modeſt air; her eyes are lively, and ſuſceptible of tenderneſs; her features are expreſsly made for each other, and have charms adapted to give her a conqueſt over the heart.

Camilla does not ſeek to adorn herſelf; but ſhe is better adorned than other women.

She has that wit which nature almoſt conſtantly refuſes to the fair, and is equally capable of ſerioufneſs and gaiety. If you chuſe it, ſhe will join in a ſenſible converſation; or ſhe will jeſt like the Graces.

The more wit a perſon has, the more will he find in Camilla. Her thoughts are ſo natural, that ſhe ſeems to ſpeak the language of the heart. Every thing ſhe ſays, every thing ſhe does, has the charm of ſimplicity; and you always find her a native ſhepherdeſs. Graces ſo eaſy, ſo refined, ſo delicate, are always obſerved; but are better felt than deſcribed.

With all theſe advantages, Camilla loves me; ſhe is tranſported at ſeeing me; ſhe is ſorry when I leave her; and, as if I could live

with-

without her, makes me promiſe to return. I continually tell her that I love her, ſhe believes me: I tell her that I adore her, ſhe knows it; but is as delighted as if ſhe knew it not. When I tell her that ſhe conſtitutes the felicity of my life, ſhe tells me that I am the happineſs of hers. In ſhort, ſhe loves me ſo much, that ſhe almoſt makes me believe that I am worthy of her love.

For a month did I ſee Camilla, without daring to tell her that I loved, and almoſt without daring to tell it myſelf. The more amiable I found her, the leſs were my hopes of meeting with a return. O Camilla! thought I, thy charms captivate my ſoul; but they let me know that I am unworthy of thee. I ſought to forget her; I would have effaced her image from my heart. How happy was I that I could not ſucceed! That image has remained there, and will never be obliterated.

I said to Camilla: I once loved the buſtle and noiſe of life; but now I ſeek ſolitude: I had views of ambition; but I deſire nothing but thy preſence: I was deſirous of viſiting diſtant climates; but my heart is now only a citizen of the places where thou breatheſt. Every

Every thing but thee has vaniſhed from before my eyes.

When Camilla ſpeaks of her tenderneſs, ſhe has always ſomething to ſay to me, and ſhe fancies ſhe has forgot what ſhe has proteſted a thouſand times. I am ſo charmed at hearing her, that I ſometimes pretend not to believe her, in order to hear her ſtill flatter my heart. Sometimes we both preſerve that ſweet ſilence, which is the moſt tender language of lovers.

When I have been abſent from Camilla, I have endeavoured to give her an account of what I have heard or ſeen. With what doſt thou entertain me, ſays ſhe? talk to me of our love; or if thou haſt not thought of it, if thou haſt nothing to ſay to me, O cruel Ariſteus, ſuffer me to ſpeak.

Sometimes, embracing me, ſhe ſays, Thou art melancholy. 'Tis true, I reply; but the melancholy of lovers is delightful: I feel my tears flow, and know not for why; for thou loveſt me: I have no cauſe of complaint; and yet I complain. Deliver me not from the languor of my mind; ſuffer me to ſigh out at the ſame time my pains and my pleaſures

In

In the tranſports of love my ſoul is too ſtrongly agitated; it is drawn towards its happineſs without enjoying it: but now I reliſh even melancholy itſelf. Dry not up my tears: what ſignifies my ſhedding them, while I am happy.

Sometimes Camilla ſays: Doſt thou love me? Yes, I love thee. But how doſt thou love me? I love, I reply, as I have loved: for I can only compare the affection I have for thee, by that which I have felt for the ſame tranſporting object.

I hear Camilla praiſed by all who know her: theſe praiſes affect me as if they were made to myſelf, and I am more delighted with them, than ſhe.

When we have company, ſhe talks with ſuch wit, that I am charmed with her leaſt words: but I am ſtill better pleaſed, when ſhe is ſilent.

When ſhe contracts a friendſhip, I would be that friend; and ſuddenly I reflect that I ſhall not be beloved.

O CAMILLA, take care of the deceits of lovers. They tell thee that they love; and they ſpeak truth: they tell thee, that they love thee more than I; but I ſwear by the Gods, that I love thee ſtill more.

WHEN I perceive her at a diſtance, my ſoul flies to her; ſhe approaches, and my heart is agitated; I come up to her, and my ſoul ſeems as if it would leave me to enter Camilla's breaſt, and that hers is going to animate mine.

SOMETIMES, when I would ſteal from her one favour, ſhe refuſes me, and inſtantly grants me another. This is not artifice. Divided between modeſty and love, ſhe would refuſe me every thing; and yet ſhe wiſhes that ſhe might deny me nothing.

SHE ſays, Is it not ſufficient that I love you? What can you deſire more, after having had my heart? I deſire, ſay I, that thou wouldſt for me commit a fault that is in the power of love, and which the greatneſs of love can juſtify.

If I ever ceaſe to love thee, my Camilla, may the Deſtinies be miſtaken, and take that for the laſt of my days! May they cut off the remainder of a life, which I ſhould find deplorable when I recollected the pleaſure I had found in loving.

Aristeus ſighed, and was ſilent; and I plainly ſaw, that he only ceaſed to talk of Camilla, in order to enjoy the pleaſure of thinking of her charms.

CANTO VI.

WHILE we were talking of our amours, we rambled out of our way; and having ſtrayed for a long time, entered a large meadow, where we were conducted by a flowery path to the foot of a frightful rock. We there ſaw an obſcure den, which we entered, thinking it the abode of ſome mortal. Ye Gods! who could have imagined that this place was ſo fatal! Scarce had I ſet my foot in it, when my whole body trembled, and my hair ſtood erect on my head! An inviſible hand drew me into this fatal abode, and in proportion as my heart was agitated, its agitations increaſed. Friend, cried I, let us enter farther ſtill, let us ſee if we ſhall increaſe our pain. I advanced to the place where the ſun had never entered, and where the winds had never breathed. There I ſaw Jealouſy, whoſe aſpect appeared more gloomy than terrible: Paleneſs, Melancholy, and Silence ſurrounded her; and about her flew Sorrow and Diſquietude. She breathed upon us; ſhe placed her hand upon our hearts; ſhe ſtruck us upon the head; and

our

our ſight and imagination could perceive nothing but monſters.

ENTER ſtill farther, unhappy mortals, ſaid ſhe; go, find a Goddeſs more powerful than I. We obeyed; and ſoon ſaw a frightful Deity, by the light of the inflamed tongues of the ſerpents that hiſſed about her head. This was Rage. She looſened one of her ſerpents, and threw it at me. I ſtrove to catch it, and in an inſtant it imperceptibly ſlid into my heart. I ſtood for a moment ſtupid; but the poiſon had no ſooner diffuſed itſelf into my veins, than I imagined myſelf in the midſt of hell. My ſoul was ſet on fire. I could ſcarce contain myſelf; and was in ſuch agitations, that I ſeemed tormented by the whips of the Furies. We abandoned ourſelves to our tranſports, and an hundred times encompaſſed this dreadful cavern: we went from Jealouſy to Rage, and from Rage to Jealouſy. We called upon Themira; we called upon Camilla: but if Themira and Camilla had been there, we ſhould have torn them in pieces with our own hands.

AT length we returned to the light of day, which then appeared troubleſome, and we almoſt

almoſt regretted our having quitted the frightful cavern: we ſunk down with laſſitude, and even this repoſe appeared inſupportable. Our eyes refuſed to ſhed tears, and our hearts could no longer form a ſigh.

I HOWEVER enjoyed a moment's tranquillity: Sleep began to ſhed on me her ſweet poppies. But, ye Gods! this ſleep itſelf became cruel. I ſaw images that appeared more terrible to me, than the pale ſhades I had ſeen when awake. I every inſtant awoke at the infidelity of Themira. I ſaw her—I dare not yet expreſs what I ſaw. What I before beheld only in imagination, I found realized in the horrours of this frightful ſleep.

I MUST then, ſaid I riſing, fly equally darkneſs and light. Themira, the cruel Themira, torments me like the furies! Who could have imagined, that in order to be happy I muſt forget her for ever?

SEIZED by a fit of madneſs, I cried, Friend, ariſe, let us deſtroy the flocks that feed in this meadow; let us purſue the ſhepherds who enjoy their loves in peace. No, I ſee at a diſtance a temple; it is, perhaps, that of Cupid:

let us go and deſtroy it ; let us break his ſtatue and render our rage formidable. We ran, and it ſeemed as if our ardour for committing a crime gave us new ſtrength. We croſſed the woods, the meadows, and the fields, and did not ſtop for a moment : a hill aroſe in vain ; we aſcended it, and entered the temple which was conſecrated to Bacchus.—How great is the power of the Gods ! Our rage was immediately calmed. We looked at each other, and ſaw with ſurprize the extravagance of our conduct.

Great God ! I cried, I return thee my thanks, not ſo much for having appeaſed my fury, as for having ſaved me from guilt. Then, approaching the prieſteſs ; We are beloved by the God whom you ſerve, ſaid I ; he has juſt calmed the agitations of our minds ; ſcarce did we enter this ſacred place, than we were ſenſible of his favourable preſence ; we would therefore offer a ſacrifice to him. Condeſcend, divine prieſteſs, to offer it for us. I will go and ſeek a victim, and bring it to your feet.

While the prieſteſs was preparing to give the mortal blow, Ariſteus pronounced theſe words :

words: Divine Bacchus, thou loveſt to ſee joy diffuſed over the countenance of man; our pleaſure is a worſhip paid to thee; and thou wilt be adored by none but the moſt happy of mortals.

SOMETIMES thou giveſt a ſweet diſorder to our reaſon: but when ſome cruel Deity has taken it from us, thou alone canſt reſtore it.

BLACK Jealouſy holds Love in bondage: but thou takeſt away the empire ſhe aſſumes over our hearts, and ſendeſt her back to her diſmal abode.

AFTER the ſacrifice was ended, all the people aſſembled about us: and I related to the prieſteſs, how we had been tormented in the habitation of Jealouſy. Suddenly we heard a great noiſe, and a confuſed mixture of voices and muſical inſtruments: upon which leaving the temple, we ſaw a troop of Bacchanals, who ſtriking the earth with their thyrſes, cried with a loud voice, *Evohe*. Old Silenus followed, mounted on an aſs: his head ſeemed to ſeek the ground, and whenever it ſeemed ready to fall from his ſhoulders, he balanced himſelf up with his body. The troop had

their faces ſmeared with the lees of wine. Pan at length appeared with his pipe; and the Satyrs ſurrounded their King. Joy reigned in the midſt of diſorder; an amiable folly was mixed with their ſports, their raillery, their dances, and their ſongs. At length came Bacchus in a chariot drawn by tygers; ſuch as was ſeen at the river Ganges, at the end of the univerſe, bearing joy and victory.

By his ſide was the beautiful Ariadne. Lovely Princeſs, you ſtill wept for the infidelity of Theſeus, when the God took your crown, and placed it in the heavens. Had you not dried up your tears, you would have rendered a God more unhappy than yourſelf who are a mortal. Love me, ſaid he, Theſeus is fled; bear no remembrance of his love; and even forget his perfidy: I will render you immortal, that I may love you for ever.

I saw Bacchus deſcend from his chariot; and I ſaw Ariadne alſo deſcend: when entering the temple, Amiable God, cried ſhe, let us ſtay in this place, and here ſigh our loves. Let eternal joy dwell in this delightful climate. Near this place the queen of hearts has fixed her empire: may the God of joy reign near her

her, and increaſe the happineſs of theſe people already ſo fortunate.

As for me, great God, I already perceive that my love is increaſed; and it is poſſible that thou mayſt one day appear even more amiable! None but the immortals can love to exceſs, and with a conſtant growing affection; none but they can obtain more then they hope for; they alone are more limited when they deſire, than when they enjoy. Here we will perform our eternal loves: for in the heavens the Gods are filled with their glory; and it is only on the earth, and in rural retreats, that they give way to love. While this troop therefore abandon themſelves to extravagant tranſports, my joy, and my ſighs ſhall inceſſantly proclaim my affection.

Bacchus ſmiled at Ariadne, and inſtantly led her into the ſanctuary. Mean while joy took poſſeſſion of our hearts; we felt a divine emotion; when being ſeized with the extravagance of old Silenus, and by the tranſports of the Bacchanals, we each took a thyrſis, and mingled in the dances and concerts.

CANTO VII.

ON our quitting the places conſecrated to Bacchus, we ſoon felt that our evils had been only ſuſpended. 'Tis true, we had not the madneſs with which we had before been agitated; but a gloomy melancholy had ſeized our ſouls, and we were racked by ſuſpicions and inquietudes.

IT ſeemed to us, that the cruel Goddeſſes had tormented us, in order to give us a foreſight of the misfortunes to which we were deſtined.

SOMETIMES we regretted our having left the temple of Bacchus; and ſoon after we were induced to approach that of Gnidus: we were deſirous of ſeeing Themira and Camilla, the powerful objects of our love and jealouſy.

BUT we had none of that ſweetneſs people are accuſtomed to feel, when on the point of ſeeing thoſe they love, when the ſoul is already raviſhed, and taſtes beforehand the promiſed happineſs.

PERHAPS,

PERHAPS, ſaid Ariſteus, I ſhall find Lycas the ſhepherd with Camilla. How do I know that he is not talking to her this very moment? Ye Gods! the traitreſs takes pleaſure in hearing him.

IT was ſaid the other day, cried I, that Thyrſis, who has been ſo in love with Themira, was to arrive at Gnidus. He has loved her, and doubtleſs loves her ſtill; I muſt diſpute with him a heart I believed intirely my own.

I REMEMBER that one day Lycas ſung to my Camilla. Inſenſible wretch that I was, I was delighted at hearing him praiſe her.

I REMEMBER that Thyrſis brought my Themira ſome freſh-blown flowers. Unhappy that I am, ſhe placed them in her boſom, ſaying, It is a preſent from Thyrſis. Oh! I ſhould have ſnatched them, and have trampled them under my feet.

NOT long ſince I went with Camilla to make an offering to Venus of two young

turtles; but they eſcaped from me, and flew away.

I HAD inſcribed my name with that of Themira on the trees; I had written alſo the ſtory of our love: I read them, and read them again without ceaſing; but one morning I found them effaced.

CAMILLA, drive not to deſpair an unhappy wretch who loves thee; for love, when provoked, has all the effects of hatred.

THE firſt Gnidian that ſhall look at my Themira, I will purſue even into the Temple, and puniſh him though at the feet of Venus.

WHILE we were holding theſe diſcourſes, we arrived within ſight of the ſacred grove where the Goddeſs delivers her oracles. The people were in crowds, that moved like the waves of the ſea agitated by the wind. Some came to hear, and others to receive an anſwer.

WE entered the crowd, and I loſt the happy Ariſteus. Already had he embraced his Camilla; and I was ſtill in ſearch of my Themira.

I AT length found her. I felt my jealouſy redoubled at her ſight, and began to reſume my former madneſs. But ſhe looked at me, and I was filled with tranquillity. Thus do the Gods ſend back the Furies, when they eſcape out of hell.

OH! what tears, cried ſhe, haſt thou coſt me! Three times has the ſun run his courſe, and I fear'd that I had loſt thee for ever. I have been to conſult the Oracle. I did not aſk whether thou lovedſt me. I only deſired to know if thou waſt ſtill alive. But Venus has juſt anſwered, that thou wilt love me for ever.

EXCUSE, ſaid I, an unfortunate wretch, who would have hated thee had he been capable of it. The Gods, in whoſe hands I am, may take away my reaſon; but they cannot, Themira, deprive me of my love.

I HAVE been agitated by the moſt dreadful jealouſy, and have endured the tortures inflicted in Tartarus on the ghoſts of criminals. But this advantage have I drawn from it, I am more ſenſible of the happineſs of being beloved by

by thee, after the dreadful ſituation of fearing to loſe thee.

COME then with me; retire into this ſolitary grove. We ought by love to expiate the crimes I have committed. It is a great crime, Themira, to believe thee unfaithful.

NEVER were the Elyſian bowers, made by the Gods for the tranquillity of the ſouls they love; never were the foreſts of Dodona, where the trees ſpoke, and revealed to man his future felicity; never were the gardens of the Heſperides, whoſe boughs bent under the weight of their golden fruit, more charming than this grove adorned with the inchanting preſence of Themira.

I REMEMBER, a Satyr who purſued a nymph, that fled from him all in tears, ſaw us; and ſtopping cried, Happy lovers! your eyes know how to anſwer and reply to your paſſion; and your ſighs are repaid by ſighs! But I ſpend my life in following a cruel ſhepherdeſs; unhappy while I purſue; but more unhappy ſtill when I have caught her.

A YOUNG nymph, who was wandering alone through the grove, perceived us; and ſighing cried, It is only to augment my torments, that cruel Cupid brings before me ſo tender a lover.

WE found Apollo ſeated near a fountain. That God had followed Diana, whom a timorous deer had led into theſe woods. I knew him again by his fair hair, and the immortal troop that ſurrounded him. He ſtruck his lyre; it drew the woods, the trees moved, and the lions remained immoveable. But we entered farther into the foreſt, and were in vain invited by that divine harmony.

WHERE do you imagine that I found the God of Love. I found him on the lips of Themira. I afterwards diſcovered him on her boſom: he ſaved himſelf at her feet; I found him ſtill: he then hid himſelf under her knees; I followed him, and ſhould have continued to follow him, if the weeping, the angry Themira had not ſtopped me. He was at his laſt retreat, and ſhe was ſo charming, that he could not leave her. Thus, a tender linnet, detained by fear and love, covers her little ones with

with her wings, and remains immoveable under the hand that approaches her, and cannot conſent to abandon them.

UNHAPPY as I am, Themira heard my complaints, and was not ſoftened: ſhe liſtened to my intreaties, and became more ſevere. In ſhort, I grew raſh: ſhe was enraged, and I trembled: ſhe appeared ſorry; and I ſhed tears: ſhe repulſed me; and I fell at her feet. I then perceived, that the ſighs I uttered would have been my laſt, had not Themira laid her hand on my heart, and recalled me to life.

I AM not ſo cruel as thou, ſaid ſhe, for I have never thought of killing thee; and yet thou wouldeſt draw me into the darkneſs of the grave. Open thoſe dying eyes, if thou wouldſt not have mine ſhut for ever.

SHE embraced me, and I received my pardon; but alas! it was without the hope of again becoming guilty.

As the following piece appears to be written by the ſame author, I have alſo tranſlated it from the Greek, and placed it here.

CUPID DISTRESSED.

ONE day being in the Idalian grove with the young Cephiſa, I found Cupid aſleep hid under the flowers, and ſheltered by ſome branches of myrtle, which gently yielded to the breath of the Zephyrs. The Sports and Laughter, who always follow him, were playing at ſome diſtance, and he was alone. Cupid was then in my power: his bow and quiver lay by his ſide; and, if I had pleaſed, I could have ſtole the arms of the God of Love.

CEPHISA however took the bow, drew an arrow, and, without my perceiving her, let it fly at me. On which I ſmiling ſaid, Take a ſecond, give me another wound, for this is too ſweet. She reſolved to let fly another arrow, but it fell at her feet; and ſhe ſoftly cried, This was the heavieſt arrow in the quiver of of Love. She then taking it up ſhot; and ſtriking

ſtriking me, I bowed, crying, O Cephiſa, wouldſt thou then bring me to my grave?

She then approached nearer to Cupid. He is in a profound ſleep, ſaid ſhe; he is fatigued with ſhooting his arrows; let us gather ſome flowers, in order to bind his hands and feet. Oh! I can never conſent to it, I returned; for he has always favoured us. I will go, then, ſaid ſhe, take his arms, and let fly an arrow at him with all my ſtrength. But he will awake, ſaid I. Well, let him, ſaid ſhe; what can he do but wound us more? No, no, I returned, do not diſturb his repoſe; we will remain near him, and ſhall by that means be more inflamed.

Cephisa then took the leaves of myrtle and roſes, and cried, I am reſolved to cover Cupid with them. The Sports and Laughter ſought him, but could not find him, when ſhe threw them upon him, and laughed to ſee the little God almoſt buried. But what am I amuſing myſelf about? ſaid ſhe, I muſt cut his wings, that there may be no more inconſtant men upon earth; for this God flies from heart to heart, carrying inconſtancy with him. She then took her ſciſſars, ſat down, and held in

her hand the ends of his golden pinions. I felt my heart ſtruck with fear, and cried, Stop, Cephiſa! But ſhe heard me not, and having cut the tip of his wings, left her ſciſſars, and fled.

When Cupid awoke, he endeavoured to fly; but felt an unaccuſtomed weight; on ſeeing the clippings of the feathers ſcattered among the flowers, he began to weep. But Jupiter perceiving him from high Olympus, ſent him a cloud that carried him to the Temple of Gnidus, and laid him on the boſom of Venus. Mother, ſaid he, I beat upon your breaſt with my wings; they are cut, and what will become of me? Son, ſaid the lovely Cypria, do not weep; ſtay in my boſom, and do not ſtir; the warmth you will find there will make them grow again. Do you not ſee, that they are already larger? Embrace me; they grow; you will ſoon find them as before; I already ſee the tips of the golden feathers; in another moment—'tis enough, fly, fly, my ſon. Yes, ſaid he, I am going to venture. He flew; he reſted himſelf near the Goddeſs; and inſtantly returned to her boſom. He thence took a ſecond flight; reſted at a greater diſtance; and again returned to the boſom of Venus. He kiſſed it, ſhe ſmiled; he kiſſed it again, and

play'd

play'd with her: and at length aroſe into the air, where he reigns over all nature.

CUPID, to be revenged on Cephiſa, has rendered her the moſt volatile of all the fair; and has cauſed her to burn every day with a freſh flame. She has loved me; ſhe has loved Daphnis; and ſhe ſtill loves Cleon. Cruel Cupid! it is me whom you puniſh. I would gladly bear the pain inflicted for her crime: but haſt thou not other torments for me to ſuffer?

LYSIMACHUS.

LYSIMACHUS.

WHEN Alexander had deſtroyed the Perſian Empire, he reſolved to raiſe a belief, that he was the ſon of Jupiter. The Macedonians were vexed at ſeeing that Prince bluſh at having Philip for his father: their diſcontent increaſed, when they beheld him aſſume the manners, the cuſtoms, and the dreſs of the Perſians; and they reproached themſelves for having done ſo much for a man who began to deſpiſe them. But the murmurs of the army did not break out into words.

A PHILOSOPHER, named Calliſthenes, had followed the King in his expedition. One day he ſaluted him after the manner of the Greeks: on which Alexander cried, "Whence comes "it that thou doſt not adore me?" "My "Lord, ſaid Calliſthenes, thou art the chief of "two nations: the one were ſlaves before they "had ſubmitted to thee, and are not leſs ſo "ſince thou haſt conquered them; the other

" free before they aſſiſted thee in gaining ſo
" many victories, and are ſo ſtill ſince thou
" haſt obtained them. I am a Greek, my
" Lord; and that name thou haſt raiſed ſo
" high, that we cannot degrade it without in-
" juring thee."

THE vices of Alexander were as extraordinary as his virtues. He was terrible in his anger; it rendered him cruel. He cauſed the feet, noſe, and ears of Calliſthenes to be cut off; ordered that he ſhould be ſhut up in an iron cage, and thus carried in the train of his army.

I LOVED Calliſthenes; and whenever buſineſs would allow me ſome hours of leiſure, I was uſed to employ them in liſtening to him: and if I have any love for virtue, I owe it to the impreſſions I have received from his diſcourſes. I went to viſit him. " I ſa-
" lute thee, ſaid I, illuſtrious but unhappy
" Calliſthenes, whom I ſee, like a wild beaſt,
" kept in a cage of iron, for having been the
" only man in the army."

" LYSIMACHUS, ſaid he, when I ſee myſelf
" in a ſituation that demands courage and for-
" titude,

" titude, I ſeem to be almoſt in my pro-
" per ſituation. Indeed, had the Gods pla-
" ced me upon earth, only to lead here a
" life of pleaſure, I believe they would have
" given me in vain a great and immortal ſoul.
" To enjoy the pleaſures of ſenſe, is a thing of
" which all men are eaſily capable; and if the
" Gods have made us only for that, they have
" made a work more perfect than they intend-
" ed, and have executed more than they de-
" ſigned. Not, added he, that I am inſenſible.
" Thou let'ſt me too plainly ſee that I am not.
" When I ſaw thee coming, I felt a ſudden
" pleaſure at ſeeing thee perform ſo courageous
" an action. But I conjure thee, in the name
" of the Gods, to let this be the laſt time.
" Leave me to ſupport my misfortunes; and
" be not ſo cruel as to add to them the weight
" of thine."

" CALLISTHENES, ſaid I, I will viſit thee
" every day. If the King ſees thee abandoned
" by virtuous men, he will no longer feel the
" leaſt remorſe; he will begin to believe that
" thou art guilty. I hope he will never en-
" joy the pleaſure of ſeeing, that his chaſtiſe-
" ments have made me abandon a friend."

One day Callisthenes said to me, "The "immortal Gods have given me consolation; "and ever since I feel within me something "divine, that has taken away the sensibility of "my pains. I have seen in a dream the great "Jupiter. Thou wast near him; thou hadst "a sceptre in thine hand, and a royal circlet on "thy forehead. He shewed thee to me, and "said, *He will render thee more happy.* The "emotions I felt awaked me from sleep. I "found my hands lifted up towards heaven, "and was making an effort to say, *Great* "*Jupiter, if Lysimachus is to reign, grant that* "*he may reign with justice.* Lysimachus, thou "shalt reign: believe a man who must be "pleasing to the Gods, since he suffers in the "cause of virtue."

In the mean while Alexander being informed, that I shewed respect to the misery of Callisthenes, that I went to visit him, and even presumed to complain of his treatment, was filled with a fresh transport of rage. "Go, "said he, and fight with lions, unhappy "wretch, that takest delight in living with "wild beasts." My punishment was, however,

ever, deferred, that it might ſerve as a ſpectacle to a greater number of men.

THE day which preceded it I wrote theſe words to Calliſthenes: "I am going to die. All "the ideas thou haſt given me of my future "grandeur are vaniſhed from my mind. I "could have wiſhed to alleviate the ſufferings "of a man like thee."

PREXAPES, in whom I confided, brought this anſwer: "Lyſimachus, if the Gods have "reſolved that thou ſhalt reign, Alexander "cannot take away thy life; for men have it "not in their power to oppoſe the will of the "Gods."

FROM this letter I received encouragement: and reflecting, that the happieſt and moſt unhappy of mankind are equally ſurrounded by the divine hand, I reſolved to conduct myſelf, not by my hopes, but by my courage, and to defend to the laſt a life on which depended ſuch great promiſes.

THEY led me to the circus, where I was ſurrounded by an immenſe number of people, who came to be witneſs of my courage or my

fear. A lion was let looſe upon me. I wrapped my cloak about my arm: I preſented it to him: he would have devoured it: I thruſt it far into his mouth, ſeized his tongue by the roots, tore it out, and threw it at my feet.

ALEXANDER was naturally fond of courageous actions. He admired my reſolution; and at that moment the greatneſs of his ſoul returned.

HE gave orders for my being called to him; and holding out his hand to me, "Lyſimachus, "ſaid he, I return thee my friendſhip, return "me thine: my anger has only ſerved to "make thee perform an action that was want-"ing in the life of Alexander."

I RECEIVED the King's favour, adored the decrees of the Gods, and waited for their promiſes, without ſeeking or flying from them. Alexander died; and all the nations were without a maſter. The King's ſons were in their infancy: his brother Arideus had not yet come into Perſia: Olympias had only the boldneſs of weak minds, and cruelty was to her courage. Roxana, Eurydice, Statyra, were loſt in grief. Every body in the palace gave vent

to their groans, and no body thought of reigning. Alexander's captains then raiſed their eyes up to the throne; but the ambition of each was checked by the ambition of all. We divided the empire; and each of us believed that he had ſhared the price of his fatigues.

It was my lot to be made King of Aſia; and now, when I can do whatever I pleaſe, I am more in need than ever of the leſſons of Calliſthenes. His joy informs me that I have done a good action, and his ſighs tell me that I have ſome evil to repair. I find him between my people and me.

I am King of a people who love me. The fathers of families hope for the length of my life, as for that of their children. The young fear to loſe me, as they fear to loſe a father. My ſubjects are happy, and I am ſo too.

A

DEFENCE

OF

The SPIRIT of LAWS.

To which are added

SOME EXPLANATIONS.

A DEFENCE OF The SPIRIT of LAWS.

PART I.

THIS Defence is divided into three parts. In the firſt are anſwered the general reproaches that have been caſt on the Author of the Spirit of Laws. In the ſecond, a reply is made to particular reproaches: And the third contains reflexions on the manner in which he has been treated. The Public will ſoon be acquainted with the ſtate of the caſe; and to its judgment the Author refers.

I.

THOUGH the Spirit of Laws is intirely a work relating to politics and civil law, the Author has had frequent occaſion, in the courſe

courſe of that work, to mention the Chriſtian religion. He has done it in ſuch a manner, as fully to ſhew its dignity; and tho' he has had no view of endeavouring to prove it to be true, he has ſought to render it beloved.

However, in two periodical pieces that have ſucceſſively followed each other*, the moſt dreadful imputations have been caſt upon him. The inquiry is no leſs, than whether the Author be a Spinoſiſt and a Deiſt: and tho' theſe accuſations are in their own nature contradictory, the critic inceſſantly returns from one to the other.

Both being incompatible cannot render him more guilty than one alone; but both may render him more odious.

He is a Spinoſiſt, who in the firſt article of his book has diſtinguiſhed between the material world and ſpiritual intelligences.

He is a Spinoſiſt, who in the ſecond article has attacked Atheiſm. "Thoſe who aſſert, "that a blind fatality produced the various

* One on the 9th of October 1749; and the other on the 16th of the ſame month.

"effects

" effects we behold in this world, are guilty of " a very great abſurdity: for can any thing be " more abſurd, than to pretend that a blind " fatality could produce intelligent beings."

He is a Spinoſiſt who continues to ſay, " God is related to the univerſe as creator and " preſerver *; the laws by which he has cre- " ated all things, are thoſe by which he pre- " ſerves them. He acts according to theſe " rules becauſe he knows them: he knows " them becauſe he has made them: and he " made them becauſe they are relative to his " wiſdom and power."

He is a Spinoſiſt who has added: " As we " ſee that the world, tho' formed by the mo- " tion of matter, and void of underſtanding, " continues to ſubſiſt, &c †."

He is a Spinoſiſt who has ſhewn, againſt Hobbes and Spinoſa, That " before laws were " made, there were relations of poſſible juſ- " tice ‡."

He is a Spinoſiſt who, in the beginning of the ſecond chapter, has ſaid: " The law

* Book i. chap. 1. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

" which,

" which, imprinting in our minds the idea of " a Creator, inclines us to him, is the firſt, in " its importance, of natural laws."

He is a Spinoſiſt who has attacked with all his power a paradox aſſerted by Bayle, " That " it is better to be an atheiſt, than an idolater ;" a paradox from which the atheiſts draw the moſt dangerous conſequences.

What do they alledge after ſuch expreſs paſſages? Natural equity demands, that the degree of proof ſhould be proportionable to the greatneſs of the accuſation.

OBJECTION I.

The Author falls at the very firſt ſtep. " The " Laws, in their moſt general ſignification, ſays " he, are the neceſſary relations derived from " the nature of things." *The Laws of relations—What can he mean by this? The Author has not however deviated from the ordinary definition of Laws without deſign. What end had he then in view? This it is. According to the new ſyſtem, there is, between all beings which form what Pope calls* the univerſal whole, *a chain ſo neceſſary, that the leaſt diſorder will produce confuſion even up to the throne of the Firſt*

Firſt Cauſe. This has made Pope ſay, that things can be no otherwiſe than they are, and that whatever is, is right. *This being conſidered, we underſtand the ſignification of this new language,* that the laws are the neceſſary relations derived from the nature of things. *To which it is added, in this ſenſe,* "All beings "have their Laws: the Deity has his Laws; "the material world its Laws; the intelli- "gences ſuperior to man their Laws; the "beaſts their Laws; man his Laws."

The ANSWER.

Darkness itſelf is not more obſcure than this paſſage. The Critic has heard that Spinoſa maintained, that the univerſe is governed by a blind and neceſſary principle; and there needed no more. As ſoon as he found the word *neceſſary*, this muſt be Spinoſiſm. The Author has aſſerted, that the Laws are neceſſary relations: here therefore is Spinoſiſm, becauſe here is the term *neceſſary*. And what appears ſurpriſing is, that the Author, in the opinion of the Critic, is found to be a Spinoſiſt by this article, tho' it expreſly oppoſes ſuch dangerous ſyſtems. The Author was attempting to overthrow Hobbes's ſyſtem; a ſyſtem the moſt terrible, it making all the virtues and vi-

ces depend on human eſtabliſhments: and by endeavouring to prove, that all mankind are born in a ſtate of war, and that the firſt natural Law, is that all ſhould make war againſt all, he, like Spinoſa, overthrows both all religion, and all morality. In anſwer to this, the Author has eſtabliſhed, in the firſt place, that there were laws of juſtice and equity before the eſtabliſhment of poſitive Laws: he has proved, that all beings have Laws; that, even before their creation, they had poſſible Laws; that God himſelf has Laws, that is, Laws which he himſelf has made. He has proved, that the aſſertion, that man is born in a ſtate of war, is falſe *. He has ſhewn, that a ſtate of war did not commence till after the eſtabliſhment of ſocieties, and on this ſubject has advanced very clear principles. Whence it evidently follows: That the Author has attacked the errors of Hobbes, and the conſequences of thoſe of Spinoſa; and that hence it has happened, that ſo little has he been underſtood, that his objections againſt Spinoſiſm have been taken for the opinions of Spinoſa. Before a perſon enters into a diſpute, he ought to begin with making himſelf maſter of the ſtate of

* Book i. chap. 2.

the

the queſtion; and with knowing whether he whom he attacks is a friend or an enemy.

OBJECTION II.

THE Critic continues: *On which the Author cites Plutarch, who ſays, that* Law is the Queen of Gods and men. *But is it from a pagan,* &c?

THE ANSWER.

'TIS true, the Author has quoted Plutarch, who ſays, That Law is the Queen of Gods and men.

OBJECTION III.

THE Author has ſaid, That "the creation, "which ſeems to be an arbitrary act, ſuppoſes "Laws as invariable as the fatality of the athe-"iſts." From theſe words the Critic concludes, that the Author admits the fatality of the atheiſts.

THE ANSWER.

A LITTLE before he has deſtroyed this fatality, by ſaying, "Thoſe who aſſert that a "blind fatality produced the various effects "we behold in the world, are guilty of a very "great abſurdity: for can any thing be more

" abſurd than to pretend, that a blind fatality " can produce intelligent beings." Moreover, in the paſſage cenſured, the Author cannot be made to ſpeak of any other ſubject but that he is treating of. He is not treating of cauſes, nor does he compare cauſes: but he treats of effects, and compares effects. The whole article, that which precedes it, and that which follows, ſhew that he is here only treating of the rules of motion, which the Author aſſerts are eſtabliſhed by God. He ſays, that theſe rules are invariable; and all natural philoſophy ſays ſo too. They are invariable, becauſe God has reſolved that they ſhould be ſo, and becauſe he has determined to preſerve the world. He ſays neither more nor leſs than this.

I MUST always maintain, that the Critic never underſtands the ſenſe of things, and that he applies his attention only to words. When the Author ſays, that the creation, which ſeems to be an arbitrary act, ſuppoſes rules as invariable as the fatality of the atheiſts, it cannot be underſtood as if he had ſaid, the creation was as neceſſary an act as the fatality of the atheiſts, ſince he had already ſhewn the abſurdity of that fatality. Moreover, the two members of a compariſon ought to have a relation

lation to each other: therefore it is abſolutely neceſſary that the ſentence ſhould run thus: The creation, which ſeems at firſt to have produced Laws of variable motion, has thoſe as invariable as the fatality of the atheiſts. The Critic, once more, has neither ſeen, nor does ſee, any thing but words.

II.

THERE is then no Spinoſiſm in The Spirit of Laws. Let us paſs to another accuſation; and ſee if it be true, That the Author does not acknowledge the truth of revealed religion. The author, at the end of the firſt chapter, ſpeaking of man as a finite being ſubject to ignorance and error, has ſaid: "Such a being "might every inſtant forget his creator; God "has therefore reminded him of his duty by "the Laws of religion."

He has ſaid, in the firſt chapter of the twenty fourth book: "I ſhall examine the ſeveral "religions of the world, in relation only to the "good they produce in civil ſociety, whether I "ſpeak of that which has its root in heaven, or "of thoſe which ſpring from the earth.

" A PERSON of the leaſt degree of impartiality muſt ſee, that I have never pretended " to make the intereſts of religion ſubmit to " thoſe of a political nature, but rather to unite " them: now, in order to unite, it is neceſſary " that we ſhould know them. The chriſtian " religion, which ordains that men ſhould love " each other, would without doubt have every " nation bleſt with the beſt civil, the beſt political Laws; becauſe theſe, next to this religion, are the greateſt good that men can give " and receive."

AND, in the ſecond chapter of the ſame book: " A Prince who loves and fears religion " is a lion, who ſtoops to the hand that ſtrokes, " or the voice that appeaſes him. He who " fears and hates religion, is like the ſavage " beaſt, that growls, and bites the chain which " prevents his flying on the paſſenger. He " who has no religion at all, is that terrible " animal, who perceives his liberty only when " he tears in pieces and devours."

IN the third chapter of the ſame book: " While the Mahometan Princes inceſſantly " give or receive death, the religion of the " Chriſtians

" Chriſtians renders their Princes leſs timid, " and conſequently leſs cruel. The Prince " confides in his ſubjects; and the ſubjects in " the Prince. How admirable the religion " which, while it ſeems only to have in view " the felicity of the other life, conſtitutes the " happineſs of this!"

In the fourth chapter of the ſame book: " From the characters of the Chriſtian and " Mahometan religions we ought, without any " further examination, to embrace the one, " and reject the other." To proceed:

In the ſixth chapter: " Mr. Bayle, after " having abuſed all religions, endeavours to " ſully Chriſtianity: he boldly aſſerts, that true " Chriſtians cannot form a government of any " duration. Why not? Citizens of this pro- " feſſion, being infinitely inlightned, with re- " ſpect to the various duties of life, and having " the warmeſt zeal to fulfil them, muſt be " perfectly ſenſible of the rights of natural de- " fence. The more they believed themſelves " indebted to religion, the more they would " think due to their country. The principles " of Chriſtianity, deeply engraven on the " heart, would be infinitely more powerful

" than the falſe honour of monarchies, the " humane virtues of republics, or the ſer- " vile fear of deſpotic ſtates.

" It is aſtoniſhing, that this great man " ſhould not be able to diſtinguiſh between the " orders for the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, " and Chriſtianity itſelf; and that he ſhould be " liable to be charged with not knowing the " ſpirit of his own religion. When the legiſ- " lator, inſtead of Laws, has given counſels, " this is becauſe he knew, that if theſe coun- " ſels were ordained as Laws, they would be " contrary to the ſpirit of the Laws them- " ſelves."

In the tenth chapter: " Could I for a mo- " ment ceaſe to think that I am a Chriſtian, I " ſhould not be able to hinder myſelf from " ranking the deſtruction of the ſect of Zeno " among the misfortunes that have befallen " the human race, &c. Laying aſide for a " moment revealed truths, let us ſearch thro' " all nature, and we ſhall not find a nobler ob- " ject than the Antoninuſes, &c."

In the thirteenth chapter: " The Pagan " religion indeed, that prohibited only ſome " of

" of the groſſer crimes, that ſtopped the " hand, but meddled not with the heart, " might have crimes that were inexpiable: but " a religion which bridles all the paſſions; " which is not more jealous of actions, than of " thoughts and deſires; which holds us not " by a few chains, but by an infinite number " of threads; which, laying human juſtice " aſide, eſtabliſhes another kind of juſtice; " which is ſo ordered as to lead us continually " from repentance to love, and from love to " repentance; which puts between the judge " and the criminal a great mediator; between " the juſt and the mediator a great judge: a " religion like this ought not to have crimes in " themſelves inexpiable. But though it gives " fear and hope to all, it makes us ſufficiently " ſenſible, that there is no crime in its own " nature inexpiable, though a whole criminal " life may be ſo; that it is extremely danger- " ous to affront mercy by new crimes and " new expiations; that an uneaſineſs on ac- " count of ancient debts, from which we are " never free, ought to make us afraid of con- " tracting new ones, of filling up the mea- " ſure, and going to that point where paternal " goodneſs is limited."

In the concluſion of the nineteenth chapter, the Author, after having ſhewn an abuſe that has ariſen in ſeveral Pagan religions with reſpect to their opinion of the ſtate of ſouls in another life, ſays: "It is not enough for religion to eſtabliſh a doctrine; it muſt alſo direct its influence. This the Chriſtian religion performs in the moſt admirable manner, particularly with regard to the doctrines of which we have been ſpeaking. It makes us hope for a ſtate that is the object of our belief; not for a ſtate we have already experienced or known. Thus every article, even the reſurrection of the body, leads us to ſpiritual ideas."

And at the concluſion of the twenty ſixth chapter: "It follows from hence, that it is almoſt always proper for a religion to have particular doctrines, and a general worſhip. In Laws concerning the practice of religious worſhip, there ought to be but few particulars: for inſtance, they ſhould command mortification in general, and not a certain kind of mortification. Chriſtianity is full of good ſenſe: abſtinence is of divine inſtitution; but a particular kind of abſtinence is ordained

" ordained by a political Law, and therefore " may be changed."

In the laſt chapter of the twenty fifth book: " But it does not follow, that a religion brought " from a far diſtant country, and quite differ- " ent in climate, laws, manners, and cuſtoms, " will have all the ſucceſs to which its holineſs " ought to intitle it."

In the third chapter of the twenty fourth book: " 'Tis the Chriſtian religion that, in " ſpite of the empire and the influence of the " climate, has hindered deſpotic power from " being eſtabliſhed in Æthiopia, and has car- " ried into the midſt of Africa the manners " and Laws of Europe, &c. Not far from " thence may be ſeen the Mahometan ſhut- " ting up the children of the King of Sennao; " at whoſe death the council ſends to murder " them, in favour of the Prince who mounts " the throne.

" Let us ſet before our eyes, on the one " hand, the continual maſſacres of the Kings " and Generals of the Greeks and Romans; " and, on the other, the deſtruction of people " and cities by the commanders Thimur and " Gengis-

" Gengis-Kan, who ravaged Aſia; and we " ſhall ſee that we owe to Chriſtianity, in go- " vernment, a certain political Law, and, in " war, a certain Law of nations; benefits " which human nature can never ſufficiently " acknowledge." The Reader is deſired to peruſe the whole chapter.

In the eighth chapter of the twenty fourth book: " In a country ſo unfortunate as to have " a religion which God has not revealed, it is " always neceſſary that it ſhould be agreeable " to morality, becauſe even a falſe religion is " the beſt ſecurity we can have of the probity " of men."

These paſſages are very explicit. We here ſee a writer, who not only believes the Chriſtian religion, but who loves it. What has the Critic ſaid to prove the contrary? Let it be once more obſerved, that the proofs ought to be proportionable to the accuſation: and as that accuſation is not of a frivolous nature, neither ought the proofs to be ſo. But as theſe proofs are always given in a pretty extraordinary form, they being a mixture of half proof and half abuſe, and in a manner concealed in the

the train of a very vague diſcourſe; I am going to ſearch for them.

OBJECTION I.

THE Author has praiſed the Stoics, who admitted a blind fatality, a neceſſary chain, *&c* *. This is the foundation of natural religion.

THE ANSWER.

SUPPOSE for a moment that this falſe manner of reaſoning is juſt. Has the Author praiſed the natural philoſophy and metaphyſics of the Stoics? He has praiſed their morals; he has ſaid, that the people obtained great advantages from them: he has ſaid this, and he has ſaid no more.—I am miſtaken; he has ſaid more: for, in the firſt page of the book, he has attacked the fatality of the Stoics; he did not then praiſe it, when he praiſed the Stoics.

OBJECTION II.

THE Author has praiſed Bayle in calling him a great man †.

* The ſecond piece, of [illegible], 1710, pag. 165.
† Ibid.

AN-

ANSWER.

I WILL here too ſuppoſe for a moment, that in general this manner of reaſoning is juſt: but, at leaſt, it is not ſo in this caſe. 'Tis true, the Author has called Bayle a great man; but he has cenſured his opinions. If he has cenſured them, he does not admit them: and ſince he has attacked his opinions, he does not call him a great man on their account. Every body knows, that Bayle had a great capacity; of which he has made an ill uſe: but that capacity which he miſuſed, he had. The Author has, therefore, attacked his ſophiſms, and complained of his errors. I do not love the men who overthrow the laws of their country; but I ſhould find it difficult to believe, that Cæſar and Cromwel were men of mean capacities. I am not fond of conquerors; but it would not be an eaſy matter to perſuade me, that Alexander and Gengis-Kan were men of a common genius. It would not, indeed, have required any great abilities in the Author to have called Bayle an abominable man: but whether he owes this diſpoſition to nature, or whether it is an effect of his education, it appears that he is not fond of uſing abuſive language. I have reaſon to believe that, was he

to

to take up the pen, he would not treat in that manner even thoſe who have endeavoured to do him one of the greateſt injuries that one man can do to another, by labouring to render him odious to all thoſe who do not know him, and ſuſpected by all who do.

Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men make little impreſſion on thoſe who are not themſelves angry. Moſt readers are men of moderation, who ſeldom take a book but in cool blood. Reaſonable men love reaſon; and if the Author had uttered againſt Bayle a thouſand abuſive expreſſions, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle had reaſoned either well, or ill: all that could have been concluded from it would have been, that the Author knew how to be abuſive.

OBJECTION III.

Is drawn from the Author's not having treated, in his firſt chapter, of original ſin *.

ANSWER.

I ask every ſenſible man, whether that chapter be a treatiſe on theology? Had the

* The piece of the 9th of October 1740, pag. 162.

Author treated of original ſin, he might in the ſame manner have been charged with not having mentioned the redemption of mankind; and thus they might have proceeded, from article to article, to infinity.

OBJECTION IV.

Is drawn from the Author's having begun his work in a very different manner from Mr. Domat; who has firſt treated of revelation.

ANSWER.

'Tis true Mr. Domat has begun his work in a different manner from the Author, and has firſt treated of revelation.

OBJECTION V.

The Author has followed Pope's ſyſtem in his Eſſay on Man.

ANSWER.

Throughout the whole work he has not one word of Pope's ſyſtem.

OBJECTION VI.

The Author ſays, That the Law which preſcribes to Man his duty towards God, is the moſt important; but he denies that it is the firſt: he pretends,

pretends, that the firſt Law of nature is peace; that men begin with being afraid of each other, &c. *But every child knows, that the firſt Law is to love God; and that the ſecond is to love his neighbour.*

ANSWER.

THESE are the Author's words: "The "Law which, imprinting in our minds the "idea of a Creator, inclines us to him, is the "firſt of the natural Laws in its importance, "tho' not in its order. Man, in a ſtate of "nature, would have the power of knowing "before he had acquired knowledge. 'Tis "evident that his firſt ideas would be far from "being of a ſpeculative nature; he would "think of the preſervation of his being be-"fore he would inveſtigate its origin. Such a "man would at firſt feel nothing in himſelf "but impotency. His fears and apprehen-"ſions would be exceſſive; as appears from "inſtances (were there any neceſſity of prov-"ing it) of ſavages found in foreſts, ever "trembling, and flying from every ſhadow *." The Author has then ſaid, that the Law which, imprinting in us the idea of a Creator, inclines us to him, is the firſt of the natural

* Book i. chap. 2.

Laws. It is not unlawful for him, any more than for other philoſophers and writers on the Law of nature, to conſider man under various ſituations. He has therefore taken the liberty to ſuppoſe a man as if dropped from the clouds, left to himſelf, and without education, before the eſtabliſhment of ſociety. Well, the Author has ſaid, that the firſt, the moſt important, and conſequently the capital Law of nature, would be for him, as well as for all other men, to be inclined towards his Creator. It is alſo allowable for the Author to inquire what would be the firſt impreſſion made on this man, and to examine the order in which theſe impreſſions would be traced in his brain: and he has believed, that he would have ſenſations before he made reflexions; that the firſt, in the order of time, would be fear; afterwards the want of food, *&c.* The Author has ſaid, that the Law which, impreſſing on our minds the idea of a Creator, leads us to him, is the firſt of the natural Laws: the Critic ſays, that the firſt Law of nature is to love God: they are therefore only divided by abuſe.

OBJECTION VII.

Is drawn from the firſt chapter of the firſt book; where the Author having ſaid

that man is a limited being, has added: "Such a being might every inſtant forget "his Creator; God has therefore remind-"ed him of his duty by the Laws of re-"ligion." Now, ſays the Critic, What is the religion to which the Author here alludes? He doubtleſs ſpeaks of natural religion; he then only believes natural religion.

ANSWER.

LET us ſuppoſe again, that this manner of reaſoning is juſt; and that when the Author ſpeaks only of the religion of nature, we may conclude from thence that he only believes in that religion, and that he excludes revealed religion: Yet, in this place I maintain that he has ſpoken of revealed religion, and not of the religion of nature; for if he had meant the religion of nature, he muſt have been an idiot. It would have been as if he had ſaid: Such a being might eaſily forget his Creator, that is, the religion of nature; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the Laws of natural religion: ſo that God had given him the religion of nature, to perfect him in the religion of nature. Thus, to prepare himſelf for caſting invectives on the Author, he begins by taking from his words their moſt evident ſenſe,

in order to give them the moſt evident abſurdity; and to obtain the advantage over him, he deprives him of common ſenſe.

OBJECTION VIII.

THE Author, ſpeaking of man, has ſaid: "Such a being might every inſtant forget his "Creator; God has therefore reminded him "of his duty by the Laws of religion: ſuch a "being is liable every moment to forget himſelf; philoſophy has provided againſt this "by the Laws of morality: formed to live in "ſociety, he might forget his fellow creatures; "legiſlators have therefore, by political and "civil Laws, confined him to his duty *." *Therefore*, ſays the Critic, *according to the Author, the government is divided between God, the philoſophers, and the legiſlators*, &c. *Where have the philoſophers learned the Laws of morality? Where have legiſlators ſeen what they ought to preſcribe, in order to govern ſocieties with equity* †?

ANSWER.

IT is very eaſy to reply to this. They have taken it from revelation, if they have been ſo

* Book i. chap. 1. † The piece of the 9th of October 1749, pag. 162.

happy

happy as to be favoured with it: otherwiſe, they have taken it from that Law which, impreſſing on our minds the idea of a Creator, leads us towards him. Has the Author of the Spirit of Laws ſaid with Virgil, *Cæſar ſhares the empire with Jupiter?* Has not God, the governour of the univerſe, given to certain men greater intellectual abilities, and to others greater power? You would maintain that the Author has ſaid, that becauſe God has been pleaſed to ordain that men ſhould be governed by men, he is not willing that they ſhould obey him, and that he has diveſted himſelf of the authority he had over them, *&c.* To ſuch abſurdities are thoſe reduced, who are extremely weak at reaſoning, but have great ſtrength at declamation.

OBJECTION IX.

THE Critic continues: *It is alſo obſervable that the Author, who finds that God cannot govern free beings as well as others, becauſe, being free, they are allowed the liberty of acting for themſelves* (I ſhall obſerve by the way, that the Author does not make uſe of the expreſſion, God cannot) *remedies this diſorder no otherwiſe than by the Law, which ſhews men what they ought to do, but gives them not the power to*

do it. Thus, according to the Author's ſyſtem, God has created beings whoſe irregularities he can neither hinder nor repair. Blind mortal! who does not ſee that God does what he requires from them, and that they can do nothing but what he pleaſes.

ANSWER.

THE Critic had before reproached the Author with not having mentioned original ſin. He again returns to the charge, and cenſures him for not having ſpoken of grace. It is an unhappy thing to have to do with a man who cenſures all the articles of a book, and has only one predominant idea. He is not unlike the curate of the village to whom ſome aſtronomers ſhewing the moon through a teleſcope, he could ſee nothing but a ſteeple.

THE Author of The Spirit of Laws thought he ought to begin with giving ſome idea of Laws in general, and of the Law of nature and nations. The ſubject was immenſe; and yet he has included it in two chapters: he was therefore obliged to omit a great number of things that belonged to his ſubject; and with much better reaſon has he omitted thoſe which had no relation to it.

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OBJECTION X.

The Author has ſaid, that in England ſelf-murder is the effect of a diſeaſe, and that they can no more puniſh it than they can puniſh the effects of madneſs. A follower of the religion of nature cannot forget that England is the cradle of his ſect. He wipes a ſponge over all the crimes he perceives there.

ANSWER.

THE Author does not know, that England is the cradle of the religion of nature. But he knows that England is not his cradle, on account of his having mentioned a phyſical effect, which he himſelf obſerved in England. His ſentiments of religion are no more like thoſe of the Engliſh, than thoſe of an Engliſhman, who treats of the phyſical effects that have happened in France, are like thoſe of a Frenchman. The Author of The Spirit of Laws is not a follower of natural religion; but he would be glad to have his Critic a follower of natural logic.

I BELIEVE I have already made the terrible arms uſed by the Critic drop from his hand: and I am now going to give an idea of his exordium;

ordium; which is ſuch, that I am afraid my mentioning it here will be thought to be done by way of deriſion.

He ſays at firſt, and theſe are his words: That *the book of The Spirit of Laws is one of thoſe irregular productions, that were never ſo numerous till after the arrival of the bull* Unigenitus. Is it not enough to make one laugh, to ſuppoſe that the arrival of The Spirit of Laws is cauſed by the arrival of the conſtitution *Unigenitus?* The bull *Unigenitus* is not the occaſional cauſe of the book of The Spirit of Laws; but the bull *Unigenitus*, and the book of The Spirit of Laws, have been the occaſional cauſes of the Critic's having made ſo ſhrewd a remark.

The Critic continues: *The Author ſays that he has often begun, and as often laid aſide his work. However, when he threw his firſt productions into the fire, he was leſs diſtant from the truth, than when he began to be ſatisfied with his labours.* How does he know that? He adds: *If the Author had been willing to follow a beaten path, his work would have coſt him leſs pains.* How again does he know that? He afterwards pronounces this oracle: *It does not require*

require much penetration to perceive, that The Spirit of Laws is founded on the ſyſtem of natural religion. It has been ſhewn in the letters againſt Pope's Eſſay on Man, that the ſyſtem of natural religion is connected with that of Spinoſa: this is enough to inſpire a Chriſtian with horror at the new book of which we are here giving an account.

I REPLY, that this is not only enough, but even too much. But I have juſt proved, that the Author's ſyſtem is not that of the religion of nature; and ſuppoſing that natural religion is connected with Spinoſa's ſyſtem, the Author's ſyſtem is not that of Spinoſa, ſince it is not that of the religion of nature.

HE would then inſpire us with horror, before he has proved that we ought to be filled with horror.

THESE are the two forms of reaſoning diffuſed through the two pieces I have undertaken to anſwer. The Author of The Spirit of Laws is a follower of natural religion: we muſt then explain what he ſays there by the principles of natural religion: therefore, if what he ſays there is founded on the principles of

of natural religion, he is a follower of natural religion.

THE other form of reaſoning is this: The Author of The Spirit of Laws is a follower of the religion of nature: what he then ſays in his book in favour of revelation is only to conceal his being a follower of the religion of nature: therefore, if he thus conceals himſelf, he is a follower of the religion of nature.

BEFORE I conclude this firſt part, I ſhall be tempted to make an objection to him that has made ſo many. He has ſo terrified our ears with the phraſe, follower of the religion of nature, that I, who defend the Author, ſcarcely dare to pronounce the word. I will however take courage. Do not theſe two pieces require more explication than that I defend? Does he do well, when he is treating of natural religion and revelation, to throw himſelf perpetually on one ſide, and to cauſe all traces of the other to be intirely loſt? Does he do well never to diſtinguiſh thoſe who acknowledge only the religion of nature, from thoſe who acknowledge both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to be frightned whenever the Author conſiders man in a ſtate

of

of nature, and when he explains any thing on the principles of natural religion? Does he do well to confound the religion of nature with atheiſm? Have I not always heard, that all of us have the religion of nature? Have I not heard, that Chriſtianity is the perfection of natural religion? Have I not heard, that people make uſe of arguments drawn from the religion of nature, in proof of a revelation, againſt the Deiſts; and that we employ the ſame natural religion, to prove the exiſtence of God againſt the Atheiſts? He ſays that the Stoics were the followers of natural religion: and I, that they were atheiſts *; ſince they believed that the univerſe was governed by a blind fatality, and that, from natural religion, we ought to oppoſe the opinion of the Stoics. He ſays, that the ſyſtem of natural religion is connected

* See the piece of October 9, 1749, pag. 165. "The Stoics admitted the exiſtence of only one God: but this God was no other than the ſoul of the univerſe. They maintained, that all beings, up to the Firſt Cauſe, were united together in the manner of a chain; a fatal neceſſity drew the whole. They denied the immortality of the ſoul, and made the ſovereign happineſs conſiſt in living conformably to nature. This is the foundation of the ſyſtem of natural religion."

with

with that of Spinoſa †: and I, that they are contradictory, and that it is by natural religion we overthrow Spinoſa's ſyſtem. I ſay, that to confound the religion of nature with atheiſm, is to confound the proof with the thing we would prove, and the objection againſt the error with the error itſelf; and that it is to deprive us of the powerful arms of which we are poſſeſſed againſt that error. God forbid that I ſhould impute any ill deſign to the Critic, or take advantage of the conſequences that might be drawn from his principles. Though he has treated the Author with very little indulgence, I would ſhew ſome to him. I only ſay, that the metaphyſical ideas in his brain are very confuſed; that he has not the leaſt power of ſeparating them; that he is incapable of forming a good judgment, becauſe, among the various things he might ſee, he never ſees but one. In this I have no deſign of making him reproaches, but merely of deſtroying thoſe he has made.

† See the firſt piece of October 9, 1749, page 161, at the end of the firſt column.

A DEFENCE OF The SPIRIT of LAWS.

PART II.

The GENERAL IDEA.

I HAVE already cleared the Author of The Spirit of Laws from the two general reproaches that have been caſt upon him: but there are ſtill ſome particular imputations, to which it is neceſſary for me to reply. But to throw the greater light on what I have ſaid, and on what will be hereafter added, I ſhall explain what has given room, or ſerved as a pretence for making invectives.

MEN of the beſt ſenſe in the ſeveral countries of Europe, men of the greateſt learning, and moſt diſtinguiſhed for their wiſdom, have conſi-

conſidered The Spirit of Laws as an uſeful work: they have thought that the morals, in which it abounds, are pure; that the principles it contains are juſt, and that it is proper to form worthy members of ſociety; that the Author there deſtroys pernicious opinions, and encourages thoſe that are good.

On the other hand, here is a man who treats it as a dangerous book, and makes it the ſubject of the moſt outrageous invectives. This requires ſome explications.

So far from having underſtood the particular paſſages on which he has ſpent his criticiſm, he has not even diſcovered what is the ſubject of which the Author treats. Thus vainly beating the air, and fighting againſt the wind, he has gained triumphs of the ſame kind: he has wrote a good criticiſm on the book he had in his head; but has not wrote a critic on that of the Author. But how was it poſſible for him thus to miſtake both the ſubject and deſign of a book placed before his eyes? Perſons of ſenſe ſee at the firſt glance, that the objects of this work are the Laws, the various cuſtoms, and manners, of all the nations on earth. It may be ſaid, that the ſubject

is

is of prodigious extent, as it comprehends all the inſtitutions received among mankind; as theſe inſtitutions are diſtinguiſhed by the Author, who examines thoſe that are moſt agreeable to ſociety in general, and to each ſociety in particular; and as he ſearches into their origin, diſcovers their phyſical and moral cauſes; examines thoſe which have any intrinſic goodneſs, and thoſe that have none; of two pernicious practices, he inquires which is moſt, and which leaſt pernicious; and treats of thoſe that in ſome reſpects may have a good effect, and a bad one in others. He has imagined that theſe reſearches would be uſeful, becauſe judgment and good ſenſe conſiſt in knowing the ſhades of things.

Now in a ſubject of ſuch extent, it became neceſſary to treat of religion: for there being but one true religion, and an infinite number of others that are falſe; one religion ſent from heaven, and an infinity of others that had their birth on this globe: he could regard the falſe religions only as human inſtitutions; and therefore was obliged to examine them, as well as all the other inſtitutions of human origin. But as to the Chriſtian religion, he had nothing to do but to pay it his adorations as being divine,

divine. He did not think himſelf obliged to treat of that religion; becauſe he conſidered it, as in its own nature not ſubject to his examination, ſo that when he has mentioned it, it has never been done to introduce it into the plan of his work, but only to pay it the tribute of reſpect and love due to it from all Chriſtians; and that in the compariſons he might draw between that religion and the others, he might make it triumph over them all. This is viſible throughout the whole work: but the author has particularly explained himſelf at the beginning of book xxiv. the firſt of the two books that treat of religion. He begins thus: "As amidſt the ſe-
"veral degrees of darkneſs, we may form a
"judgment of thoſe which are the leaſt thick,
"and, among precipices, which are the leaſt
"deep; ſo we may ſearch among falſe reli-
"gions for thoſe that are moſt conformable to
"the welfare of the ſociety; for thoſe which,
"though they have not the effect of leading
"men to the felicity of the other life, may
"contribute moſt to their happineſs in this.

"I SHALL therefore only examine the ſe-
"veral religions in the world, in relation to
"the good they produce in civil ſociety; whe-
"ther

" ther I ſpeak of that which has its root in " heaven, or of thoſe which ſpring from the " earth."

THE Author therefore, regarding human religions only as human inſtitutions, was in the right to treat of them, becauſe they neceſſarily entered into his plan. He did not go out of his way to ſeek for them; but they came in ſearch of him. And as to the Chriſtian religion, he has only mentioned it occaſionally; becauſe, in its own nature, it could not be modified, mitigated, and corrected, and therefore did not enter into the plan he had propoſed.

WHAT has he done then to give ſo full a ſcope to declamation, and to open ſo wide a door to invective? The author has been conſidered as if, after the example of M. Abbadie, he had reſolved to write a treatiſe on the Chriſtian religion; he has been attacked, as if his two books on religion were two treatiſes on Chriſtian divinity. He has been charged, as if ſpeaking of any religion whatſoever that had no relation to the Chriſtian, it had been his buſineſs to examine it according to the doctrines and precepts of Chriſtianity. He has

been judged, as if he had undertaken, in his two books, to form an eſtabliſhment in behalf of the Chriſtians, and to preach the doctrines of Chriſtianity to Mahometans and Idolaters. Whenever he has mentioned religion in general, whenever he has uſed the word religion, it is ſaid, This is the Chriſtian religion. Whenever he has compared the religious rites of any nation whatſoever, and has ſaid, that ſome of theſe rites were more conformable to the political government of the country, than others; it is ſaid, You then approve them, and abandon the Chriſtian faith. When he has mentioned any people who have not embraced Chriſtianity, or who lived before the coming of Chriſt, it is ſaid, You then do not acknowledge the Chriſtian moral. When he has examined, in a political writer, any cuſtom whatſoever, it is ſaid, Was this the doctrine of Chriſtianity you ought to have inculcated? You ſay, that you are a Civilian; and I will make you a Divine in ſpite of yourſelf. You in ſome places ſay ſome very fine things in favour of the Chriſtian religion; but you only ſay them to conceal yourſelf: for I know your heart, and read your thoughts. 'Tis true, I don't underſtand your book; it is of no conſequence whether I have penetrated rightly,

or

or not, into the view with which it was written: but I dive to the bottom of your thoughts. I don't know a word you ſay: but I underſtand very well what you think. Let us enter now into the ſubject.

Of the COUNSELS of RELIGION.

The Author, in the book on religion, has attacked the errors of Bayle. Theſe are his words *: "Mr. Bayle, after having abuſed all "religions, endeavours to ſully Chriſtianity. "He boldly aſſerts, that true Chriſtians cannot "form a government of any duration. Why "not? Citizens of this profeſſion, being infi- "nitely enlightened with reſpect to the various "duties of life, and having the warmeſt zeal "to fulfil them, muſt be perfectly ſenſible of "the rights of natural defence. The more "they believed themſelves indebted to reli- "gion, the more they would think due to "their country. The principles of Chriſtian- "ity, deeply engraven on the heart, would be "infinitely more powerful than the falſe ho- "nour of monarchies, the humane virtues of "republics, or the ſervile fear of deſpotic "ſtates.

* Book xxiv. chap. 6.

" It is aſtoniſhing that this great man ſhould " not be able to diſtinguiſh between the or- " ders for the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, " and Chriſtianity itſelf: and that he ſhould " be liable to be charged with not knowing " the ſpirit of his own religion. When the " legiſlator inſtead of Laws gave counſels, it " was becauſe he knew, that if thoſe counſels " were ordained as Laws, they would be con- " trary to the ſpirit of the Laws themſelves."

What has the Critic done to deprive the Author of the honour of having thus attacked one of Bayle's errors? He has taken the following chapter, which has nothing to do with Bayle *. " Human Laws made to direct the " will, it is there ſaid, ought to give precepts, " and not counſels: religion, which is formed " to influence the heart, ought to give many " counſels, and few precepts." Whence it is concluded, that the Author conſiders all the precepts of the Goſpel only as counſels. He in return, might alſo ſay, that he who made this criticiſm conſiders all the counſels of the goſpel as precepts: but this is not his manner of reaſoning, and ſtill leſs is it his manner of

* That is, Book xxiv. chap. 7.

acting

acting. Let us come to the point. It will here be proper to lengthen out a little what the Author has repreſented in a manner extremely conciſe. Mr. Bayle had maintained, that a ſociety of Chriſtians could not ſubſiſt; and alledged as the reaſon the order of the Goſpel, When thou art ſmote on one cheek, turn the other alſo; the command to leave the world to retire into deſarts, *&c.* The Author ſays, that Bayle took for precepts what were only counſels; for general rules what were only particular ones. In this the Author has defended religion. But what has this occaſioned? It is laid down as the firſt article of his creed, that all the books of the Goſpel contain only counſels.

Of POLYGAMY.

OTHER articles have likewiſe furniſhed commodious ſubjects of declamation. Polygamy afforded an excellent one. The Author has wrote a chapter expreſsly upon it; in which he has cenſured it. It is as follows:

"Of Polygamy conſidered in itſelf.

"WITH regard to polygamy in general, "independently of the circumſtances that may

" render it tolerated, it is not of the leaſt ſervice
" to mankind, nor to either of the two ſexes,
" whether it be that which abuſes, or that
" which is abuſed. Neither is it of ſervice to
" the children ; for one of its greateſt incon-
" veniences is, that the father and mother
" cannot have the ſame affection for their off-
" ſpring ; a father cannot love twenty children
" with the ſame tenderneſs that a mother can
" love two. It is much worſe when a wife
" has many huſbands ; for then paternal love
" is only held by this opinion, that a father
" may believe if he will, or that others may
" believe, that certain children belong to him.

" MAY I not ſay that a plurality of wives
" leads to that paſſion which nature diſallows ?
" for one depravation always draws on ano-
" ther, *&c.*

" BESIDES, the poſſeſſion of many wives
" does not always prevent their entertaining
" deſires for thoſe of others. It is with luſt as
" with avarice, where the thirſt is increaſed by
" the acquiſition of treaſures.

" IN the reign of Juſtinian, many philo-
" ſophers, diſpleaſed with the reſtraints of
" Chriſ-

" Chriſtianity, retired into Perſia. What there " ſtruck them moſt, ſays Agathias, was that " polygamy was permitted amongſt men who " did not even abſtain from adultery."

THE Author has then maintained, that polygamy is in its own nature, and conſidered in itſelf, pernicious. It was neceſſary to overlook this chapter; and therefore no notice is taken of it. The Author has, beſides, made a philoſophical examination, in what country, in what climate, and in what circumſtances, its effects are leaſt pernicious; he compares climate with climate, and country with country; and has found thoſe where its effects are leſs prejudicial than in others; becauſe, according to the accounts that have been publiſhed, the number of men and women not being equal in all countries, it is evident that, if there are places where the women are much more numerous than the men, polygamy, tho' bad in itſelf, is leſs ſo there than in other countries. The Author has diſcuſſed this point in the fourth chapter of the ſame book. But the title of this chapter conſiſting of theſe words, *That the Law of Polygamy is an affair that depend on calculations*, the Critic has ſeized hold of this title. However, as the title of a chap-

ter relates to the chapter itſelf, and can ſay neither more nor leſs than the chapter, let us ſee it.

" ACCORDING to the calculations made in " ſeveral parts of Europe, there are here born " more boys than girls: on the contrary, the " accounts we have of Aſia inform us, there " are born in that part of the world more girls " than boys. The Law which in Europe al- " lows only one wife, and that in Aſia which " permits many, have then a certain relation " to the climate.

" IN the cold climates in Aſia there are " born, as in Europe, more males than fe- " males; and from hence, ſay the Lamas, is " derived the reaſon of that Law which, " amongſt them, permits a woman to have " many huſbands.

" BUT it is difficult for me to believe, that " there are many countries where the diſpro- " portion can be great enough for any exi- " gency to juſtify the introducing either the " Law in favour of many wives, or that of " many huſbands. This would only imply " that a majority of women, or even a ma-

" jority

" jority of men, is more conformable to na-
" ture in certain countries, than in others.

" I CONFESS that, if what hiſtory tells us be
" true, that at Bantam there are ten women to
" one man, this muſt be a caſe particularly
" favourable to polygamy.

" IN all this I only give their reaſons, but
" do not juſtify their cuſtoms."

LET us now return to the title: *Polygamy is an affair of calculation.* Yes it is, when we would know if it be more or leſs pernicious in certain climates, in certain countries, and in certain circumſtances, than in others. It is not an affair of calculation, when we are to determine whether it be good or bad in itſelf.

IT is not an affair of calculation, when we reaſon on its nature; it may be an affair of calculation, when we combine its effects. In ſhort, it is never an affair of calculation, when we examine the end of marriage; and it is much leſs ſo, when we conſider marriage as eſtabliſhed, or confirmed, by Jeſus Chriſt.

I SHALL

I SHALL here add, that what has happened by mere accident, is of great ſervice to the Author. He doubtleſs did not foreſee, that the Critic would overlook a whole chapter expreſſed in the plaineſt terms, in order to give an equivocal ſenſe to another; and yet he had the happineſs to conclude this other with theſe words: "In all this, I only give their reaſons; "but do not juſtify their cuſtoms."

THE Author had juſt ſaid, that he did not believe that there could be climates where the number of the women could ſo greatly exceed that of the men, or the number of the men that of the women, as to juſtify polygamy in any country; and has added, "This would "only imply that a majority of women, or "even of men, is more conformable to nature "in certain countries, than in others *." The Critic has ſeized the word, *is more conformable to nature*, in order to charge the Author with approving polygamy. But if I ſay, that I had rather have a fever than the ſcurvy, Will that be a declaration that I am fond of a fever; or only that the ſcurvy is leſs diſagreeable to me than a fever?

* Book xvi. chap. 4.

HERE

HERE follows, word for word, a very extraordinary objection.

The polygamy of one woman who has many husbands, is a monstrous disorder, which was never permitted in any case, and which the Author does not at all distinguish from the polygamy of a man who has several wives †. *This language, from a sectary of natural religion, needs no comment.*

I BEG that attention may be paid to the connexion of the Critic's ideas. According to him it follows that, as the Author is a sectary of the religion of nature, he did not mention what he had no business to mention; or that the Author has not mentioned what he had no business to mention, because he is a follower of natural religion. These two methods of reasoning are of the same kind, and the consequences drawn from them are equally found in the premisses. The usual manner is to criticize upon what a person writes; but here the criticism is bestowed upon what he does not write.

† The piece of October 9, 1749, pag. 164.

I SAY

I SAY this, ſuppoſing with the Critic that the Author has not diſtinguiſhed the polygamy of a woman who has ſeveral huſbands from that of a huſband who has ſeveral wives: but if the Author has diſtinguiſhed them, what will he ſay? And what will he ſay, if the Author has ſhewn, that the abuſe in the firſt caſe is much the greateſt? I deſire the reader to peruſe the ſixth chapter of book xvi. repeated above. The Critic has treated him with invectives for keeping ſilence with reſpect to this article: nothing remains but to make them for not keeping ſilence.

BUT here is what I cannot comprehend. The Critic ſays, in the ſecond of his pieces, page 166. *The Author has told us, that religion ought to permit polygamy in hot countries, and not in thoſe that are cold.* But the Author has no where ſaid this. This is a queſtion that does not turn upon the falſe reaſoning of the Critic againſt the Author, but on a matter of fact: and as the Author has never ſaid, that religion ought to permit polygamy in hot, and not in cold countries, the imputation is in its own nature both falſe and cruel; and

therefore

therefore I desire the Critic to pass judgment on himself.

This is not the only passage of which the Author has had reason to complain: for, in page 163. of the first piece, the Critic says: *The fourth chapter has for its title, That the Law of polygamy is an affair of calculation: that is, in places where there are born more boys than girls, as in Europe, we ought to have but one wife; and in those where there are born more girls than boys, polygamy ought to be introduced.* Thus when the Author explains customs, or gives the reasons of their being founded, those reasons are turned into maxims, and, what is more barbarous still, into maxims of religion: and as he has mentioned an infinite number of customs and practices, throughout all the countries upon earth, he may, by a parity of reason, be charged with all the errors, and even all the abominations of the universe. The Critic says, at the end of his first piece, that God has given him some zeal; to which I reply, that God has not given him this.

On CLIMATE.

What the Author has said on the effects of different Climates is also another excellent

topic

topic of rhetoric. But all effects whatſoever have their cauſes: the climate and the other phyſical cauſes produce an infinite number of effects; and if the Author had ſaid otherwiſe, he would have been conſidered as extremely ſtupid. The queſtion is reduced to this: Whether, in countries placed at a great diſtance from each other, or whether in different climates, there are the marks of a national ſpirit. Now that there are ſuch differences, is eſtabliſhed by almoſt the univerſal conſent of writers. As the impreſſions of this national ſpirit have a conſiderable influence on the diſpoſitions of the heart, it cannot be at all queſtioned that certain diſpoſitions of heart are more frequent in one country than another; and, in proof of this, we have alſo the teſtimony of an infinite number of writers in all times and places. As theſe things are merely human, the Author has treated them in that light. He might indeed have added to them many queſtions debated in the ſchools, with reſpect to the humane and chriſtian virtues; but it is not uſual to crowd theſe queſtions into books of natural philoſophy, politics, and civil law. In a word, the climate may be the phyſical cauſe of producing various diſpoſitions of mind; theſe diſpoſitions may have

an

an influence on human actions: but how does this give a ſhock to the throne of him who has created, or to the merits of him who has bought us?

If the Author has inquired what the magiſtrates of various countries might do, in order to conduct their ſeveral nations in a manner moſt proper, and moſt ſuitable to their reſpective characters, what harm has he done in this?

One may alſo reaſon on the local cuſtoms of religion. The Author had no buſineſs to conſider them as either good or bad: he has only ſaid, that there are climates where certain religious cuſtoms were more eaſily received, that is, the people in thoſe climates were more eaſily accuſtomed to them, than the people in others. Of this it would be unneceſſary to give examples; there are an hundred thouſand.

I am very ſenſible, that religion is, in its own nature, independent of any phyſical effects whatſoever: that what is good in one country is good in another: and that it cannot be bad in one country, without being bad in all.

all. But, as it is practiſed by men, and for men, there are places where a particular religion is more eaſily practiſed, either in part, or in the whole, in one certain country than in others, and in certain circumſtances than in others. And whoever aſſerts the contrary muſt diveſt himſelf of common ſenſe.

THE Author has remarked, that the climate of the Indies has produced there a certain ſweetneſs of manners. But, ſays the Critic, *The women there burn themſelves at the death of their huſbands.* There is but little philoſophy in this objection. Is the Critic ignorant of the contradictions of the human mind, and how readily it can ſeparate things the moſt cloſely united, and unite thoſe that are the moſt widely ſeparated. See the Author's reflexions on this ſubject in book xiv. chap. 3.

Of TOLERATION.

ALL the Author has ſaid on toleration relates to this propoſition in book xxv. chap. 9. " We are here politicians, and not divines: but " the divines themſelves muſt allow, that there " is a great difference between tolerating, and " approving a religion.

" WHEN

" WHEN legiſlators have believed it their " duty to permit the exerciſe of many reli- " gions, they are alſo under the obligation of " inforcing a toleration amongſt theſe reli- " gions themſelves." The reader is deſired to peruſe the whole chapter.

A GREAT outcry has been raiſed againſt the Author for having added in the next chapter: " This is then a fundamental principle of the " political Laws of religion, That when a ſtate " is at liberty to receive or reject a new reli- " gion, it ought to be rejected; when it is re- " ceived, it ought to be tolerated."

IT is here objected to the Author, that he is going to inform idolatrous Princes, that they ought to ſhut Chriſtianity out of their ſtates. Really it is a ſecret that it was ever whiſpered to the King of Cochin-China. As this argument has furniſhed matter for much declamation, I ſhall give two anſwers. The firſt is, That the Author has excepted it by name in his book on religion. He has ſaid in book xxiv. chap. 1. " The Chriſtian religion, which or- " dains that men ſhould love each other, " would doubtleſs have every nation bleſt with

" the beſt civil, the beſt political Laws ; be-
" cauſe theſe, next to this religion, are the
" greateſt good that men can give and receive."
If then the Chriſtian religion is the firſt and principal good, and political and civil Laws the ſecond, there are no political or civil Laws in a ſtate that can or ought to hinder the entrance of the Chriſtian religion.

My ſecond anſwer is, that the religion ſent from heaven is not eſtabliſhed by the ſame methods as the religions of the earth. Read the hiſtory of the church, and you will ſee the wonders of the Chriſtian religion. Has ſhe reſolved to enter a country?—ſhe knows how to open its gates, and all inſtruments are proper for that purpoſe : ſometimes God makes uſe of a few fiſhermen ; at others, he places an Emperor on the throne, and makes him bend his neck under the yoke of the Goſpel. Is Chriſtianity concealed in caverns, and ſubterraneous abodes ? ſtay a moment, and you will ſee the Imperial Majeſty ſpeak in her behalf. She, whenever ſhe pleaſes, croſſes the ſeas, rivers, and mountains ; and no obſtacles here below can ſtop her progreſs. Place repugnance in the mind ; ſhe will make it fly before her : eſtabliſh cuſtoms, form habits, pub-

liſh edicts, make Laws ; ſhe will triumph over the climate, the Laws that reſult from it, and the legiſlators who made them. God, according to decrees concealed from us, extends or contracts the limits of his religion as he pleaſes.

We are told : That this is as if you went to the Kings of the Eaſt, and told them they ought not to receive the Chriſtian religion among them. How carnal is it to talk in this manner ! Is the Meſſiah a man like Herod ? It ſeems as if Jeſus Chriſt was conſidered as a King who conceals his ſtratagems and intelligences. Let us do ourſelves juſtice : Is the manner in which we conduct ourſelves in human affairs ſo pure, as to allow us to think of employing it in the converſion of nations ?

Of CELIBACY.

We now come to the article of celibacy. All that the Author has ſaid of it relates to this propoſition, which is found in book xxv. chap. 4. " I ſhall not here treat of the conſequences of the Law of celibacy : it is evident it may become hurtful, in proportion " as the body of the clergy may be too numerous ;

" merous; and, in conſequence of this, that " of the laity too ſmall." It is evident, that the Author here ſpeaks only of the greater or leſs extenſion that ought to be allowed to celibacy, with reſpect to the greater or leſs number of thoſe who embrace it: and, as the Author ſays in another place, that Law of perfection cannot be made for all mankind. Beſides, we know, that the Law of celibacy, as it now ſubſiſts, is only a Law of diſcipline. The Spirit of Laws has no where conſidered the nature of celibacy, or the degree of its goodneſs; and that is not a ſubject that ought to enter at all into a book of political and civil Laws. The Critic, however, would never allow the Author to treat his own ſubject: he is continually for having him treat of his; and becauſe he is always a divine, he will not ſuffer him, even in a book of Laws, to be a civilian. However we ſhall ſoon ſee that, with reſpect to celibacy, he is of the ſame opinion as the divines; that is, that he acknowledges its goodneſs. It muſt be obſerved, that in book xxiii. where he treats of Laws in relation to the number of inhabitants, the Author has given a theory of what the political and civil Laws of different people have done in this reſpect. He has ſhewn, by examining the hiſtories of the

ſeveral

ſeveral nations of the earth, that there have been particular circumſtances in which theſe Laws were more neceſſary, than others, people who had more need of them, and certain times when theſe people had ſtill more need of them: and, as it is thought that the Romans were the wiſeſt people upon earth, and that they had more need of theſe Laws to repair their loſſes, he has collected with great exactneſs the Laws they made for that purpoſe; he has pointed out, with great preciſion, in what circumſtances they were made, and in what other circumſtances they were taken away. There is no divinity in all this; and there is no need of any. The Author has however thought proper to add a little. Theſe are his words: "God forbid that I ſhould 'here ſpeak againſt celibacy, as adopted by 'religion: but who can be ſilent, when this 'is built on libertiniſm; when the two ſexes 'corrupting each other even by the natural 'ſenſations themſelves, fly from an union 'which ought to render them better, to live 'in that which always renders them worſe.

"It is a rule drawn from nature, that the 'more the number of marriages is diminiſhed, 'the more corrupt thoſe are rendered that are

" entered into that ſtate. The fewer mar-
" ried people there are, the leſs fidelity is there
" in marriage; as, when there are more
" thieves, there are more thefts *."

The Author has not then diſapproved the celibacy practiſed, on a religious motive; and no complaint can be raiſed againſt him for cenſuring the celibacy introduced by libertiniſm. He is offended, that a prodigious number of rich and voluptuous men fly the yoke of marriage, that they may the more conveniently purſue the gratification of their licentious appetites. They give themſelves up to delight and voluptuous pleaſure, and leave trouble and care to the miſerable. We cannot, I ſay, complain that he has cenſured theſe. But the Critic, after having cited what the Author has ſaid, pronounces theſe words: *We here perceive the malignity of the Author, who would throw upon the Chriſtian religion the diſorders it deteſts.* It might look ill-natured, were I to accuſe the Critic of not being willing to underſtand the Author: I ſhall therefore only ſay, that he has not underſtood him; and that he has made him ſay againſt religion, what he ſaid

* Book xiii. chap. 21.

againſt

againſt libertiniſm. He ought to be very ſorry for it.

A particular ERROR committed by the CRITIC.

ONE would be ready to believe, that the Critic has ſworn never to form a right judgment of the ſtate of the queſtion, and never to underſtand a ſingle paſſage he attacks. The whole ſecond chapter of the twenty fifth book turns upon the motives, more or leſs powerful, by which mankind are attached to the preſervation of their religion. Here the Critic finds another chapter which contains the motives that oblige men to change their religion. The firſt ſubject implies a paſſive ſtate; the ſecond a ſtate of action: but applying to one ſubject what the Author has ſaid on the other, he indulges himſelf in falſe reaſoning intirely at his eaſe.

THE Author has ſaid, in the ſecond chapter of the twenty fifth book, "We are extremely addicted to idolatry; and yet have no great inclination to the religion of idolaters. We are not very fond of ſpiritual ideas; and yet are moſt attached to thoſe religions that teach us to adore a ſpiritual being. This

" proceeds from the ſatisfaction we find in " ourſelves at having been ſo intelligent as to " chuſe a religion that raiſes the Deity from " that baſeneſs in which he had been placed " by others." The Author had certainly no other motive, than to explain why the Jews and Mahometans are as invincibly attached to their religion as we ourſelves, tho' they have not the advantages with which we are poſſeſſed: and that they are, we know from experience: but the Critic underſtands it otherwiſe: *Mens paſſing from idolatry to the belief of one God is here, ſays he, attributed to pride* *. But no mention is made, either here, or thro' the whole chapter, of paſſing from one religion to another: and if a Chriſtian feels a high ſatisfaction, ariſing from the idea of the glory and grandeur of the Divine Majeſty, and this is what he calls pride, it is a very good pride.

Of MARRIAGE.

HERE is another uncommon objection. The Author has two chapters in the twenty third book; one intitled " Of Men and Animals with reſpect to the Propagation of their

* The ſecond piece, pag. 166.

Species;"

Species ;" and the other, " Of Marriage." In the firſt he has theſe words : " The females " of brutes have an almoſt conſtant fecundity ; " but, in the human ſpecies, the manner of " thinking, the character, the paſſions, the hu- " mour, the caprice, the idea of preſerving " beauty, the pain of child-bearing, and the " fatigue of a too numerous family, obſtruct " propagation a thouſand different ways." And in the other he ſays, " The natural obli- " gation of the father to provide for his chil- " dren has eſtabliſhed marriage ; which makes " known the perſon who ought to fulfil this " obligation."

Upon this the Critic ſays, *A Chriſtian would refer the inſtitution of marriage to God himſelf, who gave a companion to Adam, and united the firſt man to the firſt woman by an indiſſoluble bond, before they had children to provide for : but the Author avoids whatever is mentioned in the Holy Scriptures.* He might reply, that he is a Chriſtian ; but not a natural : that he venerates theſe truths ; but did not chuſe to inſert at random, and without propriety, all the truths that are the objects of his faith. The Emperor Juſtinian was a Chriſtian, as was alſo his compilator : yet in their books

of

of Laws, which are ſtill taught to youth in the ſchools, they define marriage, the union of one man and woman, who form a ſociety of individual life *. It never entered into the head of any perſon, to reproach them for not having here mentioned revelation.

Of USURY.

We are now come to the ſubject of uſury. I am afraid the reader will be tired with hearing me repeat, that the Critic never underſtands the point in queſtion, and never takes the ſenſe of the paſſages he cenſures. He ſays, that *here the Author finds nothing unjuſt in maritime uſury: theſe are his words.* Indeed The Spirit of Laws has a very ſad interpreter. The Author has treated of maritime uſury in the twentieth chapter of the twenty ſecond book: he muſt therefore have ſaid in that chapter, that maritime uſury is juſt. Let us ſee what he ſays.

" Of Maritime Uſury.

" The greatneſs of maritime uſury is " founded on two things: the danger of the

* Maris & fœminæ conjunctio, individuam vitæ ſocietatem continens.

" ſea,

" ſea, which makes it proper that thoſe who
" expoſe their ſpecie, ſhould not do it without
" conſiderable advantage; and the caſe with
" which the borrower, by the means of com-
" merce, ſpeedily accompliſhes a variety of
" great affairs. But uſury, with reſpect to
" landſmen, being founded on neither of theſe
" two reaſons, is either prohibited by the legiſ-
" lators, or, what is more rational, reduced to
" proper bounds."

I ASK every ſenſible man, whether the Author has here determined that maritime uſury is juſt; or whether he has ſimply ſaid, that the greatneſs of maritime uſury is leſs repugnant to natural equity, than the greatneſs of Uſury at land. The Critic is acquainted with none but poſitive and abſolute qualities, and does not know the meaning of thoſe terms, *more* or *leſs*. If one was to tell him that a mulatto woman was not ſo black as a negro, this would ſignify, according to him, that ſhe is as white as ſnow: if one was to tell him that ſhe was blacker than an European, he would then think ſhe was as black as a coal. But to proceed.

IN the twenty ſecond book of The Spirit of Laws there are four chapters on uſury. In the

the two firſt, which are the nineteenth, and that the reader has juſt peruſed, the Author examines uſury * in the relation it bears to the commerce of different nations, and the ſeveral governments of the world; and to this theſe two chapters ſolely relate. The two following only explain the variations of uſury among the Romans. But here the Author is ſuddenly raiſed to be a caſuiſt, a canoniſt, and divine; for no other reaſon but becauſe the Critic is a caſuiſt, a canoniſt, and divine, or that he is two of the three, or one of the three, or, perhaps at bottom, none of the three. The Author is ſenſible, that the conſideration of lending at intereſt, as connected with Chriſtianity, is a ſubject attended with endleſs diſtinctions and limitations. He is ſenſible that the civilians, and a multitude of courts of juſtice, do not always agree with the caſuiſts and canoniſts; that ſome of theſe admit certain limitations of the general principle of never aſking intereſt, and others admit ſtill greater. Though all theſe queſtions had belonged to his ſubject, which they do not, how would he have been able to have treated of them? We find it difficult to know thorough-

* Uſury and intereſt among the Romans ſignified the ſame thing.

ly

ly what we have well ſtudied; but much more difficult is it to know what we have never ſtudied at all. However, thoſe very chapters that are employed againſt him, ſufficiently prove, that he is only an hiſtorian and civilian. Let us read chap. 19 *.

" SPECIE is the ſign of value. It is evident, " that he who has occaſion for this ſign ought " to pay for the uſe of it, as well as for every " thing elſe that he has occaſion for. All the " difference is, that other things may be either " hired or bought; whilſt money, which is " the price of things, can only be hired, and " not bought.

" To lend money without intereſt, is cer- " tainly an action laudable and extremely " good; but this is perhaps only a counſel of " religion, and not a civil law.

" IN order that trade may be ſucceſsfully " carried on, it is neceſſary that a price be fixed " on the uſe of ſpecie; but this price ſhould " be very inconſiderable. If it be too high, " the merchant, who finds that it will coſt " him more in intereſt than he can gain by

* Book xxii.

" commerce,

" commerce, will undertake nothing. If " there is no conſideration to be paid for the " uſe of ſpecie, no body will lend it; and " here too the merchant will undertake no- " thing.

" I AM miſtaken when I ſay that no body " will lend; the affairs of ſociety muſt ever " make it neceſſary. Uſury will be eſtabliſh- " ed, but with all the diſorders with which it " has been conſtantly attended.

" THE Laws of Mahomet confound uſury " with lending upon intereſt. Uſury increaſ- " es in Mahometan countries, in proportion to " the ſeverity of the prohibition. The lender " indemnifies himſelf for the danger he under- " goes of ſuffering the penalty.

" IN thoſe eaſtern countries the greateſt " part of the people are ſecure of nothing. " There is hardly any connexion between the " actual poſſeſſion of a ſum, and the hope of " receiving it again after having lent it. Uſu- " ry then muſt be raiſed in proportion to the " danger of inſolvency."

AFTER-

AFTERWARDS comes the chapter on maritime uſury mentioned above; and the twenty firſt chapter, which treats of lending by contract, and of uſury amongſt the Romans, which is as follows:

" BESIDES the loans made for the advan-
" tage of commerce, there is ſtill a kind of
" lending by a civil contract, from whence re-
" ſults intereſt or uſury.

" As the people of Rome daily increaſed in
" power, the magiſtrates ſought to inſinuate
" themſelves into their favour by enacting
" ſuch Laws as were moſt agreeable to them.
" They retrenched capitals; firſt lowered, and
" at length prohibited intereſt; and took away
" the power of confining the debtor's body. In
" fine, the abolition of debts was contended
" for, whenever a tribune was diſpoſed to
" render himſelf popular.

" THESE continual changes, whether made
" by the Laws, or by the *plebiſcita*, naturali-
" zed uſury at Rome: for the creditors ſee-
" ing the people their debtor, their legiſlator,
" and their judge, had no longer any confi-
" dence

" dence in agreements with them. The peo-
" ple, like a debtor who has loſt his credit
" could only tempt them to lend by allowing
" an exorbitant intereſt ; for if the Laws did
" not from time to time remedy the evil, the
" complaints of the people became continual,
" and conſtantly intimidated the creditors.
" This was the cauſe that all honeſt means of
" borrowing and lending were aboliſhed at
" Rome, and that the moſt monſtrous uſury,
" conſtantly blaſted by the thunders of the
" ſtate, and conſtantly revived, became eſta-
" bliſhed in that city.

" CICERO tells us, that in his time intereſt
" at Rome was at thirty four *per cent.* and in
" the provinces at forty eight. This evil was
" a conſequence of the ſeverity of the Laws
" againſt uſury. Laws exceſſively good are
" the ſource of exceſſive evil. The borrower
" found himſelf under the neceſſity of paying
" for the intereſt of the money, and for the
" danger the creditor underwent of ſuffering
" the penalty of the Law."

THE Author has then treated of intereſt only in relation to the commerce of various nations, and to the civil Laws of the Romans; and

and this is ſo true, that he has diſtinguiſhed, in the ſecond paragraph of the nineteenth chapter, the eſtabliſhments of the religious, from thoſe of the political legiſlators. Had he mentioned by name the Chriſtian religion, he would have treated the ſubject in other terms, and have pointed out what that religion ordains, and what it counſels; he would, with the divines, have diſtinguiſhed the ſeveral caſes; he would have laid down all the limitations ſet by the Chriſtian religion to that general Law, ſometimes eſtabliſhed among the Romans, and always among the Mahometans, That we ought, in no caſe, and in no circumſtance, to receive intereſt for money. The Author had not this ſubject to treat of; but that a general, unlimited, indiſtinct defence of it, without any reſtrictions, made the Mahometans loſe their commerce, and was near deſtroying the Roman republic: whence it follows, that the Chriſtians, on account of their not living under theſe rigid Laws, ſtill enjoy their commerce, and there is not found in their ſtates that monſtrous uſury required by the Mahometans, and that was formerly extorted by the Romans.

THE Author has employed the twenty firſt and twenty ſecond chapters * in examining what were the Laws of the Romans on the ſubject of lending by contracts, in the different times of their republic. But here his Critic quits for a moment the banks of theology, to turn to the ſide of erudition. But we ſhall ſoon ſee, that he is alſo deceived in his erudition, and that he cannot even for once underſtand the ſtate of the queſtion he endeavours to examine. Let us read a paſſage in the twenty ſecond chapter †.

" TACITUS ſays, that the Law of the Twelve " Tables fixed the intereſt at one *per cent. per* " *annum*. It is evident that he was miſtaken, " and that he took another Law, of which I " am going to ſpeak, for the Law of the " Twelve Tables. If this had been regulated " in the Law of the Twelve Tables, why did " they not make uſe of its authority in the " diſputes which afterwards aroſe between the " creditors and debtors? We find not any " veſtige of this Law upon lending at intereſt; " and, let us have but ever ſo little knowledge " of the hiſtory of Rome, we ſhall ſee that a

* Book xxii. † Ibid.

" Law

" Law like this could never be the work of the " Decemvirs." And a little after the Author adds: " In the year of Rome 398, the Tri- " bunes Duellius and Menenius cauſed a Law " to be paſſed, which reduced intereſt to " one *per cent. per annum.* 'Tis this Law " which Tacitus confounds with the Law of " the Twelve Tables; and this was the firſt " ever made by the Romans to fix the rate of " intereſt," *&c.*

HERE the Author ſays, that Tacitus is miſtaken in ſaying that the Law of the Twelve Tables had fixed the rate of intereſt among the Romans. He has ſaid, that Tacitus has taken for the Law of the Twelve Tables, a Law made by Duellius and Menenius about eighty five years after the Law of the Twelve Tables; and that this Law was the firſt that fixed the rate of intereſt at Rome. What does the Critic ſay to this? He replies, that Tacitus was not miſtaken, but ſpoke of uſury at one *per cent. per menſem*, and not of uſury at one *per cent. per annum.* But the queſtion is not here of the rate of uſury; it is to know, whether the Law of the Twelve Tables has made any regulation whatſoever in relation to uſury. The Author ſays, that Tacitus is miſtaken in ſaying

that the Decemvirs had made a regulation in the Law of the Twelve Tables, to fix the rate of uſury; and upon this the Critic ſays, he was not miſtaken, becauſe he ſpoke of uſury at one *per cent.* by the month, and not at one *per cent.* for a year. I had reaſon then for ſaying that the Critic did not know the ſtate of the queſtion.

It now remains to inquire, whether the Law mentioned by Tacitus, whatever it is, fixes uſury, according to the Author, at one *per cent.* by the year, or, according to the Critic, at one *per cent.* for the month. Prudence required that he ſhould not enter into a diſpute with the Author on the Roman Laws, without knowing them; that he ſhould not deny a fact with which he was unacquainted, and of which he was ignorant of the means of obtaining information. The queſtion is, what Tacitus meant by theſe words, *unciarium fœnus* *. He needed but to have opened the dictionaries, and he would have found in that of Calvinus or Kahl †, that it was one *per cent.* by

* Nam primò duodecim tabulis ſanctum, ne quis unciario fœnore ampliùs exerceret. *Annal. lib.* vi.

† Uſurarum ſpecies ex aſſis partibus denominantur: quod ut intelligatur, illud ſcire oportet, ſortem omnem ad cente-

by the year, and not by the month. Had he conſulted the learned Salmaſius, he would have told him the ſame thing ‡.

Teſtis mearum centimanus Gyas
Sententiarum. HOR.

Had he aſcended to the ſource, he would have found clear texts on this ſubject in books of Law ‖: he would not have blended different

centenarium numerum revocari; ſummam autem uſuram eſſe, cùm pars ſortis centeſima ſingulis menſibus perſolvitur. Et quoniam iſtâ ratione ſumma hæc uſura duodecim aureos annuos in centenos efficit, duodenarius numerus juriſconſultos movit, ut aſſem hunc uſurarium appellarent. Quemadmodùm hic as non ex menſtruâ, ſed ex annuâ penſione æſtimandus eſt; ſimiliter omnes ejus partes ex anni ratione intelligendæ ſunt: ut ſi unus in centenos annuatim pendatur, unciaria uſura; ſi bini, ſextans; ſi terni, quadrans; ſi quaterni, triens; ſi quini, quincunx; ſi ſeni, ſemis; ſi ſepteni, ſeptunx; ſi octoni, bes; ſi novem, dodrans; ſi deni, dextrans; ſi undeni, deunx; ſi duodeni, as. *Lexicon J. Calvini. Coloniæ Allobrogum, anno* 1622, *apud Petrum Balduinum, in verbo Uſura, p.* 960.

De modo uſurarum, Lugduni Batavorum, ex officinâ Elzeviriorum, anno 1639. *p.* 269, 270, & 271; particularly theſe words, Undè verius ſit unciarium fœnus eorum, vel uncias uſuras, ut eas quoque appellatas infrà oſtendam, non unciam dare menſtruam in centam, ſed annuam.

‡ *Argumentum legis* xlvii. §. *Præfectus legionis ff. de adminiſtratione & periculo tutoris.*

ideas: he would have diſtinguiſhed the times and occaſions when the *unciarium fœnus* ſignified one *per cent.* by the month, from thoſe when it ſignified one *per cent.* by the year; and he would not have taken the twelfth of the hundredth part for the hundredth part itſelf.

While the Romans had no Laws that fixed the rate of uſury, the moſt common cuſtom was for the uſurer to take twelve ounces of copper for the loan of an hundred ounces; that is, twelve *per cent. per annum*: and an *as* being of the value of twelve ounces of copper, the uſurer received annually an *as* for an hundred ounces. It being frequently neceſſary to reckon uſury by the month, the intereſt for ſix months was called *ſemis*, or the half of the *as*; the uſury for four months was named *triens*, or the third of the *as*; the uſury for three months was called *quadrans*, or the fourth of the *as*; and, in ſhort, the uſury for one month was called *unciaria*, or the twelfth of the *as*: ſo that as they raiſed an ounce every month on every hundred ounces lent, this uſury by the ounce, or one *per cent. per menſem*, was called centeſimal uſury. The Critic had acquired

the

the knowledge of this ſignification of the centeſimal uſury, but has applied it very ill.

We ſee, that all this was nothing more than a method or form of regulating the accounts between debtor and creditor in relation to uſury, on a ſuppoſition that it was at twelve *per cent. per annum*, which was the common and uſual rate; but if a perſon borrowed at eighteen *per cent. per annum*, they made uſe of the ſame method, only increaſing one third of the intereſt for each month; ſo that the *unciarium fœnus* was then an ounce and a half *per* month.

When the Romans made Laws on uſury, they did not concern themſelves about this method, which had been uſed, and was ſo ſtill, between the debtors and creditors, for the diviſion of the time, and the convenience of paying their intereſt. The legiſlator had a public regulation to make; the buſineſs here was not to divide uſury by the month, but to fix it; and this was done by the year. They, however, continued to make uſe of the terms derived from the diviſion of the *as*, without applying the ſame ideas to them. Thus the *unciarium fœnus* ſignified one *per cent. per annum*;

num; the uſury *ex quadrante* ſignified three *per cent. per annum*; the uſury *ex triente*, four *per cent. per annum*; the uſury *ſemis*, ſix *per cent. per annum*. And if the uſury *unciaria* had ſignified one *per cent. per menſem*, the Law which fixed the *ex quadrante*, *ex triente*, *ex ſemiſſe*, would have eſtabliſhed uſury at three *per cent.* at four *per cent.* at ſix *per cent.* by the month; which would have been abſurd, becauſe the Laws made to ſuppreſs uſury would have been more cruel than the uſurers.

THE Critic has then confounded the ſpecies of things. But I ought here to give his very words, in order that the reader may be fully convinced, that the confidence with which he writes ought not to impoſe on any one. *Tacitus*, ſays he *, *is not miſtaken; he ſpeaks of intereſt at one* per cent. *by the month, and the Author has imagined that he ſpeaks of one* per cent. per annum. *Every body knows, that the hundredth part was paid to the uſurer every month. Ought a man, who has written two quarto volumes on the Laws, to be ignorant of this?*

WHETHER this man was, or was not ignorant of the *centeſimal*, is of no conſequence:

* The piece of the 9th of October 1749, p. 164.

but

but he was not ignorant of it, ſince he has mentioned it in three places. But how has he mentioned it, and where has he ſpoken of it †? I may defy the Critic to gueſs, as he cannot find the words and expreſſions he is acquainted with.

The queſtion here is not, whether the Author is, or is not a man of learning, but to defend his altars ‡. However, it was neceſſary to ſhew the public, that the Critic has aſſumed ſo deciſive a tone on things about which he was intirely ignorant, and had ſo little doubt that he did not even open a dictionary to confirm his opinion; that, tho' ignorant himſelf, he accuſes others of not having his own errors, and therefore can no longer merit the leaſt confidence with reſpect to his other accuſations. Would not one have been apt to believe, that the haughty and inſolent manner he aſſumes muſt have proceeded from his never being in the wrong? that when he chafes and bluſters, this is a proof of his not being in an error? that when he anathematizes the Author with his phraſes of impious mortal, and follower of natural religion, we may ſtill be-

† The third and laſt note of book xxii. chap. 22. and the laſt of the third note. ‡ Pro aris.

lieve

lieve that he is not miſtaken? Who would have thought that it is neceſſary to keep a guard over ourſelves, to prevent our receiving thoſe impreſſions that put his ſpirits in motion, and give impetuoſity to his ſtyle? that in his two pieces it is highly proper to ſeparate his reaſons from his abuſe, and that afterwards, ſetting aſide thoſe reaſons that are bad, nothing will remain?

The Author, in the chapters on lending at intereſt, and of uſury among the Romans; a ſubject doubtleſs the moſt important in their hiſtory, ſince it is ſo cloſely connected with the conſtitution of Rome, that a thouſand times it was near ſubverting it; after treating of the Laws they made from deſpair; of thoſe dictated by prudence; of ſuch regulations as were only temporary; and of thoſe that were deſigned to laſt for ever, ſays at the end of the twenty-ſecond chapter, "In the year of Rome "398, the tribunes Duellius and Menenius "cauſed a Law to be paſſed, which reduced "intereſt to one *per cent. per annum.*—Ten "years after this uſury was reduced one half, "and in the end it was intirely aboliſhed.

" It fared with this Law as with all thoſe in " which the legiſlator carries things to exceſs ; " an infinite number of ways were found to " elude it. They enacted, therefore, many " others to confirm, correct, and temper it. " Sometimes they quitted the Laws, to follow " the common practice, at others, the com- " mon practice to follow the Laws; but in " this caſe cuſtom eaſily prevailed. When a " man wanted to borrow, he found an ob- " ſtacle in the very Law made in his favour ; " this Law muſt be evaded by the perſon it " was made to ſuccour, and by him it was " made to condemn. Sempronius Aſellus the " Prætor, having permitted the debtors to act " in conformity to the Laws, was ſlain by the " creditors, for attempting to revive the me- " mory of a ſeverity that could no longer be " ſupported.

" Under Sylla, Lucius Valerius Flaccus " made a Law which ſuffered intereſt to be at " three *per cent. per annum.* This Law, the " moſt moderate, the moſt equitable ever made " on this account by the Romans, is diſap- " proved by Paterculus. But if this Law was " neceſſary for the advantage of the republic,

" if

" if it was of ſervice to every individual, if it " formed an eaſy communication between the " debtor and creditor, it could not be unjuſt.

" He pays leaſt, ſays Ulpian, who pays " lateſt. This decides the queſtion, whe- " ther intereſt be lawful, that is, whether " the creditor can ſell time, and the debtor " buy it."

Let us ſee how the Critic reaſons on this laſt paſſage, which refers only to the Law of Flaccus, and to the political diſpoſitions of the Romans. The Author, ſays he, on reſuming all he had ſaid on uſury, maintains that a creditor is permitted to ſell time. The Critic here ſeems to inſinuate, that the Author had been writing a treatiſe on theology, or Canon Law, and that he had at length reſumed it; tho' it is evident that he is only treating of the political regulations of the Romans; of a Law of Flaccus, and the opinion of Paterculus: ſo that this Law of Flaccus, Paterculus's opinion, the reflexion of Ulpian, and that of the Author, are cloſely connected, and cannot be ſeparated from each other.

I HAVE ſtill many things to ſay; but I chuſe rather to refer the reader to the pieces themſelves. *Believe me, my dear Piſo, they have formed a work which, like the dreams of the ſick, exhibit nothing but vain phantoms* *.

* Credite, Piſones, iſti tabulæ fore librum
Perſimilem, cujus, velut ægri ſomnia, vanæ
Fingentur ſpecies.

HORAT. *de Arte Poetica.*

A DEFENCE OF The SPIRIT of LAWS.

PART III.

WE have ſeen in the two firſt parts, all that reſults from ſo many bitter criticiſms is, That the Author of The Spirit of Laws has not performed his work according to the plan and views of his Critics; and that if his Critics had wrote a work on the ſame ſubject, they would have thrown in a great many things which they know. It alſo follows from thence, that they are divines, and that the Author is a civilian; that they think themſelves qualified to do his buſineſs, and that he has not the preſumption to believe himſelf fit for theirs. In fine, it follows from thence, that, inſtead of attacking him with ſuch

ſuch acrimony, they had better have made themſelves ſenſible of the value of what he has ſaid in favour of religion, which he has with equal ardour reſpected and defended. I ſhall now make ſome reflexions.

THAT manner of reaſoning is not good, which, being employed againſt any good book whatſoever, may make it appear as bad as any bad book whatſoever; and which, being uſed againſt any bad book whatſoever, may make it appear as good as any good book whatſoever.

THAT manner of reaſoning is not juſt which, to the ſubject in debate, calls in others that have no relation to it, and confounds the ſeveral ſciences, and the ideas belonging to each.

WE ought not to diſpute, on a work wrote on any of the ſciences, with reaſons that may attack the ſcience itſelf.

WHEN a perſon writes a criticiſm on a work, and on a work of conſiderable extent and importance, he ought to endeavour to procure a particular knowledge of the ſcience which is the ſubject of that work, and carefully to read the approved authors who have already

already wrote upon it; in order to ſee, whether the Author has deviated from the uſual received manner of treating the ſubject.

When an Author explains himſelf by word of mouth, or by his writings, which are the images of thoſe words, it is contrary to reaſon to quit the exterior ſigns of his thoughts, to run in ſearch of his thoughts themſelves; becauſe none but himſelf is capable of knowing his thoughts. It is much worſe, when his thoughts are good, and bad ones are attributed to him.

When a perſon writes againſt an Author, and becomes exaſperated againſt him, he ought to prove the character he gives him by what he ſays, and not what he ſays by the character he gives him.

When we ſee that an author's intention is in general good, we ſhall be ſeldomer miſtaken if, in certain places which we think equivocal, we judge according to the general intention, than if we allow him a particular bad intention.

In books wrote for amuſement, three or four pages give an idea of the ſtyle, and the charms

charms of the work: but, in books of reaſoning, we retain nothing if we do not retain the whole chain.

As it is very difficult to write a good work, and very eaſy to write a critic upon it, becauſe the Author has all his defiles to guard, and the Critic has only one of them to force; the latter ought not to fail: but if it happens that he has continually failed, he muſt be inexcuſable.

Besides, as the Critic may be chargeable with an oſtentation of his ſuperiority over others, and as the uſual effect of the criticiſm is giving ſome delicious moments to human pride; thoſe who give themſelves up to it deſerve to be treated with ſtrict juſtice, but very ſeldom with indulgence.

And as, of all the different kinds of writing, it is that in which it is moſt difficult to ſhew a good temper, we ought to take care not to increaſe, by the bitterneſs of words, this unhappineſs in the ſubject.

When we write on grand and noble ſubjects, it is not ſufficient for us to conſult our

 zeal;

zeal; we ought alſo to conſult our abilities, and if heaven has not bleſſed us with great talents, we may ſupply the want of them by diſtruſt of ourſelves, exactneſs, labour, and reflexion.

THE art of finding, in what has naturally a good ſenſe, all the bad ſenſes which a perſon by falſe reaſoning is capable of giving it, is of no uſe to mankind; and thoſe who practiſe it are like the ravens that fly from living bodies, and hover on all ſides in ſearch of carcaſes.

A LIKE manner of criticizing produces two grand inconveniences. The firſt is, That it hurts the mind of the reader, by exhibiting a mixture of truth and falſhood, of good and evil: he is accuſtomed to ſeek for a bad ſenſe in things that have naturally a good one; whence he is eaſily led to the diſpoſition of ſearching for a good ſenſe in things that have naturally a bad one: it thus makes him loſe the faculty of reaſoning juſtly, and throws him into all the ſubtilties of a falſe logic. The ſecond inconvenience is, That, in rendering, by this manner of reaſoning, good books ſuſpected, we have no arms left with which we can attack thoſe that are bad: ſo that the public

lic has no rule whereby to diſtinguiſh them. If thoſe are treated as Spinoſiſts and Deiſts who are not, what ſhall be ſaid to thoſe who are?

THOUGH we ought readily to think, that thoſe who write againſt us on ſubjects in which all mankind are intereſted, are prompted to do this only by the impulſes of chriſtian charity; yet, as it is the nature of that virtue rarely to conceal itſelf, as it will ſhine in ſpite of ourſelves, and ſparkle and blaze on all ſides, if it happens that, in two pieces wrote one after another againſt the ſame perſon, no trace can be found of that amiable virtue, that it does not appear in any phraſe, in any turn, in any word, or expreſſion, he who has written ſuch works muſt have juſt cauſe to fear that he was not led to it by chriſtian charity.

AND as virtues merely human are, in us, the effect of what is called a good diſpoſition; if it be impoſſible to diſcover any veſtige of this good diſpoſition, the public may conclude from thence, that theſe pieces are not even the effect of the human virtues.

In the judgment of mankind, it is eaſier to ſee the actions, than to be convinced of the ſincerity of the motives; and it is more eaſy to believe, that the action of uttering atrocious abuſe is an evil, than it is to be perſuaded, that the motive which prompted to it is good.

When a man is fixed in a ſtate intended to render religion reſpected, and which religion itſelf renders reſpectable, and attacks before the men of the world one of that body, it is eſſentially neceſſary that he ſhould maintain, by his manner of acting, the ſuperiority of his character. The world is very corrupt: but there are certain paſſions found there that are kept under great reſtraint; becauſe there are others more favoured that forbid their appearance. Conſider the men of the world in their behaviour to each other; there is nothing ſo timid; pride durſt not reveal its ſecrets, and, in the regard it has for others, it quits itſelf only to gain new ſtrength. Chriſtianity gives us the habit of ſubduing this pride; the world gives us the habit of concealing it. With the little virtue we have, what would become of us, if our whole ſouls were ſet at liberty, and if we were not attentive to the leaſt word, to the

the leaſt ſigns, the leaſt geſtures? Now when men, venerable and reſpectable by their characters, ſhew paſſions which the men of the world durſt not ſuffer to break out to public view, theſe begin to think themſelves better than they really are; and this is a great evil.

We men of the world are alſo ſo weak, that we ought to be treated with the utmoſt care and precaution. Therefore when a prieſt lets us ſee all the external marks of violent paſſions, what would he have us think of what paſſes within his breaſt? Can he hope that we, raſh as we are in judging, will not judge accordingly?

It is obſervable that, in the converſations and diſputes of men of a harſh and obſtinate temper, as they ſtrive not to inform and aſſiſt each other, but to obtain a victory, they fly from truth, not in proportion to the greatneſs or littleneſs of their minds, but according to the greater or leſs caprice and inflexibility of their diſpoſitions. The contrary happens to thoſe to whom nature or education has given candour and ingenuity. As their diſputes are mutual ſuccours, they have the ſame object in view; they think differently only that they

may think alike, and find and acknowledge the force of truth in proportion to the ſtrength of evidence: this is the reward of a good diſpoſition.

When a man writes on religious ſubjects, he ought not to depend ſo much on the credulity of thoſe who read, as to ſay things contrary to good ſenſe; becauſe, by increaſing his credit with thoſe who have more piety than underſtanding, he loſes his credit with others who have more underſtanding than piety.

And as religion beſt defends itſelf, it ſuffers greater prejudice by being badly defended, than if it was not defended at all.

If it ſhould happen that a man, after having loſt his readers, ſhould attack a perſon of ſome reputation, and thus obtain the means of being read; one might ſuſpect that, under the pretence of ſacrificing this victim to religion, he ſacrificed him to his own ſelf-love.

The manner of criticiſing of which we are treating, is the only thing in the world moſt capable of limiting the extent, and diminiſhing, if I may uſe the term, the ſum total of national

genius. Theology has its bounds and its forms; becauſe, the truths it teaches being known, men are not allowed to deviate from them. Here then genius cannot take her flight, ſhe being in a manner circumſcribed in a circle. But, to pretend to place the ſame incloſure about thoſe who treat of human ſciences, is mocking the world. The principles of geometry are very true; but if we apply them to things of taſte, we ſhall make reaſon itſelf talk unreaſonably. Nothing ſtifles knowledge more, than covering every thing with a doctor's robe; and the men who would be for ever teaching, are great hindrances to learning. There is no genius that is not contracted by being enveloped by a million of vain ſcruples. Have you the beſt intention in the world, they will force you yourſelf to doubt of it. You can no longer employ your endeavour to ſpeak or write with propriety, when you are perplexed with the fear of expreſſing yourſelf ill; and when, inſtead of purſuing your thought, you are only buſied about chuſing ſuch terms as may eſcape the ſubtilty of the critics. They come to put a biggin on your head, each ſaying at every word, Take care of falling; you would ſpeak like yourſelf, but I would have you ſpeak like me. Do

you endeavour to ſoar aloft? they ſtop you by pulling your ſleeve. Have you life and ſtrength? they deprive you of it in an inſtant. Do you riſe a little? they take their rule, and, lifting up their heads, call you to come down that they may meaſure you. Do you run your courſe? they would have you examine all the ſtones the ants have thrown up in your way. No ſcience nor literature is proof againſt this pedantry. The preſent age has formed academies; but they would make us re-enter the ſchools of the darker ages. Deſcartes, however, may give aſſurance to thoſe who, with a genius infinitely beneath his, have the ſame good intentions. That great man was inceſſantly charged with atheiſm; and yet there are not now employed againſt the Atheiſts ſtronger arguments than his.

We ought to regard criticiſms as perſonal only, in the caſes where thoſe who made them have been willing to render them ſo. It is certainly very allowable to criticize the works preſented to the public; becauſe it would be ridiculous for thoſe who are willing to inlighten others, to be averſe to be inlightened themſelves. Thoſe who give us information are the companions of our labours. If the

Critic

Critic and the Author are both in ſearch of truth, they have the ſame intereſt; for truth is a bleſſing deſigned for all mankind: they are then confederates, and not enemies,

It is with great pleaſure that I now lay down the pen. I ſhould have continued to have kept ſilence, if, in keeping it, many perſons had not concluded that I had been reduced to it.

SOME EXPLANATIONS OF The SPIRIT of LAWS.

I.

SOME perſons have made this objection: In The Spirit of Laws, honour or fear, and not virtue, is repreſented as the principle upon which certain governments are founded, and virtue is repreſented as the principle of only a few others: whence it follows, that the chriſtian virtues are not required in moſt governments.

To this it is anſwered, that the Author has placed this note in the fifth chapter of the third book: "I ſpeak here of political virtue, "which is a moral virtue as directed to the "general advantage; very little of private mo-"ral virtue, and not at all of that virtue which "has a relation to revealed truths." In the following

following chapter is another note that refers to this, and to the ſecond and third chapters of the fifth book. This virtue the Author has defined *the love of our country*; and the love of our country he has defined *the love of equality and frugality*. The whole fifth book reſts on theſe principles. When a writer has defined a word in his work, when he has given, if I may uſe the expreſſion, his dictionary, ought not his words to be underſtood according to the ſignification he has given them?

The word virtue, like moſt of the words in all languages, is taken in ſeveral acceptations: ſometimes it ſignifies the chriſtian virtues; ſometimes the pagan virtues; and often, a certain chriſtian virtue, or a particular pagan virtue; it likewiſe ſometimes ſignifies fortitude; and in ſome languages it means a certain capacity for an art, or for certain arts. It is what precedes, or what follows the word, that fixes its ſignification: but here the Author has done more—he has ſeveral times given his definition. This objection has therefore been only made on account of the work being read with too much rapidity.

II. The

II.

THE Author has ſaid in the third chapter of the ſecond book, "The beſt ariſto-"cracy is that in which the part of the people "who have no ſhare in the legiſlature is ſo "ſmall and inconſiderable, that the governing "party have no intereſt in oppreſſing them. "Thus, when Antipater made a Law at "Athens, that whoſoever was not worth two "thouſand drachms ſhould be excluded from "the right of ſuffrage *, he formed by this "means the beſt ariſtocracy poſſible; becauſe "this was ſo ſmall a ſum, that it excluded "very few, and not one of any rank or conſi-"deration in the city. Ariſtocratical families "ought therefore, as much as poſſible, to level "themſelves in appearance with the people. "The more an ariſtocracy borders on demo-"cracy, the nearer it approaches to perfection; "and it is the more imperfect, in proportion as "it draws towards monarchy."

IN a letter inſerted in the *Journal de Travaux* for the month of April 1749, this quo-

* Diodorus, lib. xviii. p. 601. Rhodoman's edition.

tation

tation is objected againſt the Author. The writer ſays, that he has open before him the place quoted, and there finds, that there were only nine thouſand perſons who had the ſum preſcribed by Antipater; and that there were twenty two thouſand who wanted it: whence it is concluded that the Author has miſapplied his quotations, the ſmall number having the ſum required, and the large number being excluded for the want of it.

ANSWER.

It were to be wiſhed, that he who has made this critical remark had paid greater attention to what both the Author and Diodorus have ſaid.

1. There were not twenty two thouſand who wanted this ſum in Antipater's republic. The twenty two thouſand perſons mentioned by Diodorus were ſent away and eſtabliſhed in Thrace; and there only remained to form this republic, the nine thouſand citizens who had the ſum, and thoſe of the lower people who would not ſet out for Thrace. The reader may conſult Diodorus.

2. Tho'

2. THO' there had remained twenty two thouſand perſons at Athens, who wanted the above ſum, the objection would not be the leſs unjuſt. The words *great* and *ſmall* are relative. Nine thouſand Sovereigns in a ſtate are an immenſe number; and twenty two thouſand ſubjects in the ſame ſtate, is a number extremely ſmall.

FINIS.

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